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 This dissertation is concerned with the social impact, and meaning of political 
conservatism for secular and theological political projects that seek to empower the 
disenfranchised and address ongoing social inequality along the lines of race, class, and 
gender.  My thesis is that progressive political projects, both secular and theological, have 
been eclipsed by political conservatism and, if they are to remain viable, they must 
undergo internal criticism and reformulation. This dissertation addresses these concerns 
on three levels: first, it treats the eclipse of progressive politics by political conservatism; 
second, it offers a theological interpretation of this eclipse; and lastly, it identifies a 
theological resource for the reconstruction of progressive politics and political theology 
in the 21st century. Prominent in this dissertation is the social impact of political 
conservatism, over that last two decades, and the movement to end affirmative action in 
the United States. In my estimation, these forces symbolize the eclipse of progressive 
politics in America.  
In identifying the kind of progressive politics that has been eclipsed by political 
conservatism, I turn to the political philosophy of Cornel West. In my view, West’s 
political philosophy, prophetic pragmatism, represents the kind of progressive politics 
that is no longer influential in the United States. In making sense of why progressive 
politics is no longer influential, I turn to the Christian realism of Reinhold Niebuhr. 
Niebuhr’s reflections on history, liberalism and radicalism are insightful for interpreting 
the eclipse of progressive politics. In an effort to reform progressive politics and political 
theology, I turn to the theological legacy Benjamin Elijah Mays. Mays was a mid-
twentieth century African American public theologian, who forwarded a theological 
perspective that placed a premium on democratic theological and political discourse and 
promoted education, as a strategy for social transformation. His theological legacy is a 
resource for progressive politics and political theology today. In the end, I build on the 
concerns drawn from my treatment of West, and the insights drawn from my treatment of 
Niebuhr and Mays, and make recommendations for the reconstruction of progressive 
politics and political theology in the 21st century.  
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CHAPTER I  
 
POLITICAL CONSERVATISM AND THE ECLIPSE OF PROGRESSIVE 
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
  
In January of 2003, the cover story for the weekly edition of Newsweek Magazine, 
dated January 27, 2003, signaled what I consider a sign of changed times.1 The title of the 
cover story was posed in the form of a question: “Do We Still Need Affirmative Action?” 
It was published in the aftermath of President George W. Bush’s public criticism of the 
practice of affirmative action at the University of Michigan. At the time of his criticism, 
the legality of Michigan’s affirmative action policies, in relation to its undergraduate and 
law school programs, was being contested and awaited hearing in the United States 
Supreme Court. The Newsweek story and the criticisms of George W. Bush reflected a 
shift in the political mood of the United States. In my estimation, it reflected the eclipse 
of progressive politics in the United States. 
 The response of George W. Bush reflected the impact of a decade- long movement 
to eliminate affirmative action policies in higher education. 2 The movement against 
affirmative action in higher education stems back to the 1970s when many public and 
                                                                 
1 Newsweek Magazine, 27 January 2003, dedicated a series of articles to the affirmative action debate in the 
United States. The articles were primarily concerned with affirmative action and higher education and its 
opposition by political conservatives. See “Spinning Race” by Howard Fineman and Tamara Lipper and 
“What’s At Stake” by Barbara Kantrowitz and Pat Wingert.  
2 There is a wide body of literature on the affirmative action debate in the United States. One exhaustive 
treatment of the affirmative action debate, particularly where higher education is concerned, is a recent text 
by legal scholar Carol Swain, The New White Nationalism In America: Its Challenge to Integration 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Also, see Lydia Chavez’s The Color Bind: California’s 
Battle to End Affirmative Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). In recent years the state 
of California has led the crusade against affirmative action. It was the first state to eliminate affirmative 
action in its public university system, thus inspiring states such as Florida and Texas to follow suit. 
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private universities, receiving federal funding, incorporated the practice into their 
admissions procedures. Yet it was not until the early 1990s that the movement made 
serious inroads into the public sphere. Its first victory was scored in 1996 when 
California voted in support of a proposition (206) that called for the elimination racial 
preferences in admission to state universities and in employment in state supported 
institutions. Shortly thereafter, both the states of Texas (Where George W. Bush once 
served as Governor) and Florida (Where the brother of the George W. Bush serves as 
Governor) followed suit in eliminating race as consideration for admission to state 
universities. Based on the successes of this movement, the intensifying debate 
surrounding Affirmative Action, and the impact of political conservatism in America, I 
contend that we have witnessed the eclipse of progressive politics in the United States. 
The dominance political conservatism in American life and the intensifying debate over 
affirmative action is one major symbol of this eclipse. 
 In this dissertation, I argue that in these early days of the 21st century America, 
political conservatism limits politically progressive efforts toward social transformation. 
The politically progressive efforts I have in mind are those that are represented by 
progressive liberals and the political left who seek to overcome social inequities along the 
lines of race, class and gender.3 In this dissertation, I seek to map out the manner in 
which this occurs and maintain that the ongoing debate regarding affirmative action is 
symbolic of the limits tha t are now placed upon progressive politics in the United States. 
In the end, I argue that political conservatism is a politics of merit and privilege, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Chavez’s text is illuminating regarding affirmative action in California and insightful for understanding the 
affirmative action debate during the 1990s.       
3 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term, “progressive politics,” as an umbrella term for political 
liberals and leftists.  
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evades the challenge of realizing a pluralistic democracy in the United States. In this 
regard, it is a challenge to   progressive democratic social transformation. In dealing with 
political conservatism, it is important to understand both the dimensions of conservative 
thought as well as the rise of conservatism in contemporary America. Furthermore, it is 
important to note the far reaching effects of political conservatism. In this vein, it is 
important to note that political conservatism is not limited to one particular racial or 
ethnic group. In the United States today, political conservatism is found among African 
Americans, Latino/a’s, women and white males.   
 My study of political conservatism in America begins with an investigation of the 
rise and influence of political conservatism in the United States. The concerns of this 
chapter provide a platform for discussing the diminished influence of progressive politics, 
particularly post-1960s liberal progressivism and left-wing radicalism. 4 In chapter two, I 
turn to the political philosophy of Cornel West. In my estimation, West’s political 
philosophy, prophetic pragmatism, represents the brand of progressive politics that has 
been eclipsed in the United States. In chapter three, I turn to Reinhold Niebuhr, whose 
Christian realism is insightful for interpreting the eclipse of progressive politics in 
America. In this regard, there are striking parallels between the dilemmas faced by 
progressives of Niebuhr’s era and the dilemmas faced by liberal progressives and left-
wing radicals in ours. In chapters four and five, I turn to the theological legacy of 
Benjamin Elijah Mays. Mays is a neglected figure in American theological and social 
thought whose career as a public theologian, college administrator and social activist is 
insightful for our conservative age. With a theological and political outlook that takes 
                                                                 
4 Of equal concern to me is the viability of theologies of liberation, whose social goals are indicted by the 
social agenda of political conservatism.  
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democracy seriously and a commendation of education as the practice of democracy, 
Mays’s legacy offers insights for our conservative age. In chapter six, I conclude this 
dissertation by offering recommendations for the reconstruction of progressive politics 
and political theology in our time. Having stated the ends of this dissertation, I will now 
attend to the stronghold of conservatism in the United States.  
 
The Impact of Political Conservatism in Contemporary America 
 The movement against affirmative action and its successes is just one facet of the 
impact of conservative political ideology in the United States in the last two decades.5 
Since the early 1980s conservative political ideology has impacted an entire spectrum of 
public policy issues ranging from welfare spending and crime and punishment to 
healthcare and income taxes. Conservative political ideology has unsettled the social and 
political liberalism that formed the New Deal/Great Society policies that spanned four 
decades. The political liberalism of the New Deal/ Great society era helped give birth to 
social security, the G.I. Bill, social legislation to fight poverty, the civil rights 
establishment, feminism and the counter-culture movements of the 1970s that sought to 
redefine the social and political landscape of the United States. Before outlining the 
impact of conservative ideology, it is important to define conservatism. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
5 For an exhaustive treatment of the impact of political conservatism on public policy over the last twenty 
years see Y. H. Clarence and Michael Shwartz’s Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda (Malden, 
Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1998). Also see Lee Edwards’ The Conservative Revolution: The Movement 
that Remade America (New York, New York: The Free Press, 1999).      
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The Idea of Conservatism 
 For a definition of conservatism I turn conservative historian and theorist Russell 
Kirk, whose two-volume work on conservatism, The Conservative Mind, is held in 
conservative circles as the bible of conservative thought. Here a definition of 
conservatism is provided as well as a delineation of six tenets of conservatism. According 
to Kirk, “the essence of social conservatism is preservation of the ancient moral traditions 
of humanity. Conservatives respect the wisdom of their ancestors.” He goes on to say 
about conservatives, “They think society is a spiritual reality, possessing an eternal life 
but a delicate constitution: it cannot be scrapped and recast as if it were a machine.” 6 
 Following his working definition of conservatism, is what Kirk terms six canons 
of conservative thought. The first canon is the conviction that political problems are 
essentially religious and moral problems. This canon maintains that society should be 
ordered and governed by a divine and eternal understanding of right and duty. The 
second canon is an affirmation of traditional life. This canon maintains that 
egalitarianism and utilitarianism, in regard to social arrangements, are more harmful than 
beneficial to society. The third canon is the “Conviction that civilized society requires 
orders and classes. The only true equality is moral equality; all attempts at leveling lead 
to despair, if enforced by positive legislation.” The fourth canon is the conviction that 
economic leveling is not economic progress. This canon maintains that freedom is 
connected to property ownership, that once private property is erased so too is liberty. 
The fifth canon is concerned with anthropology. This canon maintains that human 
                                                                 
6 Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Elliot (Chicago and Washington, DC: Regenery 
Books, 1986), 7-8.  This text is volume one of a two-volume work on the conservative mind. The second 
volume is The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana. These texts were produced in the aftermath 
of World War II and were quite influential among libertarians who were hostile to the then continuing 
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impulse and emotion must be regulated by tradition. For the conservative, “Tradition and 
sound prejudice provide checks upon man’s anarchic impulse.” The sixth and final canon 
is an affirmation of gradualism as a means of social change. This canon maintains that 
“change and reform are not identical, and that innovation is a devouring conflagration 
more often than it is a torch of progress.” If society is to change, change must be 
congruent with its conservation. Essentially, society must change slowly. 7  
Kirk’s definition of conservatism and the six canons of conservative thought outlined 
above, represent in my view, the backbone of conservative ideology in the United States. 
To take it a step further, I call it the Conservative Version of the American dream. What 
does this mean? Politically, it means minimal government intervention in the lives of 
ordinary citizens, in promotion of individual rights. Economically, it means the right to 
property ownership, free enterprise and unregulated market competition. Religiously, it 
means the conservation and promotion of America’s Christian heritage, which equates to 
the conservation and promotion of traditional values related to family, sex and work. 
Overall, its most potent theme is the unrestrained capacity of individuals, rooted in the 
protestant ethic, to achieve the American dream. Individuals may achieve the American 
dream beyond the limits of social, historical and biological forces related to race, gender 
and class background.     
  Conservatism stands in stark contrast to progressivism or what conservatives such as 
Kirk call radicalism. For conservatives, progressivism or radicalism is a wholesale 
alteration of tradition, an opponent of minimal government, resistant to individualism, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
legacy of New Deal liberalism. Along with William F. Buckley, Kirk became one of the leading ideologues 
of the then emerging conservative movement.       
7 Ibid. 
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anti-Christian and committed to socialist economics.8 Progressivism, for conservatives, 
leads to anarchy and incivility. The social explosions that occurred in the United States 
between 1960 and the mid 1970s, i.e., the civil rights, peace, women’s and counter-
cultural movements, represent the vices of progressivism, which conservatives oppose. 
Contemporary political conservatism upholds the belief that such movements produced 
anarchic consequences for American society. Political conservatives point to the rise in 
crime, out of wedlock births, a decadent popular culture and unstable institutions such as 
the family and public schools during the 1980s and 1990s as the result of the social unrest 
of prior decades.  Hence, conservatives seek to overcome the effects of a progressive era 
by re- instituting those traditional social arrangements and social beliefs that were 
unsettled over a generation ago. 
 For more than a generation, political conservatives and liberal and left-wing 
progressives have competed for the allegiance of the American public. However, the 
former is more prominent and influential today than the latter. James Davidson Hunter 
attests to the struggle between conservatism and progressivism in his book, Culture 
Wars: The Struggle to Define America.9 Here he makes a distinction between what he 
calls the orthodox, those who want to preserve the tried and tested, or, tradition, and 
progressives, those who seek to go beyond traditional arrangements. Hunter maintains 
that the tensions between the two are played out in a plethora of arenas, from politics and 
education, to debates about the family and debates about the arts. Hunter also maintains 
                                                                 
8 Ibid., Kirk’s outline of conservatism is laid out adjacent to an outline of progressivism, which he terms 
radicalism. For Kirk, Marx inspired socialism is the nemesis of the tenets of the economic and political 
tenets of conservative thought. It undermines the focus on individuals, tradition and markets that are vital to 
conservative thought.  Overall, Kirk’s definition of conservatism is defined against radicalism.     
9 See the chapter entitled “Competing Moral Visions” in James Davidson Hunter’s, Culture Wars: The 
Struggle to Define America (New York, New York: Basic Books, 1991), 107-132. This chapter gives a 
historical account of the conservative- progressive divide in the United States.      
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that the tension between conservatism and progressivism is one that has recurred 
throughout American history, and that the dichotomy between the two is not always 
sharp; on each side of the conservative/progressive divide there are those who mediate 
between the two. However, as general tendencies in American history and society, 
conservatism and progressivism each seek to define what America ought to be. 
 
The Conservative Takeover: A Brief Historical Sketch 
Given the history of struggle between conservatism and progressivism, one must ask 
the question, How did political conservatism dismantle the impact of liberal and left-wing 
progressivism in our recent history and become the dominant political ideology of our 
society? In A Time for Choosing: The Rise of Modern American Conservatism, Jonathan 
M. Schoenwald, a historian of conservatism in the United States, points to the post WWII 
era as a marker for tracing the seeds of contemporary conservatism. During the Post 
WWII America, conservatives sought to redefine an America that continued to feel the 
effects of New Deal liberalism born under the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
and continued under the presidency of Harry Truman. According to Schoenwald, it was 
the legacy of the New Deal coupled with the Cold War that birthed contemporary 
conservatism in America.   
The decade between 1945 and 1955 was a pastiche of events that, when seen 
by conservatives, comprised a bleak picture: American influence abroad 
seemed to crumble before policymakers’ eyes, and at home “un-American” 
activities and troubles multiplied with each new controversy. With end of 
World War II and the beginning of the Cold War most Americans hoped to 
regain stability and predictability in their lives. For the previous sixteen years 
normalcy had been rare, upstaged by the depression, a new activist 
government that created a welfare state, and finally entry into World War II, 
ending a twenty-year period of unwavering isolationism. When the less-than-
mythical Harry S. Truman replaced Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1945, 
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Americans came to realize that the postwar world would not be joined 
seamlessly to what had come before.10 
 
Dissatisfied with the domestic policy legacy of Roosevelt and Truman, and 
America’s posture toward the Cold War, conservatives began organizing around ideas 
and issues that would challenge the political liberalism of prior decades. Interestingly, the 
conservatism of that era fell under the umbrellas of libertarianism, traditionalism and 
anti-communism. Each represented distinct forms of conservative thinking that up until 
that time were disconnected. Furthermore, there was no formal conservative ideology that 
drove a conservative political agenda. In time, however, the various strains of 
conservatism would join forces, though not without problems, and a formal ideology 
would be codified that represented the conservative mind in America. As far as ideology 
was concerned, persons such Russell Kirk and William F. Buckley would lead the 
ideological development of conservatism. What served conservatives well in their 
pioneering efforts, was their political organization and their organizing outside of the 
political arena. Such organizing would be key to their future success. In building an 
ideology, agenda and public influence, conservatives did not limit their efforts to politics. 
Journals, newspapers, Christian media foundations, grass-root organizations along with 
electoral politics were their means of gaining public influence.  
 Though conservatives pursued a two-pronged approach in building a movement 
they remained marginal in American politics during the postwar period and throughout 
most of the 1960s. To be sure, the voice of political conservatism was heard even as the 
                                                                 
10 Jonathan Shoenwald. A Time for Choosing: The Rise of Modern Conservatism (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 22. Beyond Schoenwald there are other histories of modern conservatism 
that are helpful in understanding the development and political successes of modern conservatism; there is 
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nation went through the liberal administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. 
Johnson. In fact, it was through failed attempts at gaining public office during this period 
that conservatives would refine their strategies and political message and identify their 
core audience, which would prove advantageous in the next decade. One significant yet 
failed conservative attempt at gaining public office was the 1964 presidential campaign 
of Barry Goldwater. Barry Goldwater’s bid for the presidency and defeat in 1964 brought 
together polarizing forces within the Republican Party enabling far right and liberal 
conservatives to identify a common agenda as well as ideological differences. 
Goldwater’s candidacy brought together conservatives from different walks of life and 
different parts of the country. Southern and mid-western blue-collar conservatives joined 
forces with white-collar conservatives from the west and east coasts. Along these lines, a 
conservative New York based intellectual such as William F. Buckley rallied behind the 
far right extremism of Arizona’s Goldwater. Interestingly, it was the far right extremism 
of Goldwater and that within the Republican Party that would not only drive away most 
American voters but also energize the conservative movement in the United States. 
Goldwater’s defeat allowed conservatives to see, demographically, the appeal of 
conservative ideology. Also, it allowed moderate and liberal conservatives to see the 
limits of ideology in gaining public influence. As a result, conservatives would increase 
their efforts at gaining public influence outside of the political arena.         
 By the end of the 1960s, the social and political climate of the United States 
would become political fodder for conservatives against liberals and the New Left, and 
would set the stage for their greatest successes in the next two decades. The civil rights, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
The Conservative Revolution, mentioned earlier and William C. Berman’s America’s Right Turn: From 
Nixon to Clinton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1998).       
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Black Power and the Vietnam War movements, coupled with the tragedy of the 1968 
Democratic National Convention in Chicago and riots across America after the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., signaled for conservatives, the failure of a 
liberal social order. For political conservatives, social order in American was being 
jeopardized due to three decades of political liberalism and the radicalism of the then 
New Left.  Aided by heightened public concerns about social stability and order and 
diminished confidence in the Democratic Party, conservatives seized the moment making 
possible the election of Republican candidate Richard Nixon to the presidency in 1968.   
 By the time Nixon became president in 1968 the conservative movement had 
expanded significantly and became more sophisticated in articulating its ideology. The 
extreme tendencies within the movement, represented by the Goldwater campaign, were 
toned down. By the late 1960s less ideological and more public and media friendly 
conservatives, like then California Governor Ronald Reagan, represented the future of 
conservatism in the United States. Richard Nixon also represented this mold and his 
election to office represented the hope of conservatives. For most conservatives, Nixon’s 
entrance into the White House would bring an end to the New Deal/Great Society 
liberalism that was influential since the days of Franklin Roosevelt. For many 
conservatives, Nixon would end political concessions made to African Americans, end 
protests against the Vietnam War, end welfare and bring order and stability to American 
life. Interestingly, many within the Republican Party viewed Nixon as a moderate 
conservative whose commitment to carrying out conservative principles was 
questionable. Needless to say, Nixon’s election represented a major ideological turn in 
American politics and his re-election four years later would not only incite one of the 
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biggest scandals in American political history but present new challenges to 
conservatives. Despite the failures of the Nixon administrations, the mid 1970s became 
the launching pad for conservative rule in the subsequent decade. The economic and 
social crises of the mid-1970s, coupled with the weak administration of Jimmy Carter, set 
the stage for what would become a turning point in the nature of American government 
for the next twenty-years. A new stage was set for the future of American politics with 
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.      
The dawning of the Reagan era in U.S. politics marked the beginning of the end of 
New Deal/Great Society era and its influence on the social and political landscape of the 
United States. The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency was the capstone of a 
revival of conservatism in American life. A defining characteristic of Reagan styled 
conservatism was Reaganomics or the Reagan doctrine. It was the belief in the power of 
the market to address America’s economic and social problems. The Reagan doctrine 
changed the course of American social policy for the next two decades. The appeal of the 
Reagan doctrine was far reaching. For it found support among evangelical Christian 
groups that would later become known as the Christian Right. It also found supporters 
among ex- liberals, ex-leftists and young republicans who would later bear the title of 
neo-conservatives. The Reagan era had far reaching effects, to the extent that the two-
term presidency of Democrat William Jefferson Clinton was made possible due in part to 
concessions he made to a highly influential conservative constituency, both within and 
outside of the White House.  
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Toward An American Meritocracy: The Political End of Conservatism 
In my reading of contemporary political conservatism the fundamental goal of 
conservative political action is the formation of an American meritocracy where 
competition and individualism flourishes. The American dream, according to 
conservatives, is based on individual achievements, that are the fruits of competition and 
merit. And for conservatives, the flourishing of individuals occurs when there is minimal 
or no government interference, in relation to the individual interests of its citizens. The 
focus on individuals and merit is fundamental to criticisms of affirmative action policies. 
Consider two writers, Carol Swain and Dinesh D’Souza, who discuss this issue in 
relation to affirmative action. I will quote both at length. In The New White Nationalism 
Swain says the following:  
Critics of affirmative action charge that policies of racial, ethnic and gender 
preference are contrary to core American values regarding fairness, equality, 
and respect for the worth of individuals. These values, they say, find 
expression in our Constitution, which guarantees equal treatment to all 
American citizens as individual persons, not as members of racial, ethnic and 
gender groups. The language of the Fourteenth Amendment and its equal 
protection provision is significant, affirmative action opponents often insist, 
since it speaks only of persons and personal rights.11  
  
Now consider Dinesh D’Souza, a non-white (Indian immigrant) neo-conservative 
opponent of affirmative action. D’Souza extols the virtues of individual rights and merits 
by appealing to the language of Martin Luther King, Jr. and using the world of 
professional sports as an analogy to make his point. In his New York Times bestseller, 
What’s So Great About America, D’Souza says the following:  
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Martin Luther King, Jr. championed the cause of 
merit against that of nepotism and racial favoritism. All we are asking, King 
said, that we be judged on our merits as individuals, based on the content of 
                                                                 
11 Swain, The New White Nationalism, 164.  
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our character and not the color of our skins…Eventually leaders of the United 
States agreed to this. There were strong pockets of resistance, especially in 
the South, but the heroic persistence of King and his supporters was 
vindicated…Merit became the operating standard just as King demanded. 
King fully expected that merit would produce diversity and that equality of 
rights for individuals would lead to equality of results for groups.12  
 
D’Souza then makes a turn in his thought in a later passage,  
It has been a generation since King’s death, and we now see that King’s 
premise was false. Equality of rights for individuals has not led to equality of 
results for groups. Merit, like racism, produces inequality. And inequalities 
produced by merit are far more justifiable than inequalities produced by 
favoritism or racism. Consider the example of the National Basketball 
Association. African Americans are 12 percent of the population but more 
than 75 percent of NBA players. Why then do we not hear demands for more 
Jews and Asians to be represented on the courts? Presumably because it is 
merit that is producing this racially proportionate result. If coaches are 
picking the best dribblers and passers and shooters, then who cares if one 
group has more players and another has less?.. If this seems like a sensible 
approach, it should also be applied to universities, and corporations, and 
government jobs.13  
 
Conservative ideologues are concerned with the formation of an American 
meritocracy. In such a meritocracy, individual rights, not group rights or group 
entitlements are encouraged. Overall, the conservative focus on individualism, 
competition and merit is a challenge to social entitlements, particularly group  
entitlements based on race, gender and class. As I stated earlier in this chapter, 
conservative politics in America today seeks to undo the impact of progressive politics 
since the 1960s. One feature of post 1960s progressive politics is its focus on 
                                                                 
12 Dinesh D’Souza. What’s So Great About America (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 122. 
This text is a recent version of what I term the conservative version of the American dream. Written from 
the perspective of an Indian immigrant who has become successful in the United States, it extols the virtues 
of individualism and merit. D’Souza appeals to the story of the successful immigrant to criticize the stories 
of native-born minorities that make claims of racial victimization. Further it is an apologetic for 
conservatism and a denunciation of multiculturalism or pluralism. For D’Souza, America is the greatest 
nation on earth affording people from all over the world equal opportunities. In his reading of African 
American claims to racial victimization, lack of initiative and underachievement, not racism is responsible 
for the relative state of black progress.       
13Ibid. 
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disenfranchised minority groups and the need for re-distributive justice in relation to such 
groups. From the 1960s until the dawning of the conservative era, the idea of re-
distributive justice influenced American social policy. However, conservatives have 
unsettled such social policy. One way of accomplishing this has been the countering of 
social policies and decision making which accommodates minorities. For conservatives, 
the provisions that were made for minorities by way of social policy had reached their 
limits. Conservatives argued that such provisions were costly for whites or non-
minorities. Conservatives argued that entitlements for disenfranchised minorities 
inadvertently discriminated against whites, particularly males. At the same time, minority 
conservatives argued that entitlements for disenfranchised minorities only contributes to 
their stigmatization and does not truly lead to their empowerment. Again, Carol Swain’s 
text sheds light on this issue. The conservative criticism and challenge of affirmative 
action is one example of preference based social policy that has been questioned.  
Perhaps the most telling aspect of the conservative assault on group entitlements 
is its reasoning surrounding the underclass. It is at the level of entitlements for the 
underclass where the conservative values of individualism, competition and merit have 
their most potent effects. For contemporary conservatives, the presence of an underclass 
may be attributed to a population within society that disregards the values of work and 
thrift. For conservatives, lack of individual initiative and the absence of middle class 
values contribute to poverty. In this vein, social programs to remedy poverty proved 
costly and ineffectual among a populace where the values of work, education and saving 
are minimal if not nonexistent. The welfare reforms of the second Clinton administration 
proved to be a major testament to conservative reasoning about the underclass. Overall, 
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political conservatives have been quite successful at convinc ing the American public of 
the costly nature and limits of entitlements for disenfranchised groups within American 
society. The success of conservative ideology largely lies in how it persuaded large 
numbers of Americans of the ineffectiveness of tax-payer funded social programs, 
programs that are perceived as minority entitlements. Again, the focus on competition, 
individualism and merit is key to their success.  
 
The Conservative Children of Disenfranchised Minorities 
 One way to gauge the impact of political conservatism in the United States is to 
map its influence upon minorities. The impact of the conservative focus on individualism, 
competition and merit and its influence, can be measured by the growing presence of 
racial minorities and women among the ranks of conservatives.14 This is significant given 
the historical relationship between liberal progressives and disenfranchised minority 
groups. In this regard, the allies of minority interests have been political liberals and the 
American left. However, the presence of African American, Latino/a and female 
conservatives, has unsettled the influence of political liberals and leftists on each group. 
To be sure, minorities have not abandoned their political allies in droves. However, 
political liberals and the American left cannot claim to be the sole voices of minority 
                                                                 
14 There is a growing body of literature on the phenomena of political conservatism among minority 
groups. This literature includes texts on minority conservatives as well as texts by minority conservatives. 
One insightful text on African American political conservatism is Gayle Tate and Lewis Randolph’s 
Dimensions of Black Conservatism in the United State: Made in America (New York, New York: Palgrave 
Publishers, 2002). This text places contemporary African American conservatism in historical perspective 
as well as illuminate the individual ethos that pervades the thinking of African American conservatives 
such as Clarence Thomas and Shelby Steele. Among texts by minority conservatives are former Oklahoma 
Congressman J.C. Watts’, What Color Is a Conservative?: My Life and My Politics (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2002) and Linda Chavez’s, An Unlikely Conservative: The Transformation of an Ex-liberal, Or, 
How I Became the Most Hated Hispanic in America (New York, New York: Palgrave: Basic Books, 2002). 
These texts suggest that liberalism and progressivism do not have a monopoly on minority interests.     
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interests. Symbols of minority conservatism are found in American politics, from 
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas to National Security Advisor Condolezza Rice, 
from Linda Chavez to former Oklahoma Congressman J.C. Watts. Symbols of minority 
conservatism are also found in the world of higher education, two very prominent 
examples being sociologist Thomas Sowell and English professor Shelby Steele. The 
presence of politically conservative minorities suggests that conservative political 
ideology cannot be limited to race, ethnicity and gender, i.e., white males. Rather, it 
transcends race, ethnicity and gender. 
  
Political Conservatism and Its Implications for Political Theology and 
Progressive Politics in North America 
 
Because ethical and theological reflection is not immune to what happens in the 
political world, it is important to note the implications of political conservatism for 
ethical and theological reflection. The post-1960s progressive politics of political liberals 
and the American left, which contemporary conservatism has disrupted, also has a 
theological counterpart. Since the late 1960s, theologies of liberation have been 
concerned with minority group interests, particularly disenfranchised minorities. Black 
liberation theology, feminist liberation theology, womanist theology, Latino/a liberation 
theology and other theologies of liberation have sought to give voice to the 
disenfranchised in American society. The theologies of James H. Cone, Rosemary 
Radford Ruether, Delores S. Williams, Dwight N. Hopkins, Mary Daley, Beverly 
Harrison, Sharon Welch, Jacquelyn Grant, all claim to represent and articulate the 
subjugation of oppressed minority groups, be they African Americans, women, Latino/a’s 
or the underclass. However, the theological claims of these North American liberation 
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theologians are now subject to the political criticism of conservative ideologues. In other 
words, the theological perspectives born from these liberation theologians are now 
challenged by the philosophical tenets and social claims of conservative political 
ideology. Political conservatism challenges these theologies on two levels: first, there is 
the challenge of the conservative version of the American dream, which focuses on 
individualism, merit and competition. This version of the American dream challenges the 
egalitarian hopes that are integral to theologies of liberation. Second, there is the 
challenge of the conservative aversion toward preferences for the disenfranchised, such 
preferences being important themes in theologies of liberation. Interestingly, these 
challenges are embodied in the endless debate over affirmative action in America. In my 
estimation, the conservative argument against affirmative action is the greatest challenge 
to these political theologies. For the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss affirmative 
action in connection to the challenges outlined in above.  
One of the most significant achievements born out of the progressive era is the 
American civil rights establishment. At the level of politics and economics, the civil 
rights establishment reformed American race relations. Significantly altering the social 
prospects of large numbers of African Americans, the civil rights establishment increased 
the number of African Americans in the political arena; it increased the number of 
African Americans with undergraduate and graduate degrees; it widened the African 
American middle class and overall; it provided African Americans with greater access to 
goods within the mainstream of American life. One significant factor that accounts for 
these achievements is the establishment of affirmative action policies in a wide array of 
arenas in American life. From college and graduate school admissions to employment 
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practices in the public and private sphere, to government set asides for African American 
businesses, affirmative action policies have been vital to the economic and social 
mobility of African Americans for more than a generation. Affirmative action policies are 
one product of a progressive era whose achievements have left and undeniable 
impression on the social landscape of America.  
Although the impress of affirmative action on America is undeniable, recent 
history has shown that this impress is not lasting. As I stated earlier, political 
conservatism has unsettled the most significant achievement of the civil rights 
establishment, affirmative action. This is particularly true with regard to higher 
education. Again, consider the fact that the practice of affirmative action has been 
eliminated in the university systems of the states of California, Texas and Florida and that 
the legality of the practice at the University of Michigan was contested as recent as June 
2003, in the United States Supreme Court. Fortunately, for the Michigan case, the 
Supreme Court ruled in its favor, upholding the practice, but with significant 
modifications. Though the court upheld the practice of affirmative action at the 
University of Michigan, the debate regarding and the conservative challenge to it is far 
from over.  
The struggle over affirmative action is connected to an epochal shift in American 
attitudes toward progressive politics. Seemingly progressive politics, which facilitated the 
rise of affirmative action and has waned with the advent of political conservatism, does 
not move the American public. One social and political analyst who attests to this shift in 
American attitudes towards progressive politics is Carl Boggs. In his work, The End of 
Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere, Boggs writes about a 
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contemporary America that is no longer moved by the spirit of progressivism. In addition 
to conservatism, he maintains that other forces such as corporate power, greed and 
narcissism have corroded faith in progressive politics in the U.S. For Boggs, the tragic 
result has led to the depolitization of the public sphere.  
As the twenty-first century dawns, American politics is an ever increasing 
apathetic condition. Elections have become more meaningless than ever, 
significant differences between republicans and democrats are scarcely 
discernable despite all the political hue and cry, public discourse is drawn 
increasingly toward trivial concerns, and legislators at all levels are in 
gridlock. Meanwhile citizens in greater numbers have retreated from political 
involvement out of justifiable feelings of disgust and pessimism. Measured 
virtually by any set of criteria, the political system is in a (potentially 
terminal) state of entropy, out of touch with the needs and aspirations of the 
vast majority of people; citizenship-rights and obligations-has decayed 
beyond recognition. While at one time in the not too distant past complaints 
about a declining public sphere, or “commons,” was the distinctive province 
of Burkean conservatives nostalgic liberals and republicans bemoaning the 
disappearance of a more simple associational life, today it is a refrain heard 
loudly across the ideological spectrum. Indeed the seemingly irreversible 
depolitization of American society, perhaps the dominant motif of our times 
is no doubt harmful to progressive movements that have a vested interest in 
critical public dialogue and broadened civic participation leading (so it is 
hoped) to far reaching change.15 
 
Boggs also says a word about the status of major ideologies that have been used as tools 
of progressive politics: 
The contemporary flight from politics occurs at a time of mounting social and 
ecological crisis on a world scale-indeed at a time of intensifying global 
disorder-as well as deterioration of classic ideologies (nationalism, 
communism, socialism, liberalism) that once provided tens of millions of 
people guideposts for thought and action. 16  
   
 According to Boggs, times have changed. With the changing of times so have 
assumptions regarding the possibilities of politics, particularly progressive politics. This 
is a tragedy.  This is tragic because progressive politics of the 1960s and 1970s 
                                                                 
15 Carl Boggs, The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere (New York, 
New York: Guilford Press, 1998), 23.  
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envisioned an American society that could be transformed indefinitely, aided by 
government and political representation. The impulse of progressive politics via the civil 
rights and women’s movements pointed toward an American society that was on course 
to becoming the Great Society envisioned by Lyndon Baines Johnson. With 
unprecedented social change and social legislation, the ideal of the beloved community 
envisioned by Martin Luther King, Jr. was a vibrant possibility. Social progress was 
being achieved in the arenas of race and gender, and it appeared as though nothing could 
stand in its way. Then came the 1980s. With the dawn of the 1980s, the era of 
progressivism and its achievements began to slowly fade away.  The idea of social 
progress, constitutive of the progressive era, was increasingly revealed to be a myth. 
Social improvements that were that were thought to be permanent were revealed to be 
tentative, one such improvement being affirmative action. Indeed we have witnessed the 
eclipse of progressive politics in the United States, and the political and ideological tools 
that defined progressive politics a generation ago have been eclipsed in terms of their 
strength and influence.                            
 Given the concerns of this chapter, particularly the challenge of political 
conservatism in the United States, one is compelled to ask, is a pluralistic democracy in 
America possible? If the intensifying debate over affirmative action is symbolic of the 
future of social justice, democracy and race relations in America, Is there much to hope 
for? Do the concerns of liberation theologians, political liberals and left-wing 
progressives stand a chance in the market place of ideas and public concern given the 
landscape of political conservatism? My contention is that projects of social justice, be 
they liberal, left-wing, secular or theological, must undergo self-criticism and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
16 Ibid., 23. 
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reformulation if they are going to be contenders in influencing the public sphere. In the 
chapters that follow, I undertake the kind of criticism that sheds light on why I think post 
1960s progressivism lost its influence in the public sphere. In the end, I offer 
recommendations for the reconstruction of progressive politics and political theology, in 
light of the affirmative action debate, for a conservative age.     
 
Conclusion 
  In this chapter, I have suggested that conservative political ideology has eclipsed 
the liberal and left-wing progressivism which has impacted our most recent social and 
political history. Though liberal and left-wing progressivism has been eclipsed in its 
influence the voice of progressivism is still alive. In the following chapters I examine this 
voice, raise questions about its viability and give an account of why it lost its influence.   
In the next chapter, I turn to one contemporary voice of progressivism, Cornel West, 
whose social hopes are scrutinized in light of the concerns of this chapter. It is to this 
voice that I now turn.      
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CHAPTER II 
 
CORNEL WEST AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA TODAY 
 
 
Can America ever truly be America without a full- fledged multiracial and multi-gendered 
democracy-a democracy that flourishes in the political, economic, cultural and even 
existential spheres? Can the dignity of everyday people thrive in an oligarchic and 
plutocratic economy? Can American democracy be true to its ideals without a nonracist 
and nonsexist culture and society? Does not pervasive homophobia require a 
nonheterosexist social arrangement? These are challenging questions of Whitman, 
Dewey, Addams, Baldwin, Lorde and Martin Luther King, Jr.…These are the great 
questions of the twenty-first century, the grand challenges of the next wave of democratic 
possibility. Have we reached the limits of an American religion of possibility? Do class, 
race and gender hierarchy have the last word on how far democracy can go in our time? 
My Chekhovian Christian viewpoint says No! No! No!…Let it be said of us centuries 
from now that we were bold and visionary in our efforts to live with courage and 
compassion in the face of death, to pursue dialogue over and against the overwhelming 
odds of misunderstanding and violence and to fight for old and new forms of democracy 
at the beginning of a century that may well produce novel forms of barbarism and 
bestiality if we fail to respond to the tests of our time.1  
 
       
Since the publication of his first book in 1982, Prophesy Deliverance, to the 
publication of an anthology of more than ten texts in 1999, The Cornel West Reader, 
Cornel West has established himself as an influential scholar and public voice in 
American life. His philosophy of social hope and harmony, prophetic pragmatism, has 
gained the attention of leaders and decision-makers from diverse arenas in American 
society. His written work and public philosophy have been praised by academics, popular 
media, social leaders and political elites. However, his work has also been the subject of 
criticism and debate. In recent years, scholars have given critical attention to his social 
and political philosophy, prophetic pragmatism, and its implications for public life. Two 
                                                                 
1 Cornel  West, The Cornel West Reader (New York, New York: Basic Civitas Books, 1999), xx.  
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recent texts, George Yancy’s edited volume, Cornel West: A Critical Reader (1999), and 
Mark David Wood’s, The Politics of Prophetic Pragmatism (2000) have questioned the 
social hopes of prophetic pragmatism. Similar to these recent efforts, I too question the 
social hopes of prophetic pragmatism. And I do so in light of political conservatism and 
its impact on American public life today. Overall, my contention is that West’s academic 
career and public philosophy symbolizes the post 1960s progressive politics that once 
influenced yet no longer affects, in significant ways, the decision makers and power-
brokers of American society. His outlook on social transformation and social hope in 
America, prophetic pragmatism, struggles for viability in a 21st century American society 
that is no longer regulated by the progressive politics which he represents.  
In this chapter, I question the value and promotion of radical democracy that is 
integral to his social and political philosophy, prophetic pragmatism. In my estimation, 
radical democracy represents West’s utopia, a utopia that he hopes will be realized in 
America. The questions that I raise regarding this utopia, serve as the starting point for a 
discussion I forward regarding the limits and possibilities of social transformation in 
contemporary America. Overall, I am not as hopeful as is West about the social prospects 
for radical democracy in America, in these early days of the 21st century. Beyond West, I 
turn to the legacies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Benjamin Elijah Mays as resources for 
understanding the limits and possibilities of social transformation in America today. For 
the purposes of this chapter, I begin with an overview of West’s prophetic pragmatism. 
Then I critique what I consider its most salient value, radical democracy. I shall now turn 
to an overview of prophetic pragmatism.     
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Prophetic Pragmatism 
In The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism, Cornel 
West puts forth a conception of pragmatism that he labels “prophetic pragmatism.” After 
crafting a genealogy of pragmatists, which includes philosophers, non-philosophers and 
persons not typically associated with pragmatism, he lays out a version of pragmatism for 
our time. This version of pragmatism which, West calls, “prophetic pragmatism,” is “an 
explicit political mode of cultural criticism” that speaks to the cultural and political crises 
of American society and speaks to what he sees as the overall decline of American 
civilization. In constructing his conception of “prophetic pragmatism” West draws upon 
what is, in his consideration, “the best” of the pragmatist tradition. In order to grasp what 
prophetic pragmatism is, it is necessary to quote West at length. 
The tradition of pragmatism the most influential stream in American thought 
is in need of an explicit mode of cultural criticism that refines and revises 
Emerson’s concerns with power, provocation, and personality in light of 
Dewey’s stress on historical consciousness and Dubois’ focus on the plight of 
the wretched of the earth. This political mode of cultural criticism must 
recapture Emerson’s sense of vision his utopian impulse yet rechannel it 
through Dewey’s conception of creative democracy and Dubois’ structural 
analysis of the limits of capitalist democracy. Furthermore, this new kind of 
cultural criticism we can call it prophetic pragmatism must candidly confront 
the tragic sense found in Hook and Trilling, the religious version of the 
Jamesian strenuous mood in Niebuhr, and the tortuous grappling with the 
vocation of the intellectual in Mills. Prophetic pragmatism, with its roots in 
the American heritage and its hopes for the wretched of the earth, constitutes 
the best chance of promoting an Emersonian culture of creative democracy 
by means of critical intelligence and social action. 2          
  
Here, West lays out the blueprint for his “prophetic pragmatism.” He wants to 
focus on a variety of themes, taken from a variety of pragmatists, and fashion a new 
version of pragmatism. From six pragmatists, he extracts nine themes that are important 
                                                                 
2 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison, Wisconsin: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 212. 
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to his conception of prophetic pragmatism. I will identify these themes according to each 
pragmatist evoked by West. First, there is a concern with power, provocation and 
personality found in Ralph Waldo Emerson. Second, there is the emphasis on historical 
consciousness and creative democracy in John Dewey. Third, there is the focus on the 
plight of the wretched of the earth and a social structural analysis of the limits of 
capitalist democracy found in W.E.B. DuBois. Fourth, there is a necessary confrontation 
with tragedy or evil as found in Sidney Hook and Lionel Trilling and in the religious 
version of the Jamesian strenuous mood found in Reinhold Niebuhr. And finally, there is 
the tortuous grappling with the vocation of the intellectual as found in C. Wright Mills.  
With these pragmatists and the concerns, that he extracts from their thoughts, 
West engages in an eclectic synthesis of ideas. The sole purpose of such a synthesis is to 
foster hope for “the wretched of the earth” and to promote “an Emersonian culture of 
creative democracy by means of critical intelligence and social action.” Interestingly, 
West’s eclecticism excludes the insights of pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Pierce, 
William James, W.V. Quine and Richard Rorty from his “prophetic pragmatism.” Given 
West’s selective emphases I will investigate, thematically, prophetic pragmatism.  
 
Power, Provocation, Personality and Ralph Waldo Emerson 
Beginning with Ralph Waldo Emerson, West hopes to foster a kind of democracy 
which promotes the full participation of human beings in decision making processes 
while at the same time enhancing human personality. It is a kind of democracy, which 
makes social experimentation a critical norm and promotes an active citizenry. Emerson 
serves as a model for this kind of democracy due to his democratic sensibilities toward 
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philosophy. That is, West sees an explicit questioning of philosophy, particularly 
epistemology centered philosophy, in Emerson’s philosophic disposition, which has 
important implications for the form of democracy he has in mind. For West, Emerson 
saw epistemological centered philosophy as a disdaining of and divergence from matters 
of everyday life. Such philosophy ridiculed common sense and the sensibilities of 
ordinary people. Hence, such philosophy was elitist and anti-democratic. West claims 
that Emerson made a swerve from epistemological centered philosophy in service of 
common sense. This swerve from epistemological centered philosophy led to an explicit 
focus on human power, personality and provocation.  
West suggests that Emerson conceived a notion of power “which enabled himself 
and others to respond to the crises of his day.”3 He contends that Emerson had a profound 
concern with the state of the nation, the state of religion and the emerging industrial 
economy which was shaping the world in which he lived. In explicating Emerson’s view 
of power West states, 
First, his view of power is multileveled: that is, it encompasses and 
distinguishes the powers of the nation, the economy, the person, tradition, 
and language. Second, he celebrates the possession, use, and expansion of 
certain kinds of power, especially transgressive acts of the literate populace 
that promotes moral aims and personal fulfillment. Third, Emerson’s 
perspective on power accentuates in an unprecedented manner the fluid, 
protean and dynamic elements in human relations and transactions with 
nature. In this regard, Emerson’s complex and perceptive reflections on 
power are guided by a profound historical consciousness.4          
 
Here, West understands Emerson’s view of power in contextual terms. The 
various contexts he cites, be they political, economic or personal, are inseparable but not 
identical. Each context yields a certain kind of power. And for West, Emerson is 
                                                                 
3 Ibid., 11. 
4 Ibid., 12. 
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concerned with expanding power within these contexts in the service of moral aims and 
personal fulfillment. A salient feature of this perspective on power is that it entails a 
dynamic notion of human relations via nature.   
 As for Emerson and the notion of “provocation,” West asserts “The primary aim 
of Emerson’s life and discourse is to provoke; the principal means by which he lived, 
spoke and wrote is provocation.”5  West contends that Emerson’s provocation is shaped 
and driven by the notions of activity, flux, movement, and energy. He further maintains 
that Emerson’s provocation is the result of and reaction to the market forces of his day. 
West suggests that the market forces of Emerson’s day, which created a culture of 
material insecurity, social instability and overall economic unpredictability, gave rise to 
selfishness, greed and human objectification. 6  In responding to market forces, West 
suggests that Emerson produced a kind of self, in service of provocation, which criticizes 
and lends itself to the dehumanizing nature of the market. That is, the notions of activity, 
flux, movement and energy, which characterize Emerson’s view of provocation, are the 
very forces which drive the market. And a self that is conceived in light of these forces is 
either critical of or complicit with a market driven culture. According to West, “Emerson 
projects a conception of the self that can be easily appropriated by market culture for its 
own perpetuation and reproduction.”7 However, despite the possibility of co-optation he 
concedes that the self, driven by provocation, is “antihierarchical, egalitarian, and 
democratic, for it pertains to human relations.” Essentially, the self and the notion of 
provocation, which Emerson promoted, were paradoxical. It is at once oppressive and 
                                                                 
5 Ibid., 25. 
6 Ibid., 26. 
7 Ibid., 27.  
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emancipatory. Yet West seeks to reformulate these notions, particularly provocation for 
his own purposes.        
 The notion of personality that West extracts from Emerson deals fundamentally 
with “the dignity and worth of human personality.” And for him, Emerson is “the 
preeminent proponent” of personality. West contends that Emerson promoted an 
enhanced conception of human personality, which was similar to his other conceptions, in 
that it was influenced by the times in which he lived. That is, Emerson’s understanding of 
personality was informed by the emerging Euro-American Empire of the nineteenth 
century. And Emerson understood personality in terms of the dominance of the Euro-
American. According to West, “Emerson is a typical nineteenth century North Atlantic 
mild racist” and “his notion of human personality is, in part, dependent on and derived 
from his view of the races.”8 Despite Emerson’s racialized understanding of personality 
he offers an understanding of personality, which takes the realities of circumstance, fate 
and history seriously. That is, his understanding of personality, in relation to race, 
allowed him to see the accidental character of both the dominance of the Europeans and 
the subordination of non-European. 9 This understanding resulted in an acknowledgement 
that race can “limit the capacities and potentialities of individual consciousness and will.” 
This understanding constitutes what West labels, “Emersonian theodicy.” It is this 
understanding of personality that serves the interests of West’s pragmatism.   
 
 
 
                                                                 
8 Ibid., 28 
9 Ibid., 31. 
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Historical Consciousness, Creative Democracy and John Dewey 
In his invocations of John Dewey, West is principally concerned with historical 
consciousness and creative democracy. These concerns build upon the notions of power, 
provocation and personality as found in Emerson. In fact, West understands Dewey as an 
inheritor of these Emersonian concerns. And when he speaks of an Emersonian culture of 
creative democracy, a culture which takes history seriously, not only does he have 
Emerson in mind, but John Dewey also. In Dewey, West sees an expansion of 
Emersonian concerns. For West this expansionism marks him as “the greatest of the 
American pragmatists.” This is due principally to Dewey’s historical consciousness.      
 According to West,  
 
“John Dewey is the greatest of the American pragmatists because he infuses 
an inherited Emersonian preoccupation with power, provocation and 
personality –permeated by voluntaristic, amelioristic, and activistic themes-
with the great discovery of nineteenth century Europe: a mode of historical 
consciousness that highlights the conditioned and circumstantial character of 
human existence in terms of changing societies, cultures, and communities. 
Dewey is the first of the American pragmatist who revises Emersonian motifs 
of contingency and revisability in light of modern historical consciousness.10”  
 
Here, West views Dewey as a creative interpreter of Emerson. That is, Dewey 
revises and refines Emersonian notions of power, provocation and personality. For West, 
Dewey’s revisionist project is done in light of the contingencies of human existence, 
which is reflected in society and culture. And such an understanding of contingency is 
driven by a historical consciousness that regulates his reconstructive project.  
For West, what makes historical consciousness so critical and attractive to Dewey 
is its implications for new forms of intellectual and existential activity. That is,    
                                                                 
10 Ibid., 70. 
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the emergence of historical consciousness in modern thought made it possible to rethink 
the past. Again West asserts, 
Dewey views modern historical consciousness-awareness of the radical 
contingent and variability of human societies, cultures and communities-as 
the watershed event in contemporary thought. To cross this rubicon is to enter 
a new intellectual terrain-to shun old philosophic forms of dualism, and 
transcendentalism and to put forward new social theorectic understandings of 
knowledge, power, wealth and culture.11 
 
Here, Dewey is the pragmatist that leads the way into “new intellectual terrain.” This 
terrain has serious implications for thinking about society and culture. In concrete terms, 
this means the rethinking of philosophy.  
West contends that like Emerson before him, Dewey’s project leads to an evasion 
of philosophy. Again, this is an evasion of epistemological centered philosophy that is 
remote from human affairs. Instead of being preoccupied with abstract philosophical 
problems, Dewey turns to the muddy stuff of history. And he links the problems of 
philosophy to social crises in history. Dewey’s concern with history leads to the 
reformulation of philosophy itself. West suggests that this reformulation of philosophy 
entails the affirmation and demystification of critical intelligence. Here critical 
intelligence means the kind of intelligence “manifest in the community of scientists.” 
And the affirmation and demystification of such intelligence is done in service of human 
flourishing, that human beings may “better control their conditions and thereby more 
fully create themselves.”12   
 For West, human flourishing and self-creation with an unfated attitude toward 
human circumstances is fundamental to Deweyan creative democracy. That is, when 
Dewey’s historical consciousness and his conceptions of philosophy and critical 
                                                                 
11 Ibid., 70. 
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intelligence are transferred into the concreteness of human existence, the result is creative 
democracy. In this vein, West treats the democratic sensibilities in Dewey in the same 
fashion as he does Emerson. That is, like Emerson, who in West’s estimation holds 
democratic sentiments in relation to philosophy, Dewey too is democratic. However, 
Dewey goes further than Emerson in that Emersonian power, provocation and personality 
are coupled with Deweyan voluntarism, ameliorism and activism. For West, Dewey’s 
creative democracy is a much bolder and more direct leveling of philosophy than that of 
Emerson. This leveling occurs through metaphilosophical criticism of metaphysics and 
epistemology. And it is such criticism, which creates the conditions for creative 
democracy. 13     
 
The Wretched of the Earth, the Limits of Capitalist Democracy and W.E.B DuBois 
In West’s treatment of W.E.B. DuBois, a historian, West is concerned with the 
social structural limits of capitalist democracy and the plight of the wretched of the Earth. 
The former has to do with the overwhelming constraints capitalism places on the 
fulfillment of creative democracy. And the latter is an explicit focus on the powerless 
within society who have been excluded from the democratic enterprise. West’s use of the 
term “the wretched of the earth” is derived from the African psychoanalyst Franz Fanon 
who authored a book under that title. For West, the two concerns mentioned merge in 
DuBois’ life-long concern with the predicament of African Americans. He maintains that, 
“DuBois’s basic concern is the specific predicament of Afro-Americans as victims of 
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white capitalist exploitation at the work place and of the white capitalists and workers in 
the political system and cultural mores of the country.”14  
West views DuBois as a social reformer, philosophically and existentially, in the 
same manner as John Dewey. However, unlike Dewey his reformist energies have a 
different focus. West contends that DuBois renders a social structural analysis of 
capitalist society, with reference to African Americans, which questions the very 
possibility of creative democracy. He cites DuBois’s classic text, Black Reconstruction: 
An Essay Toward a History Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct 
Democracy In America, 1860-1880 (1935), as an example of how “the struggle for 
democracy was stifled at a critical period in American history.”15 West argues that 
“Unlike any of the other pragmatists, DuBois provides an account of the means by which 
industrial America imposed severe constraints upon an emerging or at least potential 
creative democracy.”16 Also, his account inadvertently illustrates the “blindnesses and 
silences in American pragmatist reflections on individuality and democracy.”17  
Interestingly, West suggests that DuBois’ concern with the structural limits of 
capitalist democracy is not simply an analysis of how “the wretched of the earth” are 
excluded from creative democracy. Rather, it is an analysis, which also highlights the 
manner in which they contribute to and expand democracy. West contends that DuBios 
links the democratic contributions of African Americans, contributions, which had future 
consequences for other minority groups (women, gays and lesbians and et.al), to the 
historical quest for democracy in the Western world. In this vein, West suggests that 
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DuBois’ concern with the social structural limits of capitalist democracy and the 
wretched of the earth is infused into pragmatism.            
DuBois provides American pragmatism with what it sorely lacks: an 
international perspective on the impetus and impediments to individuality and 
radical democracy, a perspective that highlights the plight of the wretched of 
the earth, namely, the majority of humanity who own no property or wealth, 
participate in no democratic arrangements, and whose individualities are 
crushed by hard labor and harsh living conditions.18  
 
West goes on to show how pragmatists fell short of the kind of perspective DuBois  
 
offers. And he cites the manner in which DuBois’s perspective is an indictment against  
 
and surpasses the views of the pragmatists within his genealogy. 
  
James possessed the ingredients for such a view, but he did not see social 
structures only individuals. Dewey indeed saw social structures and 
individuals yet primarily through American lens. Hook too adopts a 
cosmopolitan viewpoint, but his cold war sentiments give a tunnel vision of 
the third world as a playground for the two superpowers. Mills comes closer 
than the others, yet, for him, postmodern historical agency resides almost 
exclusively in the Western (or Westernized) intelligentsia. DuBois goes 
beyond them all in the scope and depth of his vision: creative powers reside 
among the wretched of the earth even in their subjugation, and the fragile 
structures of democracy in the world depend, in large part, on how these 
powers are ultimately exercised.19 
 
Essentially, for West, DuBois is the pragmatist, who, like Dewey, works for and is in 
favor of creative democracy. However, his quest for such democracy takes into account 
its structural limitations, that creative democracy is not always a reality for the powerless. 
And he also accounts for the way in which the powerless or “the wretched of the earth” 
contribute to and expand democracy.     
 
 
 
                                                                 
18 Ibid., 158. 
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Hook, Trilling, Niebuhr and the Sense of the Tragic 
When West invokes the names of Sidney Hook, Lionel Trilling and Reinhold 
Niebuhr, he is principally concerned with what he calls “the tragic sense.” Here, the 
tragic sense is a profound awareness of fateful circumstances and historical limitations. It 
is a recognition of the limits of the self and human will. West views Hook, Trilling and 
Niebuhr as maintaining a sense of the tragic as they advance their pragmatist projects. 
Sidney Hook, whom West labels the Deweyan Political Intellectual, is characterized as a 
pragmatist in the Deweyan sense in that he promotes creative democracy. However, he 
also takes the Marxist tradition seriously, which questions the reformist impulse in 
Deweyan creative democracy. It is the fundamental difference between reform and 
revolution, the former being optimistic in outlook and the latter being pessimistic in 
relation to progressive change. And for Hook, the Deweyan reformist impulse must be 
infused with realism regarding the historical limits of democracy. West maintains that 
Hook deepened Deweyan historical consciousness by including the sense of the tragic. 
Interestingly, West notes that in his career, Hook went beyond both Dewey and Marx, but 
maintained his sense of the tragic.   
           West maintains that Lionel Trilling, a literary critic, infuses a tragic perspective 
into pragmatism, which severed it from its Emersonian roots. That is, he stripped the 
pragmatist ideals of individuality and democracy by denouncing Emersonian theodicy. 20 
As a literary critic who initiates a marriage between literature and politics, he links the 
poetry of Matthew Arnold to the pragmatism of John Dewey. Like Dewey, he takes 
seriously the values of critical intelligence, individuality and democracy. However, like 
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Sidney Hook, he accented “circumstances over the self, life over imagination” and 
“world over the will.”21 For West, this is evident in his harsh criticisms of political 
liberalism. West asserts that Trilling saw much of what was flaunted as liberalism in his 
day as maintaining the status quo. This led to a deep skepticism toward the political arena 
as a context for promoting human flourishing. Political liberalism needed a renovation, 
for Trilling’s liberal hope, democracy, was sobered by tragedy. In this vein, West 
highlights Trilling’s preoccupation with Sigmund Freud, particularly Beyond The 
Pleasure Principle and Civilization and Its Discontents, later in his life, which intensified 
his focus on the “circumstantial and conditioned.”22    
   For West, Reinhold Niebuhr’s tragic perspective employs what he terms the 
religious version of the Jamesian strenuous mood. He contends that Niebuhr was a 
Jamesian cultural critic who “deployed a tragic perspective stamped with Christian 
imprimatur as impetus to moral critique of and heroic struggle in corporate liberal 
America.”23 As a theologian with links to liberal Protestantism and American 
pragmatism, he promoted a version of “Christian pragmatism.” This “Christian 
pragmatism” understood religion as an agent of moral and social change while at the 
same time advancing a democratic-socialist political agenda. Like Dewey, Niebuhr is an 
advocate of social and political reform. However, like Hook and Trilling, his democratic 
sensibilities are sobered by “the dialectic of human will and historical limits, individual 
volition and fateful circumstances.”24 And this sense of the tragic is most visible in his 
theological anthropology. Niebuhr’s anthropology accents the biblical account of the fall 
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and overall human depravity. It is a skeptical account of human nature, which modifies 
the optimistic stance of American pragmatist with regard to the present and future. 
Interestingly, Niebuhr’s sense of tragic, like Trilling, emerged out of his own 
dissatisfaction with liberalism, both theological and secular.”25 However, Niebuhr’s sense 
of the tragic is distinctively religious and theological.  
 
C. Wright Mills and the Vocation of the Intellectual 
In his treatment of C. Wright Mills, a sociologist, West is concerned with the 
vocation of the intellectual. West contends that Mills struggled with the role of the 
intellectual in society. He suggests that his struggle emerged out of personal 
dissatisfaction with “capitalistic profitable production and bourgeois conspicuous 
consumption,” that creates powerlessness among large numbers of people. Also, as a 
proponent of radical democracy, in the Deweyan sense, he struggled with “corporate 
liberalism,” a bastard child of capitalist culture, which places limits on creative 
intelligence and social action. West contends that Mills understood the intellectual as 
having a role in society, a role, which speaks to capitalist culture and “corporate 
liberalism.” But in a capitalist society where intellectual work is commodified such a role 
is undermined. It is also undermined by professionalization and careerism, which leads to 
the marginalization of intellectuals and their work. Despite these obstacles West contends 
that Mills advanced an understanding of intellectual vocation that responds to the crises 
in question. 26 This understanding upholds the Deweyan ideals of critical intelligence and 
creative democracy. “Mills views the vocation of being an intellectual as the only 
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alternative to an emaciated liberalism, a traduced communism, and an impotent tragic 
viewpoint. His conception of the intellectual vocation is value laden; that is, it is shot 
through the Deweyan ideals of critical intelligence and creative democracy.”27   
     West suggests that Mills’ preoccupation with intellectual vocation in light of 
Deweyan ideals points to the need for pragmatists to take such a vocation seriously. A 
weakened liberalism and the crisis of capitalist culture must be countered by intellectual 
activity. Interestingly, this counter intellectual activity has no place for tragic 
perspectives. Mills conceded the circumstantial and the conditioned character of human 
life and human possibility. However, he had greater confidence in human responsibility 
and agency. 28 Hence, the high value he places upon intellectual vocation. Essentially, the 
intellectual is somewhat of a super hero who can rescue society, promoting Deweyan 
ideals through intellectual agency.  
 
Prophetic Pragmatism in Criticism 
 Thus far we have seen how West’s prophetic pragmatism is spelled out via the 
themes and pragmatists he invokes. At this point, I will critique what I consider the most 
salient feature of his perspective, namely, radical democracy. In my estimation, radical 
democracy represents West’s utopian vision for American society and is a normative 
principle for his philosophy, prophetic pragmatism. Overall, prophetic pragmatism can be 
understood as a form of left-wing social and political romanticism that has characterized 
left-wing politics in the United States during the last third of the 20th century. In this 
critique, I advance an interpretive framework for understanding prophetic pragmatism, 
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especially radical democracy, while at the same time pointing to its limitations. Before 
probing radical democracy, I want to say a word about the religious impulse of prophetic 
pragmatism.  
 
The Religious Impulse of Prophetic Pragmatism 
There is a relationship between West’s conception of pragmatism and religion. In 
West’s conception of prophetic pragmatism, which began this chapter, a fleeting 
reference is made to religion, the religious version of Jamesian strenuous mood in 
Reinhold Niebuhr. Though he treats the theological anthropology of Reinhold Niebuhr, it 
does not fully account for the relationship between religion and his prophetic 
pragmatism. The relationship of religion to his pragmatism is expounded upon in a 
fashion that is prior to and subsequent to his thematic formulation. In the introduction to 
American Evasion, he cites his previous work on prophetic Christianity and his 
connection to liberation theology. 29 And towards the last pages of American Evasion, he 
reveals the Christian roots of his perspective.30 For the most part, religion serves as a 
motivating force behind the overall purpose of his project. However, this motivation is 
only disclosed in fragments. In explicating the religious backdrop of his version of 
pragmatism, West asserts the following: 
My own version of prophetic pragmatism is situated within the Christian 
tradition...I am religious not simply for political aims but also by personal 
commitment. To put it crudely, I find existential sustenance in many of the 
narratives in the biblical scriptures as interpreted by streams in the Christian 
heritage; and I see political relevance in the biblical focus on the plight of the 
wretched of the earth. 31  
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West goes on to link his version of pragmatism to other pragmatists in his genealogy and 
then goes further in his explication of what it is. 
Like James, Niebuhr, and to some extent DuBois, I hold a religious 
conception of pragmatism. I have dubbed it “prophetic” in that it harks back 
to the Jewish and Christian prophets who brought urgent and passionate 
critique to bear on the evils of their day. The mark of the prophet is to speak 
the truth in love with courage come what may. Prophetic pragmatism 
proceeds from this impulse.32  
 
West’s explication of the religious origins and purpose of “prophetic pragmatism” 
helps to illuminate the eclectic vision put forth in his thematic conception. The reasons he 
provides for his project are existential and political. The existential reason involves a 
personal commitment to the Christian tradition, a tradition that nurtures him. The political 
reason has to do with the biblical focus on the plight of the wretched of the earth. This 
focus is nurtured by the tradition of the prophets as found in the Hebrew and Christian 
scriptures. Philosophically, this vision is supported by the pragmatisms of James, Niebuhr 
and DuBois. Of the three, James is the only pragmatist whose religious tendencies do not 
conform to the aims of West’s of prophetic pragmatism. That is, James did not focus on 
the wretched of the earth nor the biblical model of the prophet. In relation to the former, 
DuBois is the closest candidate. In relation to the latter, Niebuhr fits comfortably in his 
paradigm. Interestingly, West admits that his version of pragmatism has organic links to 
prophetic Christianity, liberation theology in particular. Similar to West’s version of 
pragmatism, liberation theologies are also concerned with social justice, particularly 
social justice in relation to the disenfranchised. Typically, such theologies criticize 
capitalism, as does West, and they place great value on the political potential of 
religiosity of the disenfranchised, as does West. Also, such theologies envision the 
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theologian as a prophet in solidarity with the disenfranchised, doing organic intellectual 
work, similar to West’s intellectual prophet, in service of their liberation. However, what 
distinguishes West from theologies of liberation is the value of radical democracy, a 
value that I shall now scrutinize.   
 
Radical Democracy 
The pursuit of radical democracy entails and is driven by a democratic faith. For 
West, this means having a Deweyan outlook on critical intelligence, historical 
consciousness and creative democracy. And for him, it amounts to a critical temper and 
democratic faith. In an essay entitled, “The Limits of Neopragmatism,” written 
subsequent to American Evasion, West explicates the meaning of both a critical temper 
and democratic faith in relation to prophetic pragmatism. 
Critical temper as a way of struggle and democratic faith as a way of life are 
the twin pillars to prophetic pragmatism. The major foes to be contested are 
despair, dogmatism and oppression. The critical temper promotes a full-
fledged experimental disposition that highlights the provisional, tentative and 
revisable character of our visions, analyses and actions. Democratic faith 
consists of a Pascalian wager (hence underdetermined by the evidence) on the 
abilities and capacities of ordinary people to participate in the decision-  
making procedures of institutions that fundamentally regulate their lives.33     
 
West’s critical temper as a way of struggle and democratic faith as a way of life is 
a way of being in the world. This way of being in the world promotes critical intelligence, 
historical consciousness and communal participation in decision making, which is done 
in service of human flourishing. It is a mode of being that is deeply Deweyan and deeply 
optimistic about the possibility of relieving oppression and advancing democracy. And it 
is has a confidence in the abilities and overall competency of ordinary people in 
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controlling their lives. Essentially, it is a social hope which makes an enemy out of 
cynicism and fate, in service of radical democracy.   
 What is intriguing about the manner in which West’s “prophetic pragmatism” 
approaches radical democracy is the extent to which it is indebted to John Dewey. In fact, 
there is a sense in which “prophetic pragmatism” is a religious reconfiguration and 
updating of Deweyan ideals. This is most evident in the prominent position Dewey holds 
in his genealogy. Of all the pragmatists in his genealogy, John Dewey is given the most 
attention. Next to his chapter- long treatment of Ralph Waldo Emerson, who only serves 
as a pre-historical figure, Dewey is the only historical pragmatist in West’s genealogy 
who attains chapter length status. Though West spends a great deal of time dealing with 
Ralph Waldo Emerson as a precursor to pragmatism, it is his treatment of Dewey in a 
chapter entitled “The Coming of Age of Pragmatism: John Dewey,” that marks Dewey as 
the epitome of what pragmatism is. In hammering his overall significance to the 
American pragmatist tradition and at the same time giving clue to his indebtedness to 
Dewey West says the following: 
John Dewey is the culmination of the tradition of American pragmatism. 
After him, to be a pragmatist is to be a social critic, literary critic, or a poet in 
short, a participant in cultural criticism and cultural creation. This does not 
mean that Dewey provides panaceas for philosophical problems or solutions 
to societal crises. Rather, Dewey helps us see the complex and mediated 
ways in which philosophical problems are linked to societal crises. More 
important, Dewey enables us to view clashing conceptions of philosophy as 
struggles over cultural ways of life, as attempts to define the role and 
function of intellectual authorities in culture and society. 34  
    
For West, Dewey is the paradigmatic pragmatist. He sees Dewey as an inspiring resource 
for projects of cultural criticism and cultural creation. It is Dewey’s conception of 
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philosophy, linked to history, society and culture and linked to societal problems that 
commands his attention. West takes Dewey as a resource for understanding the conflict 
of interpretations, within society, as a conflict over which persons or group will set the 
paradigms for defining reality. And such reality is shaped by philosophy. Moreover, 
because Dewey’s conception of philosophy evades “epistemological philosophy” this 
makes Dewey all the more relevant to West’s project. Dewey is a central, if not the most 
important, figure in his version of “prophetic pragmatism.” 
 
Democracy on Trial 
Democracy in America today has an uncertain future. The Deweyan democratic 
idealism which informs West’s conception of radical democracy is challenged by an 
American society that is polarized along the lines of class, race, gender and ideology. 
Such polarities and others undermine the values of community and participation that are 
the hallmark of Deweyan democracy. Where ordinary people are concerned, persons 
whom West views as the greatest beneficiaries of radical democracy, the fragility of these 
values threaten what democracy means for their future. One democratic thinker who is 
concerned about the future of democracy is Jean Bethke Elshtain. In Democracy on Trial 
she speaks of a democratic tradition that is being jeopardized by the polarities mentioned 
above. 
American democracy is faltering…The signs of the times are not 
encouraging. To interpret those signs is not easy, unless one reacts 
automatically from a stance of harsh ideological predetermination, whether of 
the Left or the Right. Let me begin with a few general considerations that 
flow from the preoccupations of democratic thinkers past and present. A 
major concern for all who care about democracy is the everyday actions and 
spirit of a people. Democracy requires laws, constitutions, and authoritative 
institutions, yes, but it also depends on what might be called democratic 
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dispositions. These include a preparedness to work with others different from 
oneself toward shared ends; a combinations of strong convictions with a 
readiness to compromise in the recognition that one can’t always get 
everything one wants; and a sense of individuality and a commitment to civic 
goods that are not the possession of one person or of one small group alone. 
But what do we see when we look around? We find deepening cynicism; the 
growth of corrosive forms of isolation, boredom and despair; the weakening, 
in other words, of that world known as democratic civil society, a world of 
groups and associations and ties that bind.35  
 
  In accounting for the fragility of democracy in America, Elshtain points to the 
absence or remoteness of democratic dispositions, dispositions that are required for the 
realization of democracy. In America today, the paucity of democratic postures among 
political conservatives, ideologues of identity politics, cultural, gender and religious, 
threatens the realization of democracy in the United States. For a moment, consider 
political conservatism. The prospects of radical democracy seem bleak given the hold of 
political conservatism on American culture and politics. With an inflexible hostility to 
social democracy by way of anorexic domestic policies, especially an uncompromising 
resistance to affirmative  action, political conservatism threatens a normative democratic 
order, much less a radical democratic order.36 Increasingly, political conservatism has 
proven to support a meritocracy, which favors the elite and powerful of American 
society. There is a sense in which the political conservatism of George W. Bush only 
caters to one class of citizens, Americans who are socially mobile who have unrestrained 
access to wealth, education and opportunity. In light of this kind of conservatism, the 
kind of democratic posture that West commends is difficult to fathom.  
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Unfortunately, political conservatives are not the only class of citizens that 
contribute to the impotence of democracy. In an era where identity politics connected to 
right wing Christianity, feminism,  African Americans, gays and lesbians contests for 
space, media attention and the allegiance of the American citizenry, democratic 
dispositions are difficult to find, much less promote. It is from this tragic state of affairs 
that cynicism, isolation, boredom and despair, are bred in relation to the ideal of 
democracy.  
What does it mean to have faith in democracy when one social class, special 
interest group, political or religious ideology seeks to make its vision the normative 
vision for all Americans, especially when the details of that vision does not include all 
Americans? What would it means for the cultural and political agenda of the Religious 
Right to be normative for all Americans? It has a vision for America that is rooted in the 
narratives and traditions of Christianity yet it is not inclusive of the diverse religiosity of 
American citizens. Further, it propagates a social and political conservatism in relation to 
government and business yet such conservatism is often hostile toward minorities, 
particularly African Americans and Latino’s. Where does democracy stand in relation to 
the monolithic vision of the Religious Right? How may we talk about community and 
participation in the face of a vision that sustains and represents only one class of citizens?   
The Religious Right is not the only segment of American society to threaten the 
prospects of democracy. The American left, despite its pretensions toward progressivism 
contributes to the precarious state of democracy. In this regard, one may consider the 
vision of radical feminism in relation to this issue. Interestingly, Elshtain is one female 
democratic thinker who has written extensively about the anti-democratic tendencies of 
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radical feminism.37 In this regard, an ideology that is concerned with the victimization 
and prosperity of women, threatens democracy in its repression of voices and experiences 
of women who do not conform to radical feminist ideology. Furthermore, its anti-
democratic tendencies are played out through the exclusion of men surrounding the issue 
of gender. There is a sense in which radical feminism mirrors Christian fundamentalism, 
except along the lines of gender. How is radical democracy possible given this state of 
affairs? 
Overall, the anti-democratic disposition evident in the posture of political 
conservatives, the ideologues of identity politics, the Religious Right and Radical 
Feminist, results in an ethics of group separatism which erodes the principles of 
democracy and threatens any hope for the radical democracy that West seeks and extols 
as a value. Tragically, this kind of separatist ethics and disposition is not limited to the 
groups just mentioned. It may be extended to a whole host of groups and associations in 
American society, which seek to make their cultural and political agendas normative for 
all. For all of the above considerations, West’s propagation of radical democracy is 
questionable. Yes, I agree with West that the value of democracy must be sustained and 
fought for. However, like Elshtain, I am concerned about the kind of culture, such as 
ours, where fixed group interests, fundamentalisms of various sorts and class elitism 
undermines the best that democracy in America has to offer. Narcissism, both at the level 
of groups and individuals, individualism and the unwillingness to compromise and 
sacrifice, pervades the American terrain, which puts the democratic experiment in 
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America in the line of fire. Radical democracy is a wonderful hope and value yet it is far 
from being realized in this land that is often called the home of the free and the home of 
the brave. What is presently at stake is the future of democracy, a future which at the 
present time is uncertain.           
                                                      
Prophetic Pragmatism and the Ec lipse of Progressive Politics in the United 
States 
 
The democratic hopes of prophetic pragmatism reflect the outlook and hopes of 
an era whose progressive spirit is no longer influential in the United States. Prophetic 
pragmatism is a product of left-wing progressive thought and activism that once affected 
race and gender relations and the economic lot of disenfranchised people during and 
shortly after the civil rights era. Tragically, the left-wing progressivism which facilitated 
the civil right establishment, the women’s movement, inspired the sexual revolution, 
birthed the politics of identity and has been consistently stereotyped by the Right as 
“political correctness," has been eclipsed by social and political conservatism. This 
eclipse is reflected in the twenty-year influence (1980-2000) that conservative ideology 
has had on politics in the United States. From the presidential election of Ronald Reagan 
in 1980 and William Jefferson Clinton in 1992 to George W. Bush in 2000, conservative 
political ideology and its public consequences have ordered American public life. With 
each consequent year following 1980, the spirit of progressivism, which characterized 
prior decades diminished in its public influence. What’s more, fractures within the 
American left, splits between those who look to Marx for inspiration and those who look 
to liberalism, between radicalism and pragmatism, further reduced the potency of left-
wing progressivism in influencing American public life. The unfortunate result has been 
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the proliferation of sects and the promotion of separatism among many within the left 
such as black Marxists, feminism of all sorts, environmentalists and liberals all seeking 
center stage in influencing the public sphere. The reign of conservatism coupled with the 
fragility of the American left seriously challenges West’s promotion of radical 
democracy, its connection to the wretched of the earth and the prophetic hopes of the 
organic intellectual.  
In these early days of the 21st century, democratic social hopes such as those 
embodied in prophetic pragmatism must contend with a conservative age. The reduction 
of government power, the de-regulation of markets, the decrease of taxes, the expansion 
of individual liberties, the privatization of the public sphere and the jettisoning of social 
preferences based on race and class, represent the conservative impulse in America. As I 
stated earlier, conservatism in politics, economics and public life only benefits the most 
privileged members of our society. It benefits members of our society who do not depend 
on the public sphere for goods and services, namely, the middle and upper classes, who 
manipulate the market, and are more often than not white and male. Given this 
description, the promotion of a pluralistic democracy seems hard to fathom.  
In these early days of the 21st century, progressive politics does not move 
Americans. This is not to say that all Americans have embraced conservative ideology 
nor that progressive political dispositions no longer exist. Rather, it is an 
acknowledgement that at the level of politics, education, religion and the family, 
progressive politics does not significantly influence the power-holders and managers of 
our society. The progressive social and political idealism and activism, born out of the 
tumultuous 1960s, coupled with a commitment to social transformation born out of 
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personal and collective sacrifice, does not constitute the status quo in 21st century 
America. Unfortunately other forms of anti-progressivism such as individualism,  
narcissism, materialism and cynicism reinforce the spirit of conservatism in America.  
Tragically, the diminished influence of progressivism cuts across, race, gender 
and class. And for West, who has deep concerns about minorities, African Americans in 
particular, his perspective must contend with the fact that the minorities are no less 
immune to anti-progressivism than any other group in America. In other words, wealthy 
white males do not have a monopoly on conservatism. Because West’s democratic hopes 
are viewed from the prism of minority experience, especially that of African Americans, 
the question is begged, What does it mean to advocate radical democratic hopes when the 
progressivism of such hopes does not move the people for whom you are concerned 
with? Interestingly, this is a question that has been raised in his work.     
In popular works such as Race Matters and Restoring Hope, West has written 
about Black Conservatism, Nihilism in Black America, the Crisis of Black Leadership 
and other crises among African Americans, pointing to the diminished spirit of 
progressivism among African Americans. He has spoken to the crises among African 
Americans by appealing to symbols of struggle and freedom such as Martin Luther King, 
Fannie Lou Hammer and the black Christian tradition in America. Unfortunately, for a 
civil rights generation that has already come of age, such symbols only invoke nostalgia 
and for generations that have come of age in a post-civil- rights America, such symbols 
invoke indifference and sometimes disdain. What’s more, the presence of privileged and 
disenfranchised blacks that have no connection to the tradition of struggle and freedom, 
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connected to black religion, that he appeals to, further diminishes democratic social 
hopes.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the prophetic pragmatism of Cornel West. I questioned 
the merits of what I consider his utopian vision for American society and the most salient 
value of his perspective, namely, radical democracy. Overall, I am not persuaded that 
radical democracy can be achieved in contemporary America. Given the concerns of this 
chapter, especially the eclipse of progressivism in politics, education and overall, the 
public sphere, What is the future of democracy in America today? How do we account 
for the eclipse of progressive politics and the fragility of democracy in the United States? 
Is it possible to conceive and commend a theological and ethical strategy that offers a 
progressive response to the anti-progressivism of our times? All of these questions are 
addressed in the chapters that follow. In the next chapter, I turn to the Christian realism of 
Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr’s realism is insightful for interpreting why progressive 
politics has been eclipsed by political conservatism and why democracy is a fragile 
political ideal.  With this being said, I shall now turn to Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian 
realism.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
REINHOLD NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM  AND THE ECLIPSE OF 
PROGRESSIVE POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES  
 
 
 
Though human society has roots, which lie deeper in history than the beginning of human 
life, men have made comparatively but little progress in solving the problem of their 
aggregate existence. Each century originates a new complexity and each generation faces 
a new vexation in it. For all the centuries of experience, men have not yet learned how to 
live together without compounding their vices and covering each other with “mud and 
blood.” The society in which each man lives is at once the basis for, and the nemesis of, 
that fullness of life which each man seeks. However, much human ingenuity may 
increase the treasures which nature provides for the satisfaction of human needs, they can 
never be sufficient to satisfy all human wants; for man, unlike other creatures, is gifted 
and cursed with an imagination which extends his appetite beyond the requirements of 
subsistence. Human society will never escape of the equitable distribution of the physical 
and cultural goods which provide for the preservation and fulfillment of human life.1  
 
 
In this chapter, I am fundamentally concerned with Niebuhr as a theologian of 
human tragedy. What I intend by such a treatment, is to disclose how Niebuhr’s approach 
to religious and moral ideals, radical political visions and overall political quests for a 
just society, is informed by a historical understanding of human fallibility. In relation to 
Niebuhr, human fallibility is conceived as hubris, sin or finitude. For Niebuhr, human 
fallibility limits the fulfillment of religious and moral ideals, radical political visions and 
overall political quests for a just society. In relation to his thought, fallibility is also 
conceived as collective egoism, the will to power, self- interest, the pride of power and the 
pride of knowledge. It is through his criticisms of 19th and 20th century liberalism, both 
                                                 
1 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: Wipf and 
Stock Publishers, 1998), 1. 
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secular and Protestant, and his embrace then rejection of Marxism, that the tragic and 
fallible dimensions of his perspective comes through.  
In this chapter, I argue that Niebuhr’s sense of the tragic is useful in interpreting 
the eclipse of progressive politics in the United States today. The kind of progressive 
politics that I have in mind includes a broad spectrum of social and political ideologies 
and social movements in the United States that became popular during the last half of the 
20th century.  Liberalism, liberation theologies and black and feminist radicalism, fall 
under the umbrella of progressive politics. If there is a single social phenomenon to 
emerge during the last half of the 20th century, where the tragic is concretely manifested, 
it is in the rise and decline of the civil rights establishment and in the fragility of its most 
significant achievement, affirmative action.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part one deals with Niebuhr’s reflections 
on the mythic idea of progress and redemption in Western history. Part two deals with 
Niebuhr’s reflections on the political limits of liberalism. Part three deals with his 
reflections on political the limits of radicalism. I conclude by pointing to the 
contemporary value of Niebuhr’s reflections for progressive politics and political 
theology today. In probing Niebuhr’s thought, I focus specifically on his early political 
reflections and his mature theological disposition.  
 
The Myths of Progress and Redemption and Western Civilization 
In 1932, Niebuhr’s seminal text, Moral Man and Immoral Society, sent an alarm 
to middle and upper middle-class liberal progressives, who for him, possessed naïve 
assumptions about state of American society and that of the Western civilization at that 
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time. The assumptions in question were connected to evolutionary theory, social gospel 
liberalism and the overall conviction that human beings were on course to living out the 
highest of human ideals and that Western civilization was undergoing stages of 
progressive evolution. The Enlightenment and the industrial and scientific revolutions of 
the 18th and 19th centuries gave historical legitimation to these assumptions. Moral Man 
turned these assumptions on upside down.  
 In Moral Man, Niebuhr sought to give a different account of Western civilization 
quite different from that, which had been embraced by the progressive liberal culture of 
his day. For Niebuhr, the story of human beings and Western civilization, in his time, was 
not written in the ink of high idealism and progress but in that of blood, conflict and 
chaos. Niebuhr’s account is one that depicts human beings as being driven by impulse, 
egoism, self- interest and selfish power. For Niebuhr, Western civilization is less than an 
oasis of high idealism and collective social progress; rather it is a bastion of immorality. 
And it is the immorality of Western civilization, particularly the immorality of social 
groups, which is echoed in Moral Man. In the following passage Niebuhr explicates the 
thesis of Moral Man.   
The thesis to be elaborated in these pages is that a sharp distinction must be 
drawn the moral and social behavior of individuals and of social groups, 
national, racial, economic; and that this distinction justifies and necessitates 
political policies which a purely individual ethic must always find 
embarrassing…The inferiority of the morality of groups to that of individuals 
is due in part to the difficulty in establishing a rational social force which is 
powerful enough to cope with the natural impulses by which society achieves 
its cohesion; but in part it is merely a revelation of a collective egoism, 
compounded of the egoistic impulses of individuals, which achieve a more 
vivid expression  and a more cumulative effect when they are united in a 
common impulse than when they express themselves separately and 
discreetly. 2 
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Niebuhr’s concern with the state of Western civilization stems from a reading of history 
that is characterized by conflicts of human interests; individual interests but specifically 
group interests. For Niebuhr, the phenomena of conflicting interests in history undercuts 
the idea that history and civilization are characterized by progress. For Niebuhr, the idea 
that civilization and history are characterized by progress is a myth. Theologically, the 
idea of salvation or redemptive history is refuted by the facts of history, namely, conflicts 
between individuals, nations, races and classes and the rise and fall of civilizations. 
Salvation or redemption in this reading of history is not the final end of history.     
Niebuhr’s reflections on history and civilization are insightful in relation to the 
eclipse of progressive politics in late 20th and early 21st century America. The era of 
robust progressivism, symbolized by “Big Government” social legislation, civil and 
economic rights for black Americans and women, group rights, identity politics and the 
cultural revolutions, has been eclipsed by political conservatism. The dominance of 
conservative cultural and political ideology in the 21st century signals the end of an era, 
the end of a progressive era. One symbol of this eclipse is the decline of the civil rights 
establishment and the fragility of its most significant achievement, affirmative action.  
Ideologically, the decline of the civil rights establishment is connected to the 
diminished influence of political forces that facilitated its rise, namely, liberalism and 
radicalism. In Niebuhr’s reflections on history and civilization, liberalism and radicalism 
are indicted as forces whose assumptions mirror those related to progressive and 
redemptive views of history. In this regard he points to their limitations. I will attend to 
his criticism of liberalism and radicalism in detail later. However, for the purposes of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Ibid., xi-xii. 
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section, I shall attend to Niebuhr’s reflections on history and the myth of progress 
redemption as the ends of history.   
 
History and Salvation 
Throughout his career, Niebuhr challenged the notion that Western civilization is 
on course to attaining some higher stage of moral development. He repudiated the 
evolutionary and progressive views of history that were born during the nineteenth 
century. For Niebuhr, these were myths, supported by science, that were carried into the 
twentieth century. Through texts such as Moral Man, Reflections at the End of an Era, 
Interpretation of Christian Ethics, Nature and Destiny of Man, Beyond Tragedy and 
Faith and History, Niebuhr sought to undermine the notion of progress as it related to 
history. In other words, he resisted the teleological approach to history, which was 
paramount in much of the modern thought of his time. In a passage from Faith and 
History, Niebuhr lays out the dilemma of salvation history, refuting the belief of human 
redemption in history.  
The history of mankind exhibits no more ironic experience than the contrast 
between the sanguine hopes of recent centuries and the bitter experiences of 
contemporary man. Every technical advance, which previous generations 
regarded has the harbinger or guarantor of the redemption of mankind from 
its various difficulties, has proved to be the cause, or at least the occasion, for 
a new dimension of ancient perplexities.3         
 
In another lengthy passage he expands upon the dilemmas connected to the belief in 
salvation history, especially as it was manifested in modern forms cultural and political 
thought prevalent over a century ago.    
 
                                                 
3 Niebuhr, Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1949), 1.  
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A single article of faith has given diverse forms of modern culture the unity 
of a shared belief. Modern shades of all opinion agreed in the belief that 
historical development is a redemptive process…The goal toward which 
history was presumably moving was variously defined. The most unreflective 
forms of historical optimism in the nineteenth century assumed that 
increasing physical comfort and well being were the guarantee of every form 
of advance. Sometimes the enlarging human community was believed to be 
developing inevitably toward human a universal human community, for 
“clans and tribes, long narrowly self- regarding, are finally enlarged and 
compacted into nations; and nations move inevitably, however slowly, into 
relations with one another, whose ultimate goal is the unification of 
mankind.”…Sometimes as in H.G. Wells’ Outline of History, the historical 
process is assumed to be moving toward democratization, as well as the 
universalization, of the human community. The democratic culmination, 
toward which history was presumably moving was frequently defined in 
contradictory terms. Libertarians thought they saw a movement toward 
increasing liberty while equalitarians and collectivists thought they could 
discern a movement toward more intense cohesion.4       
       
Niebhur’s reflections on the redemptive hopes of the generation of which he 
wrote, may be extended to the redemptive hopes of a subsequent generation. The belief in 
redemption in history, popular during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, are mirrored 
in the assumptions, activism and hopes of a generation that emerged more than half a 
century later. Earlier in this chapter, I suggested that we have experienced the passage of 
an era, an era of progressive politics. That progressive era of which I have spoken had it 
genesis with the rise of the Civil Rights/Baby Boomer generation. In many respects, what 
Niebuhr forwarded about an entire generation of the late 19th and early 20th centuries is 
applicable to the social movements of the sixties, seventies and their impact in the 
subsequent decades. The children of Civil Rights/ Baby Boomer generation, especially 
those who had a faith in progressive politics were swept away by redemptive hopes. 
Redemptive social hopes were characteristic of the actions and rhetoric of liberals, 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 1-2, 4. 
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feminists, civil rights activists, Marxists and American liberation theologians. There was 
an implied belief that the redemption of America was on the horizon.  
The social explosions of the late 1950s and the decades of the 1960s and 1970s in 
the United States and the fall of colonialism in the third world gave support and 
justification to these assumptions. The social injustice and abuses of prior generations 
were being unsettled and gave way to new freedoms. African Americans and women, in 
particular, achieved more social and political freedom than prior generations. To many, 
the principles of democracy and ideal of justice for all: African Americans, women, the 
underclass, the earth and even animals were finally being realized. The social injustice 
and abuses of prior generations were on their way to permanent elimination. The beloved 
community of Martin Luther King, Jr. seemed a possibility.  
Tragically, like Niebuhr’s generation, whose optimism was crushed by two world 
wars and a depression, the social hopes of this generation have been eclipsed. With the 
dawning of a new era, an era of hardcore social and political conservatism, what appeared 
to be redemption and progress increasingly became mythical. The social injustice and 
abuses of prior generations (of race, gender and class) thought to be eliminated, only 
revived with greater force and sophistication.  
 
The Teleological Dilemma of Redemption and Progress 
In his reflections on history and salvation, perhaps the single problem that 
Niebuhr identified in redemptive and progressive views of history is a flawed teleology 
with regard to human life. Such views fail to make a distinction between purposive and 
ultimate ends. In such views the two are synonymous; purposive ends are also ultimate 
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and may be achieved in history. This implies that a purposive end such as freedom can be 
realized ultimately. For Niebuhr, there is a distinction between the two; purposive ends 
are contingent and given to change due to the flux of history; ultimate ends are eternal 
and outside of the grasp of history. Niebuhr contends that human beings err when 
pursuing purposive ends with pretensions toward ultimacy. This is tantamount to standing 
outside of history and forwarding purposive ends that do not change. For instance, what 
would it mean if one generation forwarded an ultimate goal or a set of ultimate goals for 
every generation that succeeds it?  If freedom is the goal and is at once purposive and 
ultimate then the nature of freedom never changes. It is once and for all. If freedom is 
purposive but not ultimate then the nature of freedom is tentative and given to change. It 
is the once and for all approach to the ends of human life that make redemptive and 
progressive views of history problematic. In the second volume of the Nature and 
Destiny of Man, Niebuhr expands on this teleological and eschatological dilemma in 
relation to history.  
Everything in human life and history moves towards an end. By reason of 
man’s subjection to nature and finiteness this “end” is a point where that 
which ceases to be. It is finis. By reason of man’s rational freedom the end 
has another meaning. It is telos. The double connotation of end as both finis 
and telos expresses, in a sense, the whole character of human history and 
reveals the fundamental problem of human existence. All things in history 
moves towards both fulfillment and dissolution, towards the fuller 
embodiment of their essential character towards death…The problem is that 
the end as finis is a threat to the end as telos. Life is in the peril of 
meaninglessness because finis is a seemingly abrupt and capricious 
termination of the development of life before it has reached its true end or 
telos. The Christian faith understands this aspect of the human situation. It 
shares an understanding of the tension between time and eternity with all 
other religions. But it asserts that it is not within man’s power to solve the 
vexing problem of his subjection to, and partial freedom from, the flux of 
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time. It holds, furthermore, that evil is introduced into history by the very 
effort of men to solve this problem by their own resources.5                       
 
 
The Contingent Nature of Social Achievements 
Because the purposive ends of human life are not ultimate, Niebuhr contented that 
there is no such thing as a final or permanent social achievement. All human 
achievements, whether in the arena of politics, religion or intellectual life, are tentative. 
This is due primarily to the relativities of history. Niebuhr maintains that if there is one 
thing that history teaches about the creations of human beings, and the human tendency 
to replace and destroy such creations, is that nothing lasts forever. The hopes and 
achievements of one generation recede and give way to the hopes, dreams and 
achievements of another. The rise and fall of civilizations, the ascension and descent of 
human systems of thought and the onset of wars, prevent any human achievement from 
being eternal. And for Niebuhr the fundamental source of this relativity is the egoism of 
human beings, an egoism, which spawns human achievement, but can also undermine 
such achievements.  
History is filled with many achievements and constructions which “have their 
day and cease to be.” The rise and fall of empires and civilizations are the 
most obvious examples of the pluralistic aspect of history, but they are not, 
by any means, the only manifestations of this aspect. This rise and fall of 
particular governments and oligarchies within a given civilizations, the 
growth and decline specific cultural traditions, or of eminent families in a 
community or of various types of voluntary associations, or of even more 
minor historical concretions, are equally illustrative of the pluralism of 
history.6               
  
                                                 
5 Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man Volume 2: Human Destiny (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 1996), 287. 
6 Ibid., 302. 
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As we shall see in the next section, Niebuhr’s assertions regarding the relativity of 
human achievements are constitutive of his reflections on history in relation to his life 
long concern with “human nature,” for it is through history that human nature is 
understood. His reflections on the tentative nature of human achievements are traced 
back to Niebuhr’s earliest political reflections, Moral Man and Reflections, respectively. 
However, it is the second volume of the Nature and Destiny of Man, Faith and History 
and Beyond Tragedy, that the relative nature of human achievements are made explicit. 
Furthermore, what is also significant about Niebuhr’s reflections on history is that no 
human achievement is worthy of being granted absolute va lue and loyalty, for such 
absolutism is a source of idolatry. Also, because the relative achievements lack absolute 
value, they can often lead to despair and disillusionment when they are dissolved or fail 
to satisfy human hopes.  
The discipline of history was central to Reinhold Niebuhr’s ethical and 
theological reflections. For Niebuhr, the study of history, in his case of Western 
Civilization, is what shatters myths regarding moral progress through the evolution of 
human rationality and technology. History also undercuts the fulfillment of political and 
religious utopian visions such as Marxism and even primitive Christianity. Niebuhr 
viewed history as a discipline that provides a big picture of human limits and 
possibilities. It is a portrait of how complex human existence has been, and it is 
indispensable for understanding current human realities. For Niebuhr, human freedom, its 
limits and possibilities, is determined by history. History exposes the fallible character of 
human life. Interestingly, it is the fallible character of human life that gives further insight 
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into his criticism of redemption in history, and it is to this aspect of Niebuhr’s thought 
that we now turn.  
 
Niebuhr’s Theological Anthropology 
In many respects, one may look at Niebuhr’s criticism of salvation history from a 
grand view of history. However, to account fully for his outlook one must evaluate his 
view of the human person. Such an account is not only insightful in understanding of the 
myth of salvation and progress in history, but it is also insightful in relation to his views 
on ideology, particularly liberalism and Marxism. Such insight will lead us to consider 
his criticism of the two as well consider why these ideologies have declined in recent 
years.  
Reinhold Niebuhr’s criticisms of faith in progress, liberalism, radicalism and 
historical achievements are influenced by his assumptions regarding human nature. More 
specifically, it is important to understand his conception of human beings as sinners. It is 
here that his critic isms unfold. For the key to understanding Niebuhr lies at the level of 
theological anthropology, this theological anthropology being fully explicated in the first 
volume of The Nature and Destiny of Man.7 Niebuhr posits a theological anthropology 
that employs the classical doctrines of the Image of God and the Fall of Humanity. 
Niebuhr views human beings as composites of both doctrines. For Niebuhr, the former 
represents the transcendent quality of human life, and the latter represent its fallible, 
limited and tragic character. The co-existence of human transcendence and fallibility 
represents, for Niebuhr, a paradox. And sin occurs when human beings attempt to escape 
                                                 
7 Niebuhr’s theological anthropology is fully explicated in the chapter, “Man as Sinner,” in volume one of 
Nature and Destiny of Man: Human Nature (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996).  
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the paradox. He conceives sin as the human attempt to escape the paradox by hiding the 
transcendent or fallible character of human existence. Though the transcendent and 
fallible are co-present in the human attempt to escape, it is the human attempt to hide its 
fallible character, that preoccupies Niebuhr the most.  
There is a single thread that is key to Niebuhr’s anthropology and work overall, 
and that is egoism. For Niebuhr, egoism is the single human force that causes conflict 
between nations, classes and other groups contesting for power and prestige. Niebuhr 
breaks this egoism down in Nietzchean terms as the will to power and the will to live. In 
Moral Man and Reflections, the challenge of human co-existence, the life and death of 
civilizations and the reality of social injustice, is due to the pervasive nature of the will to 
live and the will to power in society. He suggests that egoism is such an all- pervasive 
force that it is difficult to regulate it through human rationality and religiosity, that the 
social strivings of privileged and under privileged classes are under its controlled, and 
that the fanaticism that often accompanies radical political visions is produced by it. 
 
The Limits of Liberalism 
Throughout his career Niebuhr criticized the social optimism of political 
liberalism. For Niebuhr, the social optimism of the political liberalism of his era was 
connected with the progressive views of history, views he found problematic. Niebuhr 
suggested that social optimism of political liberalism was rooted in a misguided faith in 
human rationality, creativity and virtue in relation to society and its possibilities. 
Niebuhr’s criticisms of political liberalism were fundamentally a criticism of 
enlightenment inspired liberalism. In his reading of this tradition, human rationality is 
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central in transforming the moral and social order. For Niebuhr, the liberal focus on 
reason has serious limitations. His reflections on the limitations of liberalism were a life-
long concern that began early in his career with the publication of Moral Man and 
Immoral Society.  
In the second chapter of Moral Man, Niebuhr takes up the limitations of political 
liberalism in relation to social problems. For Niebuhr, the overriding concern is the issue 
of justice. Here, Niebuhr acknowledges a connection between rationality and justice. He 
contends that rationality is necessary for justice to exist in a society. He maintains reason 
attempts to correct the moral dilemmas that are derived from social injustice. For 
Niebuhr, the moralist or moral theorist is involved in an intellectual enterprise that seeks 
to minimize or eliminate the problem of injustice. He points to historical periods such as 
the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment and particular moralists such as Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, that have attempted to make justice a rational force in 
society. However, despite these efforts at lessening or eliminating the problem of 
injustice, the problem remained. For Niebuhr, the persistence of injustice is not simply a 
matter of having more or less reason in society. Rather, it is a matter of reason being 
eclipsed by other forces that do not conform to rationality. The forces that he has in mind 
are psychological: impulsive egoism, the will to power and the will to live. For Niebuhr, 
theses are forces that lessen the impact of justice in society. In a passage that sets the tone 
for his concerns, as well as identifies his audience, Niebuhr addresses what he perceives 
as a flawed confidence in rationality in relation to social progress.  
Inasfar as this treatise has a polemic interest it is directed against those 
moralists, both religious and secular, who imagine that the egoism of 
individuals is being progressively checked by the development of rationality 
or the growth of a religiously inspired goodwill and that of nothing but the 
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continuance of this process is necessary to establish the social harmony 
between all the human societies and collectives. Social analyses and 
prophecies made by moralists, sociologists and educators upon the basis of 
these assumptions lead to a very considerable moral and political confusion 
of our day. They completely disregard the political necessities in the struggle 
for justice in human society by failing to recognize those elements in man’s 
collective behavior which belong to the order of nature and can never be 
brought completely under the domination of reason or conscience. They do 
not recognize that when collective power, whether in the form of imperialism 
or class domination, exploits weakness, it can never be dislodged unless 
power is raised against it. If conscience and reason can be insinuated into the 
resulting struggle they can only qualify but not abolish it. 8 
 
 
John Dewey: The Exemplar Liberal Optimist 
In Niebuhr’s criticism political of liberalism, he addresses an entire generation of 
optimistic political liberals. He singles out representatives from this generation who 
embody the liberal optimism that he challenges. One such representative is John Dewey. 
Niebuhr targets John Dewey, whose faith in social progress, predicated upon human 
rationality, is for him, shortsighted. For Niebuhr, liberals such as Dewey had a misplaced 
faith in social progress that was derived from the scientific and technological innovations 
of his day. He possessed a great faith in the scientific method, especially in matters of 
education and morals. According to Niebuhr, this faith in scientific method results from 
the achievements of the natural sciences and the belief that the procedures of science are 
applicable to social life. This faith in scientific method leads liberals like Dewey to 
believe that human social problems will disappear through proper education, education 
informed by scientific methodology. Such liberals see human social problems as the 
result of irrational beliefs, social myths and unquestioned traditions. It is through proper 
instruction, expanding human rationality through education, that the social problems 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 23; Moral Man and Immoral Society. 
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stemming from irrational beliefs, social myths and unquestioned traditions are overcome. 
It is precisely this kind of intellectual outlook that Niebuhr criticizes. For him, this sort of 
outlook on science and human rational powers is shortsighted and tantamount to bad 
faith. For Niebuhr, such a faith in human rationality, does not acknowledge the 
limitations of reason in relation to improving social life.        
 
Liberalism in the Face of Power 
Niebuhr’s critique of Dewey’s faith in rationality and social progress is one 
dimension of a larger criticism of a liberal-minded generation whose faith in social 
progress was similar to Dewey’s. In an essay entitled “The Wise Men and the Mighty 
Men,” Niebuhr concerns about the limits of rationality and social change is expanded. 
Here, Niebuhr deals with the limits of liberal thought in the face of power and the failures 
of social liberals in transforming the conscience of the powerful. For the most part, it is a 
reflection on progressivism in a tragic society. Here he makes a distinction between the 
“wise” in society: educators, social scientists, religionists, philosophers and intellectuals 
in general, and the mighty: the bureaucrats, business people, politicians and overall 
power holders in society. Niebuhr contends that the wise are impotent in relation to the 
mighty in terms of persuading the mighty to share their resources and developing a social 
conscience. He further maintains that this relationship between the wise and the mighty 
and how they interact is one that recurs throughout history. For the most part, it is a 
relationship that is characterized by the triumph of power-holders over moralists. This 
relationship is spoken to in the fo llowing passage.  
The wise and learned men, the seers and saints, the philosophers, social 
scientists and religious idealists who seek to dissuade the oligarchs of our era 
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from their suicidal policies, conform to an old tradition. Since the dawn of 
history there have been men of wisdom and virtue who stood before the king 
to speak the truth. The modern wise men have greater confidence that their 
advice will be heeded than their predecessors had. But the court preachers 
and the prophets of righteousness of every age have had something of that 
confidence when they were either defying or cajoling the men of power. 
Their advice and wisdom seemed to them so logical and persuasive that they 
could never understand why the potentates should not be convicted of evil by 
their strictures and turned to paths of righteousness by their guidance. The 
priest or the philosopher standing before the king is a perpetually recurring 
theme in human history. It is symbolic of the contrast between the conscience 
of society and its imperial impulses, a contest which conscience does not 
frequently gain the victory. 9    
 
Niebuhr’s reflections on the disjunction between the mighty and the wise are 
simply reflection on power over against social consciousness. In relation to the interests 
of the powerful social consciousness and even criticism are limited. In our time this 
dynamic is played out in the image of advocacy groups such as the NAACP, the ACLU, 
NOW, Amnesty International and etc., petitioning aid from powerful institutions such as 
churches, corporations and government, only to have their petition lost in bureaucratic 
red tape or even ignored altogether. It is played out in the peace activist that protests war 
and the environmentalist who wants to preserve the earth. Both are subject to being 
ignored by the powerful, government leaders and corporations. It is played out through 
the cries of an activist like the Rev. Al Sharpton, protesting police brutality and racial 
profiling by law enforcement officers in the streets of New York. He brings criticism and 
consciousness to the powerful yet such consciousness does not promise any decision by 
those with power to make a difference.   
Niebuhr’s reflections suggest that power may prevail over wisdom and morality. 
Under this scenario, public moralists within a society may be pushed to the margins, 
                                                 
9 Reinhold Niebuhr, Reflections on the End of an Era  (New York and London: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1934), 40.   
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garnering minimal support for their causes. Moral causes can run the gamut from jobs 
and job training for poor people, workplace discrimination, improving public education, 
universal health care, prison reform, HIV/AIDS and etc. There is a sense in which the 
interests connected with such causes are not commensurate with the interests of those 
who can make a difference, policy makers with political and financial clout. Further, one 
may consider various kinds of moral criticism; that of African Americans, feminists, gays 
and lesbians, and measure how they are valued and attended to by the power-holders of 
American society. The point that Niebuhr makes is that one cannot assume that a 
particular moral stance promises the allegiance of those who possess the power to make a 
difference.  
 
The Stubbornness of the Powerful 
Niebuhr suggests that power prevails over wisdom and morality because power-
holders of a society have little interest in carrying out the objectives and ideals, no matter 
how progressive or beneficial to others, pursued by a moralist or class of moralists. The 
moralist may urge power-holders to act in the interests of others, particularly the 
disinherited. However, power-holders may ignore their compulsions altogether. Again, 
this occurs when the interests of the moralist collide with that of power-holders. For 
Niebuhr, if power-holders do extend power to the moralist cause it is when there is no 
conflict of interest. In this case, power-holders will embrace the criticisms of moralist’s 
as long as it does not conflict with the power-holder’s interests and goals.  
Usually the man of power does not yield. He beguiles and captivates his more 
guileless counselors and dismisses or even destroys his more astute and 
courageous ones. Frequently he allows himself to be criticized as long as 
criticism does not threaten his policy…Some of our modern critics of the 
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social order take mere criticisms so seriously because they have not yet 
learned that rulers and men of power are offended by criticism only when it is 
implemented by political policy. Moral critics are tolerated; but the same 
toleration is not extended to political foes…Only when it threatens to arouse 
political resentments and to create an inimical political power is it a peril to 
the oligarch and dealt with accordingly.10    
 
How does this understanding of power connect to contemporary society? Fortunately, 
American society is not under the rule of an oligarch or dictator, who at any moment can 
silence their critics through death. However, we do have a representative from of 
government where the reigning political party and ideology can limit the ideology of its 
opposition. Consider the posture of the Republican Party and its conservative political 
ideology, in relation to the progressive agenda of the Democratic Party. In these early 
days of the 21st century, there is a sense in which the conservative eclipse of progressive 
politics is due to a lost tolerance for a progressive agenda. Though political conservatism 
has not killed a progressive agenda, it certainly has neutralized its moral force.   
Beyond toleration, the inability of the moralist to penetrate the conscience of the 
power-holders has to do with the power-holders not sharing the same conscience of the 
moralist.  
The recalcitrance and stubbornness of the man of power before the strictures 
and admonitions of the wise man are not simply due to personal defects or 
self-deceptions. The cause lies in representational character of the oligarch. 
He expresses not only his own impulses but those of a social group, a class or 
a nation. He is the incarnation of a raison d' etat. 11  
 
What Niebuhr suggests regarding the representational character of the oligarch is 
expressed in contemporary politics. In the United States, the moral causes championed by 
liberal moralists have been countered by power-holders whose interests lie outside of 
those whom liberal moralist represent, the disinherited. The conservative stronghold over 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 42. 
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politics in the United States in the early 20th century is one portrait of this reality. In 
many respects, the political liberalism of prior eras, characterized by robust social polices 
that benefit powerless classes in society, are incommensurate with the interests and social 
policies of political conservatism that serve interest of the rich and powerful in American 
society.     
Overall, Niebuhr’s reflections on the limits of political liberalism imply that 
confidence in the powers of human rationality and goodwill betrays the brutal realities of 
struggle and conflict in the arena of politics. It is shortsighted to ignore the egoistic and 
self- interested elements of human behavior, which make a just society difficult. For him, 
fidelity in human rationality and virtue are limited and only serve as qualifiers of human 
conflict, but in no way eradicates human conflict. For the most part, faith in human 
rationality and consciousness is limited in the face of power. 
For all these reasons the men of power are not as amenable to the counsels of 
the wise men as the whole school of liberal rationalist assume. There is 
something rather pathetic about the simple confidence of our social scientists 
and preachers of international and economic righteousness in the redemptive 
power of their advice. They are quite sure that nothing but “cultural lag” 
prevents modern society from curing its vices. They attribute to disinterested 
ignorance what ought to be ascribed to interested intelligence. Even when 
they recognize the force of self- interest in social policy, they preserve a 
simple faith in their ability to persuade society to cease from the suicidal 
policy of pursuing self- interest too narrowly. 12      
 
 
The Stubbornness of the Disinherited 
Though Niebuhr’s reflections are confined to the relation between the liberal-
minded optimist and the powerful decision-makers of society, I would go further and 
include the disinherited in the equation. There is a sense in which the moral stubbornness 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Ibid., 43. 
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of power-holders may be extended to the powerless or the disinherited of society. In this 
regard, the question must be raised: Are the disinherited more eager to embrace the 
criticism of moralists than power-holders? In harkening back to the example of the Rev. 
Al Sharpton and his concerns about police brutality and racial profiling this question is 
begged. Not only must Sharpton persuade persons with power to take note of his cause, 
but he must also win the support of the disinherited on whose behalf he purports to speak. 
Consider an example from more than a generation ago, involving the leadership of Martin 
Luther King, Jr. and civil rights movement in the United States. Can it be said in no 
uncertain terms that all African Americans of his generation were eager to embrace his 
cause and leadership? Did he not claim to represent their interests? Can it be said that 
there were African Americans who rejected his cause and leadership? This writer thinks 
so. What is the point of such a question?  This point is, as Niebuhr suggests, rational 
moral suasion does not promise social progress.     
Overall, Niebuhr’s his criticisms of the social optimism of political liberalism 
were directed primarily at a liberal minded power-holders, namely, intellectuals and 
decision makers of his time; educators, philosophers, social scientists, the clergy, 
theologians and others whose livelihood involved interpreting and managing society. 
Like Niebuhr’s reading of John Dewey, such persons constituted a liberal minded class of 
citizens that were misguided by the myth of progress. Like Dewey, such persons viewed 
growth and development in industry, technology and the sciences as moral growth. Such 
a view suggested that a positive correlation occurred between technological expansion 
and the expansion of moral consciousness, particularly social consciousness. He 
contended that moral consciousness remained underdeveloped despite other 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Ibid., 45. 
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advancements. For his optimistic peers this underdevelopment was understood as 
“cultural lag.” However, Niebuhr understood it in theological terms as sin.  For Niebuhr 
it was the world of politics and business that demonstrated how technical growth does not 
necessarily lead to moral growth. For Niebuhr, it is shortsighted to believe that the 
expansion of moral consciousness leads to social progress. 
In many respects, Niebuhr’s “words to the wise” may be extended to a generation 
of socially optimistic leaders and thinkers who came of age during late 20th century, at the 
height of the social revolutions of the 1960s and 1970s, and are currently in positions of 
influence and power in early 21st century. The wise of this era include: civil rights 
activists, feminists, environmentalists, Marxists, egalitarians and a cadre of left-wing 
political intellectuals, academics, religious leaders, cultural workers, social activists and 
decis ion makers. What characterizes the various utopias, which emerged from this 
generation, is the assumption that historical social problems of American society, e.g. 
racism, classism and sexism, to name a few, could be overcome overnight. It was 
assumed that with the appropriate ideologies, political organizations and cultural 
education, such historical social problems could be overcome completely. These 
assumptions were supported by unprecedented social events, e.g. the civil rights and 
women’s movement the sexual revolution and other social movements of that era, which 
implied that American society was on its way to utopian realization. Tragically, cultural, 
political and religious conservatism in 21st century has challenged these assumptions. In 
many respects, the various utopias within this generation fall under Niebuhr’s critique of 
the optimism of intellectuals, decision-makers, religious leaders, social activists and 
persons who influenced public opinion in the early 20th century.                
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The Limits of Radicalism 
Throughout his entire career, from his earliest political reflections in Moral Man 
to his analysis of democratic political theory in The Children of Light and the Children of 
Darkness, Niebuhr engaged Marxist economic and political theory. He had much to say 
about Marxism, its advocates and goals, and its possibilities as a radical vision for 
society. With the exception of Moral Man, which in many ways was influenced by 
Marxist themes, the bulk of Niebuhr’s reflections on Marxism were negative. Niebuhr 
viewed Marxism and the kind of radicalism it inspired as utopian. 13 
Niebuhr’s criticism of Marxism may be extended to liberation theologies in North 
America, many of which borrow language from Marx’s lexicon. Black liberation 
theology, feminist theology, womanist theology and other liberationist theologies that 
seek to change the world are influenced at some level by Marx. Not only are theologies 
of liberation implicated under Niebuhr’s critique of Marx, the Marx inspired wing of the 
American cultural and political left is also indicted. The impulse to usher in a new world 
order and the romancing of the oppressed are features of liberation theologies and left-
wing cultural and political thought that fall under Niebuhr’s criticism of Marx.  
 Though the bulk of Niebuhr’s reflections on the Marxist vision were negative, he 
did acknowledge its insights regarding the impact of capitalism on the underprivileged 
classes, the need for structural transformation and its affirmation of the revolutionary 
potential of the proletariat. He was in agreement with the Marxist critique of capitalistic 
                                                 
13 An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York and London: Harper Brothers Publishing, 1935) and 
Reflections on the End of an Era  (New York and London: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934) are texts where 
Niebuhr levels substantive criticism toward Marxism. In the former, such criticism is concerned with the 
limits of socialism as an economic system. The latter is concerned with the political fanaticism that is 
sometimes connected to those who adhere to Marxian doctrine. Though he was empathetic towards the 
outlook and social hopes of Marxism, Niebuhr viewed both as being impractical and in some instances 
dangerous.  
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industrial society, that it is fundamentally a creator and perpetrator of poverty and 
economic injustice for the working class. In fact, in his early reflections on the problems 
of Western Civilization, one of the demons that he names and calls for its demise is 
capitalism. However, he was aware of the depths of capitalism and the hold it has on the 
working and business classes. He knew that it would not dissolve overnight, if at all. He 
conceded the religious dimension of the Marxist vision in terms of its goals and the zeal 
of its advocates. For Niebuhr, the Marxist vision mirrored the apocalypticism of the 
Hebrew prophets and the Christian scriptures, and the passion of its advocates was 
similar to that of the most die-hard Christian evangelists. Overall, Niebuhr viewed 
Marxism as a radical social vision, which exposed economic injustices and sought to 
remedy such injustices through revolutionary social transformation. He regarded its 
criticisms of society as undeniable and necessary. His early ethical and political 
reflections in Moral Man attest to his appreciation of Marx. However, he did not see its 
methodology as plausible nor its goals as achievable in history. Overall, he did not think 
that it was humanly possible to create a “Kingdom of God” on earth, that it is not possible 
to forward an alternative to capitalism that would create happiness for all. Hence, the 
economic hopes of Marxism are unrealistic.  
Niebuhr viewed Marxism and the radical economic and political vision that its 
adherents advocated as being thoroughly utopian. For Niebuhr, the ideal of a 
classless/socialist society that it sought after were not possibilities that could be achieved 
in history. He admired the noble and buoyant hopes of Marxism, but felt that pervasive 
human egoism and the permanency of evil thwart the fulfillment of the Marxist vision. 
For the most part, Niebuhr viewed Marxism as an apocalyptic mythology. In his view, it 
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is similar to the apocalypticism of the Hebrew prophets. As an apocalyptic vision 
Marxism contends that the forces of injustice and inequality will ultimately be eliminated 
in history, with the triumph of the disinherited or the oppressed over their oppressors. 
Similar to the Hebrew prophets, though Niebuhr does not specify which prophets, 
Marxism renders a prophecy of doom upon the immediate social order, calling for new 
social arrangements, a new social order. And the oppressed or proletariat are at the center 
of bringing about this new social order. In this regard, Niebuhr maintains,  
In common with apocalpytic religion it transmutes an immediate pessimism 
into an ultimate optimism by its hope in the final establishment of an ideal 
social order through a miracle of history. In the case of Marxism the 
proletariat is the active agent of this consummation: yet its success would be 
impossible without the activity of God who casts the mighty from their seats 
and exalts them of low degree.14 
 
For Niebuhr, Marxism is a secularized religion with a triumphant social vision, albeit a 
utopian one. It is the attempt to demolish an imperfect and relative social order and 
replace it with an eternal and perfect one.  
The anarchistic millennium of Marxism, where each will give according to 
his ability and take according to his need, in which all social conflicts will 
finally be resolved and all human needs satisfied, is the perfect product of a 
naturalistic religion which tries vainly to domesticate the eternal and absolute 
and to fit the vision of perfection into inevitable imperfections of history. 15  
 
For Niebuhr, the utopian vision of Marx was fundamentally a form of 
perfectionism with regard to the social order. The Marxist vision assumes that it can 
guarantee an ideal society, a classless social order where class conflict is non-existent, 
only social harmony. Niebuhr suggests that no such society has ever existed and it is less 
than likely, given the weight of evil, that one ever will. He suggests that Marxists are 
                                                 
14 Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York and London: Harper and Brothers 
Publishing, 1935), 18. 
15 Ibid. 18. 
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naïve in believing that their vision can resolve the ambiguities and paradoxes in history 
that are tied to injustice. In other words, Marxists are shortsighted in thinking that their 
vision serves as the final answer to the problem of economic injustice. In assuming that 
the Marxist vision is the final answer the advocates of Marxism deny the fallible nature 
of their perspective. In speaking to this issue of the fallible nature of the Marxist vision 
Niebuhr asserts the following, “It has no means of discovering that its visions and dreams 
are relative to partial interests and temporary perspectives and that even the universal 
element in them will loose its universality and unqualifiedness when it is made in 
concrete history. 16” In his overall criticism of the Marxist vision, Niebuhr maintains that 
the Marxist has same problem as the liberal, the naturalist and the philosophical idealists 
and that is, the Marxist believes that human perfection in economics, politics and 
philosophy is possible. Niebuhr disagrees. 
 
The Limits of Radicalism and North American Theologies of Liberation 
What would it mean to apply Niebuhr’s criticisms of Marxism and radicalism to 
contemporary forms of radicalism today, such as North American theologies of 
liberation? Are not North American theologies of liberation instances of radicalism? For 
the most part, Niebuhr’s reflections on Marxism point to the fallible nature of radicalism. 
He maintains that radicalism is not immune to, and does not adequately account for the 
ambiguities and paradoxes of history. Can the same be said about North American 
theologies of liberation? Furthermore, Niebuhr suggests that radicalism pretends to have 
the final answer to such ambiguities and paradoxes. Herein lies the limitations and even 
dangers of radicalism; it promotes a dangerous absolutism with regard to how to 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 19. 
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adequately address the economic and political issues facing a society.  In my estimation, 
North American theologies of liberation commit this error.   
There is a sense in which a North American liberation theology such as black 
liberation theology pretends to have the final answer to the political and economic 
challenges, that confront African Americans. In this regard, it courts a dangerous 
absolutism with regard to the parties that should be involved in addressing such 
challenges and how such challenges are to be addressed. Under such conditions, the 
participation of whites, in the cause of black liberation, are limited and in some respects 
prevented altogether. Overall, it does not lend itself to the possibility of democratic 
political discourse and coalition building that is democratic in nature. In the concluding 
chapter of this dissertation, I expand on this issue in greater detail. However, the issues 
outlined above, in connection to Niebuhr’s concerns about Marx and radicalism, serve as 
a starting point for this discussion and a consideration of the limits of radicalism and by 
extension, liberation theology.   
  
Assessing Niebuhr’s Reflections 
At the outset of this chapter, I suggested that Niebuhr’s reflections on history, 
liberalism and radicalism, over a half-century ago, are insightful for interpreting the 
eclipse of progressive politics in the United States. I am persuaded that the dominance of 
political conservatism in early 21st century America, is to a great degree, the result of the 
forces outlined in this chapter. The human forces of egoism and collective self- interest 
have trumped liberal morality. By virtue of its perfectionistic impulses and political 
absolutism, radical politics is limited by anti-democratic practices that thwart the 
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fulfillment of its social vision. Given these conditions, it is understandable why Niebuhr 
deemed the idea of progress in history a mythic notion. Overall, this interpretation is 
insightful for interpreting the eclipse of progressive politics in the early 21st century 
America.        
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I suggested that Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian realism is insightful 
for interpreting the eclipse of progressive politics in the United States. I began with an 
appraisal of his reflections on history and suggested that his reflections on history, 
especially the idea of redemption in history, are insightful for thinking about the idea of 
progress and redemption today. Next, I turned to his reflections on liberalism and 
suggested that his reflections on liberalism, particularly liberal rationality in relation to 
power, are insightful for thinking about the limits of liberalism today. I concluded with 
discussion of Niebuhr’s reflections on radicalism and suggested that his reflections on 
radicalism, particularly its perfectionism and absolutism, are insightful for thinking about 
the limits of radicalism today. In the next chapter, I turn to the theological legacy of 
Benjamin Elijah Mays. There, I discuss Mays’s legacy as a resource for thinking about 
progressive politics in a conservative age. With a democratic theological and political 
outlook, and a confidence in practical strategies for social change such as education, 
Mays’s legacy is a resource for progressive politics in our age. With this being said, I 
shall now turn to Mays.       
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
PRAGMATISM AND SOCIAL HOPE: THE THEOLOGICAL LEGACY OF 
BENJAMIN ELIJAH MAYS 
 
 
 
What the black man needs most are: a better education; technical skills to enable him to 
succeed in a highly competitive society; decent jobs that pay enough to enable him to live 
comfortably above the poverty line; adequate housing, with the consequent abolition of 
slums and ghettos; political strength to influence voting to his benefit and to defeat racist 
politicians; a sense of pride, self- respect, and self- identity; and a sense of solidarity. I 
believe that neither black- nationalism nor black separatism has any magic power to 
provide for the needs of black people. Separatism of itself will not wipe out slums or 
ghettoes, provide adequate jobs and wages, or create a superior educational system for 
black children. Separatism may mirror the despair which drives a black man to wish to 
escape entirely from association with whites. Or it may stem from the desire of blacks to 
control their own destiny for the good or for ill. But it can never be a lasting solution.  
….The central questions confronting every black man are what can he do to enlarge his 
freedom, to create in himself a sense of his inherent worth and dignity, and to develop 
economic and political security. He must also consider what can be done to help build a 
society where each person has the opportunity to develop his mind, body, and spirit 
without the imposition of artificial barriers. Are these things more likely to be achieved in 
a separate or nationalistic society than in a so-called integrated society? There is no easy 
way; there are no certain answers.1  
 
 
The quote above represents the disposition of an African American social leader, 
whose work as a Christian minister, scholar, college president and human rights activist, 
serves as a resource for thinking about progressive politics and social transformation in 
the early 21st century. These words belong to Benjamin Elijah Mays. They were written 
at the end of his life, at the end of his autobiography, Born to Rebel.  Mays’s words 
reflect a pragmatic disposition toward the economic and political situation of African 
Americans during the early 1970s. They were written in the aftermath of the Civil Rights 
 79 
 
and Black Power movements. And after a life- long struggle against racism and the 
institution of segregation, he offers what he considers to be, the most feasible path to 
social transformation, in relation to African Americans at that time. In doing so, he 
eschews ethical strategies such as black nationalism and black radicalism, pursued by 
other African Americans of his era. In his estimation, such strategies were highly 
impractical.  
In the following pages, I argue that Mays’s theological legacy is a resource for 
progressive theological thinking and political action in an age of political conservatism.  
My contention is that theological and political insights may be gained from African 
American leaders such as Mays, who addressed what was then called “the Negro 
situation.” The Negro situation involved the economic and political challenges that faced 
African Americans prior to the Civil Rights and Black Power movements. The single 
challenge that faced Mays’s generation was the institution of segregation and its social 
effects upon the then American Negro. In his lifetime, Mays appealed to Christianity, 
democracy and education, as resources for dismantling institutionalized segregation. His 
theological legacy is relevant to our times; it offers a pragmatic approach to social 
transformation that is not fraught with the practical dilemmas associated with liberalism 
and Marxist style radicalism. Mays forwarded a theological perspective that valued 
democracy, and promoted education, that is insightful for creatively engaging political 
conservatism. He spent a lifetime challenging segregation in the American South. His 
legacy as a desegregationist, and an advocate of democracy and education, speaks 
volumes to the novel forms of segregation, sustained by political conservatism in 21st 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 Benjamin Elijah Mays, Born to Rebel: An Autobiography (Athens and London: University of Georgia 
Press, 1987), 308-309. 
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century America. In my estimation, the social and political conservatism that prevails in 
early 21st America, is similar to the political conservatism that sought the preservation of 
a racially segregated America over a half-century ago. However, unlike the 
segregationists of mid-twentieth century America, who supported racial segregation, the 
politics of contemporary political conservatism sustains a segregationist ethos that   
extends beyond race.   
My treatment of Mays’s theological legacy is divided into two chapters. This 
chapter is the first part of my treatment of his legacy. Here, I contextualize his style of 
leadership, social concerns and outline his theological perspective. In the subsequent 
chapter, I discuss his ethical perspective, particularly his moral confidence in education 
as a means of social progress. As far as this chapter is concerned, I will discuss Mays’s 
legacy on three levels. First, I will contextualize his style of leadership and the era in 
which it emerged. Second, I will contextualize his theological perspective. Third, I will 
outline his theological perspective. I conclude this chapter by pointing to the ethical 
significance of his theological legacy. The ethical significance of his legacy is further 
developed in the next chapter.  
 
The Negro Era of African American Leadership and the Ethics of Education 
Benjamin Elijah Mays was a product of what I call the Negro Era of African 
American religious and social leadership.2 The Negro Era spanned from the early to the 
middle of the 20th century. This era emerged at the dawn of the 20th century, one 
generation after Reconstruction. It reached its heights with the Civil Rights movement 
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and began to decline with the Black Power movement. The Negro Era came to a close 
during the 1970’s with the rise of black consciousness. Significant leaders of this era 
were Booker T. Washington, Howard Thurman, Mary McCloud Bethune, W.E.B. 
Dubois, Carter G. Woodson, E. Franklin Frazier, Thurgood Marshall, Fannie Lou 
Hammer and Martin Luther King, Jr. Negro era leaders were members of what W.E.B. 
DuBois called the Talented Tenth, a small number of privileged Negro men and women 
who had access to education, political power and significant social influence. Such 
persons were essentially, “race saviors,” who due to their elite status assumed the social 
burden of uplifting the American Negro from the morass of poverty and ignorance.3 
Negro Era leaders were fundamentally concerned with social reform that included 
institution building within black communities, building pride, self-esteem and self-  
respect among the black masses and the overall emancipating the Negro masses from 
social, economic and political depravation. Negro era leaders worked within as well as 
outside of black communities, being involved in coalition building and amassing 
economic support across racial, ethnic, gender and ideological lines. Moreover, Negro era 
leaders made their concerns inclusive of a broad public, avoiding separatism and 
dogmatism. They were fundamentally pragmatic in their orientation with regard to the 
“race problem” as it was understood at that time. Benjamin Elijah Mays was a public 
theologian of the Negro Era.4 To accent the outlook of Mays and his era, I will use the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Lerone Bennett’s, Before the Mayflower: A History of Black America (New York, New York: 
Penguin Books, 1993) and The Shaping of Black America (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1993) 
for a full treatment of the figures and events that defined the Negro Era. 
3 See W.E.B. Dubois’ The Souls of Black Folk  (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1995) for his 
conception of Race Leadership.  
4 My treatment of Mays as a Negro theologian builds on Mark Chapman’s treatment of him in Christianity 
On Trial: African American Religious Thought Before and After Black Power (Maryknoll, New York: 
Orbis Books, 1996) and a collection of articles in Lawrence Edward Carter’s edited work, Walking 
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adjective Negro instead of black American or African American as a racial description 
for him and the concerns of his era.    
 
Negro Era Leadership and the Ethics of Education 
 For Negro era leaders, one pragmatic route to social transformation, especially 
where the Negro was concerned, and achieving democracy in America, in matters of race, 
was that of education, both secondary and higher education. With the exception of Fannie 
Lou Hamer and Thurgood Marshall, all of the Negro era leaders previously named were 
educators. All worked within the context of Negro Higher Education. On one level or 
another, all viewed the elevated social condition and democratic participation of the 
America Negro in American society, as being contingent upon education. Under 
conditions of segregation, especially where education was concerned, the American 
Negro could only become a partial participant of American democracy. As a pillar of 
morality in the United States, Negro era leaders such as Mays appealed to the necessity of 
education in challenging the institution of segregation. 
 
Pragmatism, Progressive Politics and Segregated American Society 
Mays’s legacy as Negro era leader and public theologian may be characterized in 
pragmatic terms.5 His pragmatism may be understood as the recognition of the limits and 
possibilities that are involved in social transformation.  Mays’s leadership involved the 
mediation between social idealism and social realism. His social goals were creative, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Integrity: Benjamin Elijah Mays, Mentor to Martin Luther King, Jr. (Macon: University of Georgia Press, 
1998)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
5 My characterization of Mays’s leadership as pragmatic is derived from an understanding of the American 
pragmatist tradition, particular early 20th century pragmatism. More specifically, it is the pragmatism of 
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idealistic and lofty, yet they were grounded by historical realities and pursued through 
practical means. In many respects, his pragmatism was contextual. His efforts at social 
reform were impacted by the times and context in which he lived, namely segregated 
Southern society. He was a progressive Negro era theologian, who had to contend with a 
rigid ideology of white supremacy, that was unsympathetic to the idea of racial progress. 
One only has to consider The Conservative Mind of the American South and race 
relations, prior to the Civil Rights movement, to understand the necessity and logic of his 
pragmatism. Since the founding of the colonies to first half of the 20th century, The 
Conservative Mind in the American South has stood as the greatest challenge to 
progressive race relations. During the Negro era, it stood as a limit to progressive race 
relations pursued by Negro and white social reformers. Similar to contemporary America, 
where the dominance of conservative ideology stands in tension with, and as a limit to 
progressive efforts at social change, Mays’s era exhibited the same tensions and 
limitations. Such tensions and limitations called for progressive social goals and 
strategies that were pragmatic in orientation. 
 Despite the historical constraints placed upon Negro era reformers, Mays’s 
pragmatic approach to social transformation was fundamentally progressive. As a 
member of an American society, particularly Southern society where a racial caste 
system stood largely unchallenged, Mays represented progressive social change in 
matters pertaining to race. His life, leadership and overall disposition, stood in 
contradiction to the tradition and custom bound Southern society then characterized by 
the polarized social relations between the then American Negro and white Americans. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
William James that is akin to Mays’s moral disposition. See James’ Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth 
(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996) for a thorough account of Jamesian pragmatism.  
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Mays was fundamentally a desegregationist, and being a desegregationist during the first 
half of the 20th century, especially in the American South, meant being labeled a leftist or 
a communist. In fact, the label of communist was attributed to Mays, mainly by 
segregationists, throughout his adult life. From the standpoint of pro-segregationist white 
Southerners, segregated society was a normal part of their existence that was sanctioned 
by law and divine command. To challenge segregated society, meant challenging law and 
God. From the standpoint of this writer, I understand Mays not as a leftist or communist, 
but as an advocate of progressive social change, particularly in matters in matters 
pertaining to race.  And to be a member of Mays’s era, and pursue a desegregated 
society, located one on the progressive side of race matters. Needless to say, it stood in 
contrast to the conservative side, which sought the preservation of a segregated society.  
 
Mays’s Theology in Context 
 Benjamin Elijah Mays was a public moralist and theologian who wrote 
prolifically.6 Over the course of his career, he published nine books, nineteen chapters in 
books, over fifteen hundred articles in newspapers and two hundred thirty-two articles for 
journals. Also included in his corpus, are hundreds of unpublished speeches and sermons. 
His writings are in no way systematic or strictly academic in nature. Mays used an 
eclectic approach to writing, utilizing the genre’s of scholarly monographs, sermons, 
commercial media and newspaper articles. They were oriented toward a broad audience, 
dealing with a particular social dilemma of his day, namely, segregation and it effects on 
American society. For the most part, his written work was directed at decision-makers, 
                                                                 
6 The Mooreland-Spingarn Research Center at Howard University, in Washington, DC, holds the Benjamin 
Elijah Mays papers. The majority of materials used for this chapter were derived from this source.  
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both white and Negro, in American society. Within his corpus lies his perspective on 
race-relations, Christianity and education. His philosophical and theological perspective 
is reflected in his written work, work that embodies a pragmatic outlook. Before probing 
his corpus, a word must be said about the contours of his theological perspective.  
 
Protestant Liberalism and the Social Gospel 
 Mays was influenced by a tradition of reform oriented Christianity, rooted in 
Protestant Liberalism and championed by the Social Gospel.7 Protestant liberalism and 
the Social Gospel of Walter Raschenbaush in particular, informed Mays’s leadership and 
outlook on Christianity and the social world. His outlook on Christianity, segregated 
society and race relations during his era, was impacted by these forces. His writings, such 
as his dissertation, The Negro’s God, a popular work, Seeking to be Christian in Race 
Relations, a book of sermons, Disturbed About Man, and other writings, are infused with 
a liberal theological perspective and themes from the Social Gospel.  His ecumenical 
affiliations with such organizations as the World Council of Churches and the YMCA, 
and his work with social organizations such as the Urban League, were also informed by 
these forces.  
Mays’s attraction to and embrace of Protestant liberalism and the Social Gospel, 
stemmed mainly from his social concerns, rooted in his Southern upbringing and from his 
exposure to liberal ideas as an undergraduate and graduate student. From his boyhood 
days to the end of his life, Mays had a disdain for the repressive and closed Southern 
society that delayed his personal and educational development, and that of American 
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Negroes. Protestant Liberalism and the Social Gospel were tools he utilized in raising 
questions about and challenging the very society that birthed him. Coupled with his 
Southern background was his education at Bates College and the University of Chicago. 
These institutions were bastions of Protestant Liberalism and promoters of the Social 
Gospel during his era. They provided Mays with the opportunity and context to explore 
reform oriented Christianity. Interestingly, it was the Socia l Gospel in particular, that 
would have far reaching effects upon Mays, to the extent that he would edit a volume of 
Rauschenbaush’s writings during his tenure at Morehouse College.  
 
Democracy and Christian Universalism 
Another striking feature of Mays’s theological perspective is the theme of 
democracy. 8 As we shall see, the theme of democracy permeates his reflections on God, 
humanity and the moral life. In his advocacy of education as a mode of social 
transformation, democracy is the end that is sought. For Mays, the idea of democracy was 
crucial to desegregating American society. The idea Democracy was necessary in 
unsettling the institution of segregation, an institution which for him prevented the 
American Negro from realizing his and her potential and from full participation in a 
democratic society. Because Mays understood democracy as a value, which ideally 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 For a thorough treatment of the influence of protestant liberalism and the social gospel on Mays’s 
theological formation see Randal M. Jelk’s article, “May’s Academic Formation,” 1917-1936 in “Walking 
Integrity,” 111.   
8 Democracy is a consistent theme in Mays’s writings. Examples of articles dealing with the theme of 
democracy include, “Full Implementation of Democracy” and “Democracy in the U.S.A. and India,” 
Moorland-Spingarn Research Center. For an account of the democratic character of Mays’s thought see 
Verner Randolph Matthews article, “Mays and Racial Justice,” in Walking Integrity, 264. In Randolph’s 
article, the democratic character of Mays’s thought is played out in his understanding of God ,human 
beings and racial justice.  
 87 
 
supported the full realization of the Negro’s potential and participation in American life, 
it became an integral part of his religious and social thought.        
Christian Universalism permeates Mays’s theological perspective. Mays’s 
universalism is inherent in his appeal to Christian doctrines. As we shall see, his 
articulation of the doctrines of God, humanity and Christ is directed toward all human 
beings.9 For him, the applicability of these doctrines is not limited to one racial group, 
class or geographical region. As ethical issues, Mays viewed racism and segregation as 
not simply problems of the American Negro, but human problems that affected all of 
American society. Furthermore, he understood the race problem as not simply an 
American problem but a problem of international proportions. His travels to India, Africa 
and Europe, allowed him to see the global dimensions of race. It was a global 
understanding of race that precluded Mays from relegating the issue to Negro 
communities, or to the segregated American South. Under these terms, the 
enfranchisement of the American Negro was connected to the basic human rights 
accorded to all human beings.  
 
Seeking to be Christian in Race Relations  
In 1954, Mays attempted to flesh out a theological basis for improving race 
relations and dismantling segregation. This effort emerged in the form of a popular book 
entitled, Seeking to be Christian in Race Relations. Seeking was the crystallization of a 
theme and theological concern, which Mays had taken up in prior article writing. In these 
                                                                 
9 In his theological writings, Mays consistently affirmed the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of 
God, themes that were integral to the social gospel. In articles such as, “In Behalf of All: We Affirm the 
Brotherhood of Man and the Fatherhood of God” and “Of One Blood: Scripture and Science Makes No 
Race Distinctions,” Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Mays employs a strategic universalism to 
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articles and this book, Mays’s fundamental theological perspective on race relations 
unfolds. In Seeking, Mays presents a theological perspective that begins with God and 
ends with anthropology. For Mays, God is a universal reality, upon which all of humanity 
and earthly phenomena depend. Mays viewed God as transcendent and absolute. As far 
as the moral existence of human beings is concerned, Mays viewed human moral life as 
being precarious and in need of transcendent principles for earthly guidance. In this 
regard, Mays articulated an anthropology that was at once pessimistic and hopeful. In his 
fundamental theological perspective, Mays mediated the poles of the one and the many. 
He posited a monistic conception of God in relationship to a monistic conception of the 
human race. At the same time, he posited the plurality of the human species and moral 
life, in relation to a monistic conception of God. As far as ethical faith is concerned, 
ethical faith as consisted of a mediation between the transcendent and the human. He 
viewed this mediation as best demonstrated in the life and witness of Jesus Christ. For 
Mays, Jesus Christ is the model for ethical living and the paradigm for human agency. It 
is from this fundamental theological standpoint that Mays challenged the morality of 
racism and the institution of segregation. In an early passage, Mays provides the rationale 
for his endeavor.  
I believe that in seeking a basis for the elimination of race prejudice and 
discrimination, we must find such a basis in something other than man. It is 
not enough for us to call upon members of different races to be decent toward 
one another for the mere sake of humanity, science or democracy. The basis 
for good relations is found in the Christian religion, in the proper 
understanding of the Christian doctrines of man, Christ, and God, and in the 
application of Christian insights and convictions in everyday living. 
Therefore, this book begins with a statement about God.10    
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
challenge the ontological assumptions of segregated society. Also, see Mark Chapman’s, “The Theology of 
Race Relations,” in Christianity On Trial, for an insightful account of Mays’s Christian universalism.   
10 Benjamin E. Mays, Seeking to Be Christian in Race Relations (New York: Friendship Press, Inc. 1957), 
xx.  
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Mays believed that the Christian faith, properly understood, could improve race 
relations. Whether Christianity contributed to poor race relations and segregated society 
did not enter his reflections. Though he recognized the racism of white Christianity, he 
conceded the value of the Christian faith in countering racism and segregation. For Mays, 
it was a poor understanding of Christianity, on the part of whites, which sustained poor 
race relations and segregation. A proper understanding of the Christian doctrines of God, 
humanity and Christ was necessary in improving race relations and dismantling 
segregation in American society. 
 
In the Beginning God: Radical Monotheism 
 Mays’s theological reflections begin with God. The God he presents is monistic, 
transcendent and absolute. For Mays, all of creation is dependent upon this one, 
transcendent and absolute God. All that is dependent upon God includes humanity, earth, 
animal life, the fruits of the human imagination, namely, science and the future. He 
maintains that the dependent nature of humanity in relation to God necessitates belief in 
God. His premise and conclusions are derived from his reading of the creation narratives 
in Genesis, and an empirical view of the world, including human history, science and the 
precarious nature of human existence. Mays’s theological standpoint is outlined as such: 
1) Humanity Is Dependent Upon God 2) Tomorrow’s World Is Dependent Upon God, 3) 
The Scientist Is Dependent, 4) Humanity Must Believe and 5) The Christian God Is The 
God of Every Race. Let us now turn to Mays’s perspective in outline. 
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Humanity Is Dependent Upon God 
For Mays, human beings have a fragile existence. Human beings are mortal and 
incapable of being absolutely self-sufficient. Human beings have no control over death 
and are dependent upon the earth’s resources to sustain their lives. Human beings are 
ultimately dependent and for Mays the ultimate source for human subsistence is God.  
Call it fate or call it God, man is dependent upon something for the span of 
his life upon the earth. Somewhere in his earthly existence he comes up 
against that inevitable event that we call death. He reaches the point where 
the things upon which he depends for life, such as food, air, sunshine, water, 
science, wealth, learning and friends no longer sustain him. He dies. And 
there is nothing he can do about it.11  
 
The assertion that human beings are dependent upon God is simultaneously an 
acknowledgement of human fallibility. As we shall see, human fallibility is an important 
feature of Mays’s anthropology, especially at the level of morality. In this regard, the 
reality of human fallibility is vital to his moral criticism of the American South, 
particularly institutionalized segregation and the ideology of white supremacy.  In Mays’s 
thought, these institutions pretend to be ultimate and contradict the conviction that human 
beings are fallible and ultimately depend upon on God.    
 
 Tomorrow’s World Is Dependent Upon God 
Mays valued the human ability to plan for the future, yet he acknowledged that 
there are limits to the kind of future that human beings may create. Human beings may 
plan for the future, but in no way can they guarantee what tomorrow may bring. The 
lessons of history demonstrate how the world of the great planners, civilization builders 
and architects of the past, could not foresee the fate of their monuments and civilizations. 
                                                                 
11 Ibid., 3. 
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There are always unforeseen forces that can ruin or propel the works of human genius 
and creativity. For Mays, only God sees and shapes the future, for the future is dependent 
upon God.     
The Christian affirms further that man is dependent upon God for the kind of 
world that he can build…Man cannot build the world as he pleases. Many 
have tried it-the Pharoahs, Cyrus the Great, Nebuchadnezzar, Alexander the 
Great, the Caesars, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm, Hitler, Mussolini, and many 
others-but to know avail…There are forces at work in the universe that are 
beyond the control of man. 12  
 
For Mays, the future of a civilization, society and even the end of the world, is open. 
Consider this meaning of the future and even history in relation to Mays’s social 
concerns. It suggests that finality cannot be granted to the work, of the architects, of 
Southern American society. For those who intended Jim Crow and the doctrine of 
separate but equal to be eternal, Mays suggests that such permanence is not possible. 
Consider this view of history in relation to the Civil Rights movement that was beginning 
to take off at the time of Mays’s writing. It stood as an unprecedented challenge to 
Southern society and the deterministic nature of then race relations.  Overall, Mays’s 
view is deterministic in relation to his understanding of God. However, the point is that 
the course of human history is not in human hands.      
 
The Scientist Is Dependent Upon God 
Mays had a tremendous respect for the discoveries resulting from scientific 
inquiry. In fact, the he turned to the biological sciences in arguing against the idea of 
Negro inferiority. He understood that scientific inquiry promotes greater understanding of 
human beings and the world that human beings dwell in. However, he believed the 
                                                                 
12 Ibid., 4-5. 
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scientist could not probe the raw materials of the world without the possibility of a world 
designed by God. The scientist is dependent upon God because God is the supplier of the 
resources, utilized by the scientist, in probing the world. For Mays, it is God who initially 
ordered the universe, discovered by the scientist, and is ultimately responsible for the 
scientific method. Hence, science is dependent upon God.    
The Scientist who may deny his dependence upon God must rely upon a 
dependable, orderly, trustworthy universe-an orderliness that is there, that he 
discovers, but that he cannot create…the Christian faith contends that the 
scientist is dependent upon God. Without a trustworthy, dependable universe, 
the scientist could not function. 13 
 
Again, Mays’s reflections on the scientist and science, for tha t matter, point back to his 
understanding of human fallibility. Like Reinhold Niebuhr, Mays was aware of the kind 
of intellectual arrogance that results from learning or knowledge acquisition. He did live 
in an era that placed a high premium on the modern mind, a mind informed by the fruits 
of scientific investigation and technological achievements. However, he was concerned 
about the pretension toward self-sufficiency that intellectual discovery can yield. As we 
shall see later, these concerns are taken up  in his reflections on the morality of education. 
Overall, Mays’s reflections on the scientist function to highlight the dependent and 
fallible nature of intellectual work. For Mays, such work is dependent on God.    
 
Humanity Must Believe In God 
Mays contends that human beings are not self-sufficient, yet there is a constant 
human hunger and thirst for self -sufficiency. This quest for self-sufficiency is seen in 
human attempts to control and order the world through science and industry, and it 
reflected in pages of history, in the conquest and building of human civilizations. Mays 
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contends that such hunger and thirst are simply a quest for God. Even the human embrace 
of religion, beyond the Christian faith, reflects this quest. Mays contends that this quest 
for God can only be satisfied by belief in the God of the Christian faith. He suggests that 
the human being must be devoted to something beyond itself to satisfy the quest for the 
absolute.    
The Christian faith makes it clear that man cannot live without God. It is the 
nature of man to look beyond himself for help. The quest for God is a search 
for something upon which one can rely completely. In this sense every person 
is search of God. He must either believe in the God of the Christian faith, 
adopt the god of some other faith or invent a god of his own. He must be 
devoted to something beyond himself that is worthy of complete allegiance.14  
 
In Mays’s thinking, the fact of human fallibility requires faith in the transcendent or of 
God. This promotion of belief in the transcendent or God provides some insight into the 
idealistic character of his theological thinking. Although Mays is adamant about the 
fallible character of human life, the transcendent dimension is just as important. This is 
particularly true with regard to the ideal of racial justice. For Mays, in the broad scheme 
of things, there is a reason why human beings have pretensions toward self-sufficiency. It 
is simply a reflection of the human hunger for God. In many respects, this view parallels 
the concept of “ultimate concern” in Paul Tillich’s thought, where the human search for 
transcendence is simultaneously a search for God. However, unlike Tillich, Mays asserts 
that this search requires belief in God.          
 
The Christian God Is the God of Every Race 
It was suggested earlier that universals permeate Mays’s work. His universalism 
begins with his doctrine of God and its relation to the entire human species. For Mays, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
13 Ibid. 
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there is only one God, the Christian God. This God is transcendent, absolute and 
universal. The Christian God compels the loyalty and devotion of the entire human race, 
including the different races within the human species. For Mays, this God is not partial 
and does not recognize hierarchies based on race, geographic origin and culture. All of 
the variations within the human family are equal from the standpoint of the Christian 
God. Mays contends that the Christian God recognizes and affirms the human quality 
common to the divergent members of the human race. This Christian God utilizes the 
following order when dealing with human beings. First, the Christian God treats members 
of the human family as human beings, second as children of one God, and third, as 
members of a particular race. Mays concludes that this is the God of every Christian.           
No belief in God is adequate unless it is a belief in a universal God, who is a 
God of justice, mercy and love. He cannot be a racial nor a national God. He 
cannot be a class God. He must be a god for all peoples. The God whom 
Christians worship is that kind of God-a universal God, a God of every 
nation, race and clan. When we lose sight of this fact, only a god of a 
particular nation, culture, or race is left. The true Christian can believe in no 
other kind of God. In his dealing with people, he sees them first as human 
beings, children of one God, and second as members of a particular race.15                
 
Mays’s final thesis is a democratic conception of God. In this conception of God, 
especially as it related to human beings, no racial group, social class or nation is given 
privilege. Consider what it means to suggests that God does not privilege whites, the 
wealthy, the American Negro, Asians, the economically disenfranchised and etc. 
Consider this understanding of God in connection to doctrine of white supremacy and its 
ordering of the American South of Mays’s era. Mays’s democratic conception of God 
unsettled the privilege and supremacy of then whites of the American South and that of 
any social group or class.      
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
14 Ibid., 6. 
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Overall Mays’s doctrine of God is strategic in that it will aid his criticism of and 
promotion of better race relations in America. It is strategic on two levels: first, by 
forwarding a conception of humanity as being dependent upon God he simultaneously 
promotes the idea of human fallibility. This will be crucial for challenging the morality 
segregated society and the assumption of Negro inferiority. Second, he forwards a 
conception of God that is non-hierarchal in relation to the various racial groupings within 
the human species. Ironically, his conception of God offers an order by which God 
measures human beings. Essentially, it is an ontology where members of the human race 
are first valued as human beings, second as children of one God and third, as members of 
a particular race. The non- hierarchal and ontological aspects of his doctrine of God are 
fundamental to his challenge of racial hierarchy and ontological assumptions regarding 
the American Negro.     
 
“Disturbed About Man”: The Precarious Nature of Human Morality 
Another aspect of Mays’s Theology is anthropology. He did not have a great deal 
of confidence in the morality of human beings. In his own words, taken from the title of 
one of his published books of sermons, he was “Disturbed About Man.” The realities of 
race prejudice, which he dealt with in his own life and in the world, the historical record 
of human abuses wrought upon by other human beings, and the persistent nature of 
human evil in the world, infused in Mays a pessimism regarding the essential goodness of 
human beings. Though pessimism ran through his veins he conceded that human beings 
were unique and capable of extraordinary achievements. The monuments of civilization, 
the fruits of science and technology and the moral possibilities of education gave 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
15 Ibid., 7-8. 
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credence to the possibilities of human virtue. Like Reinhold Niebuhr, Mays conceded that 
the human being is a paradox, a composite of goodness and evil. However, he was more 
inclined to point out the evil dimensions of human existence than the good. In contrast to 
his outlook on God, who for him is absolute and transcendent, Mays viewed human 
moral existence in fallible and precarious terms. 
There is a contradiction in man that is disturbing. He has inherent in his 
nature elements of the divine. He also has inherent in his nature elements of 
the Devil. Man may be good or evil, honest or dishonest, loving or unloving, 
just or unjust. Man is capable of building a heaven or an earth. There is not a 
sure way of determining which of these natures is going to predominate. This 
is true because in making man a free person rather than a machine, God gave 
man the power of choice, the power to decide for himself between good and 
evil.16  
  
Mays turns to classical theological doctrines to articulate his anthropology. There are two 
dimensions to his view of the moral existence of human beings: the uniqueness of human 
beings as implied in the classical doctrine of the Imago Dei, and the fallible morality of 
human beings. Let us now turn to these aspects of his anthropology.   
 
In the Image of God: The Uniqueness of Human Beings 
Mays turned to the creation narratives in Genesis as the basis for understanding 
the uniqueness of human beings. For Mays, human beings are unique because they are 
made in the image of God. The image of God implies that human beings have value and 
importance on a level unlike the rest of creation and such value and importance are 
derived from the image of God. In other words, no other aspect of creation, earth, animal 
life, etc., is as significant as the human being. Furthermore, the uniqueness of the human 
being means that the human being has a unique role to play and status in the universe. In 
                                                                 
16 Ibid., 61. 
 97 
 
Mays’s words, the Image of God means that the human being is somebody. For Mays, the 
Christian faith affirms the value, “somebodiness” and overall uniqueness of the human 
being. As we shall see, Mays will connect this view of the human being with the work of 
science. For the uniqueness of the human being is supported by science.    
The Christian faith as revealed in the Bible makes it clear that man is unique 
among creatures of the earth. It is not too much to say that when God reached 
man in the creative process, he did for man what he did not do for any other 
creature. The author of Genesis tells us that God breathed into man’s nostrils 
his own breath, and man became a living soul. God did not do this for the 
beasts of the field nor the fowls of the air nor for the fish of the sea-only for 
man. The writer is accounting for the uniqueness of man. He shows clearly 
that man is “somebody” and that he is important not in his own right, but 
because God conferred dignity and value upon him. For this reason it is a 
foolish notion that man has special distinction merely because he belongs to a 
particular race, nation or family. It is also important to note that when 
referring to creation the author of Genesis makes man a unique creature in his 
declaration that man was created in God’s own image. The Christian faith 
fully comprehends man’s unique place in the universe. Centuries before 
modern science demonstrated man’s superior status, the Christian religion 
had affirmed it.  17  
 
Mays’s turn to the classical doctrine of the Imago Dei in discussing the uniqueness 
of the human being is strategic in challenging racial assumptions regarding the inherent 
inferiority of the American Negro. For Mays, white supremacy deemed the Negro sub-
human with little to contribute to human civilization. The idea of Negro inferiority 
diminished the intrinsic value of the American Negro. The Negro was essentially a 
second- class citizen who was destined to permanent marginality in American society. 
The function of the image of God was to promote the worth and moral possibilities of the 
American Negro. God has granted every member of the human family intrinsic worth. 
Such intrinsic worth undermines the notion of human inequality between the races. To 
exclude a racial group from the human family is to deny the worth of the human being. 
                                                                 
17 Ibid., 9. 
 98 
 
Furthermore, the image of God means that all human beings, including every race and 
class, have something to contribute to civilization. Each human being, from the various 
races and social classes of people, brings something unique to bring to the cultural table. 
For Mays, the uniqueness of human beings cuts across nationality and race. The 
American Negro is just as unique and has just as much to contribute to the world as every 
other member of the human family.     
 
The Fallible Morality of Human Beings 
On the one hand, Mays contends that human beings are unique creatures among 
God’s created order, creatures capable of doing extraordinary things. On another hand, he 
contends that human beings are morally fallible, that human beings are capable of 
committing morally vicious acts. In other words, he suggests that human beings have a 
propensity towards both good and evil. However, for Mays, the human propensity toward 
evil often undermines human goodness. It is the human propensity toward evil that  
creates all manner of evil social conditions such as racial segregation and poverty. What’s 
more, this propensity towards evil is seldom offset by education, an important source of 
human morality, along with religion, which in Mays’s thought functions to foster 
goodness among human beings. Despite being a strong advocate of education, Mays 
knew the limits of knowledge in relation to human morality.  
 The connection between knowledge and virtue is one aspect of Mays’s 
anthropology where the fallible nature of human morality is pronounced. As a champion 
of education Mays understood the connection between learning, knowledge acquisition 
and human moral development. Simultaneously, he also understood that learning and the 
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increase in knowledge does not necessarily increase human virtue. Similar to Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Mays went against the grain of modern thinking of his day that saw a 
correlation between the increase in human knowledge and moral development. A close 
reading of history prompted Mays to challenge the moral assumptions of modernity that 
placed a high premium on human vir tue.  
It is disturbing to realize that when we increase in knowledge, we do not 
necessarily increase in goodness or senses of values. We used to believe that 
people did the destructive or brutal thing because they did not know any 
better. We believed that nations fought wars because their knowledge was 
limited. We believe that it was all a matter of education and that once men 
saw the light, he would follow it; and that once he could distinguish the high 
road from the low road, he would take the high one.18  
 
One source that helped Mays understand the distance between knowledge and 
virtue was the Bible. Mays turned to the New Testament, particularly the seventh chapter 
of the book of Romans, to understand the disconnect between knowledge and virtue. In 
doing so, he contends that human beings willfully commit vicious acts with full 
knowledge of their consequences.     
Men know the truth and lie. Men can know the ways of peace and 
deliberately plan war. Socrates believed that men did evil things through 
ignorance. But the apostle Paul was wiser than Socrates and nearer to the 
truth when he exclaimed: “For I do not the good I want, but the evil I do not 
want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it 
but sin which dwells within me. So that I find it to be a law that when I do 
right, evil lies close at hand” Romans 7:19-21.19   
 
After turning to Bible, Mays turned to education in delineating the disjunction between 
knowledge and virtue. Again, Mays was a highly educated person who revered learning. 
Yet he conceded the limits of education in improving human morality. He understood 
that education was limited in preventing wars, eliminating poverty, changing economic 
                                                                 
18 Ibid., 61. 
19 Ibid., 62. 
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systems and politically transforming the world. For Mays, history was proof of the moral 
limits of education.      
Men have more learning now than they ever had before more mathematics, 
physics, chemistry, philosophy, social science, and religion than any other 
generation. Yet we are as confused now as men have ever been at any period 
in history. We saw a great war coming upon us and we could not avert it. 
Germany and Japan were defeated in World War II, but all our knowledge 
and learning, we hardly know enough to avoid sowing seeds of another war. 
Our economists are well trained, but they cannot determine what kind of 
economic system we shall have twenty-five years from now. We find 
ourselves caught in the midst of catastrophe and chaos, and in one sense the 
Ph.D. is as inadequate as the illiterate and the world statesmen stands almost 
as helpless in shaping world politics as the country politician. 20        
 
On one level, Mays’s anthropology may be attributed to his academic study 
particularly his reflections on history. However, a broader understanding of his 
anthropological reflection on knowledge and virtue can be derived from his life 
experience. Growing up in the Jim Crow South, Mays witnessed first hand the worst 
things that a human being or a human system can do to other human beings. The 
psychological and economic brutalities, wrought by living as a Negro in the Jim Crow 
South, made him skeptical of the idea of the inherent goodness of human beings. The 
legacy of slavery, lynchings, sharecropping and unequal educational systems were all 
evidence of the limits of human virtue. As far as the connection between knowledge and 
virtue was concerned, Mays witnessed the disjunction between the two as a school -boy 
in South Carolina, where the privilege of education afforded to whites was not afforded 
to Negroes. As a graduate student at the University of Chicago, he experienced racism in 
a supposedly enlightened context. In his autobiography, Mays recounts how he and his 
then wife experienced racial hostility from professors and students at the university. 
Consider the following passage, where recounts the experience he had in Chicago. He 
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speaks of it in light of a more hospitable experience, in Lewiston, Maine, while a student 
at Bates College.  
I found more prejudice at the University of Chicago and in the city of 
Chicago than I had found at Bates and in the city of Lewiston…At Bates, 
teachers spoke to Negro students on campus and downtown, especially if the 
Negro student was in the professor’s class. I knew one or two professors at 
the University of Chicago in 1921 who never recognized a Negro student 
when off campus or on. We sometimes saw one of them with his wife, and 
whenever we did we spoke, calling him by name, bowing and tipping our 
hats. Of course, he had to return the courtesy. We enjoyed that response.21        
 
From Mays’s racial experience, he knew all too well that education had limitations, 
despite his being a champion of education. Interestingly, his awareness of the limits of 
education would not prevent his promotion of it, as we shall see, as a mode of social 
transformation.   
 
Loving God and Humanity: Ethical Aspects of Mays’s Thought 
Beyond his reflections on the doctrine of God and humanity are his reflections on 
the Christian moral life. Mays understood Christianity as an ethical faith whose merits 
were determined by its applicability in the real world. The ethical concept of love 
informed his approach to the Christian moral life. Similar to his fundamental theological 
perspective, Mays’s ethical thought was concerned with the then racial hierarchy in 
America. More specifically, Mays’s ethical thinking addresses the question of how 
Christians should engage race relations and segregation in the United States. For Mays, 
racial inequality was a contradiction of Christian ethical teachings derived from the New 
Testament. More succinctly, it was a contradiction of the Christian imperative to love. In 
his reading of the New Testament, Christians are commanded to love God as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
20 Ibid., 64-65. 
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other human beings.  And he views the love of God and others as inseparable. In this 
regard, the Christian life is fundamentally relational and guided by the concept of love. 
The model for this way of living is displayed in the New Testament in the person of Jesus 
Christ. Mays contends that Jesus embodied the love of God and humanity in his life and 
that faithful discipleship upholds it.    
The Christian faith as stated in the New Testament affirms that the love God 
and the love of man is one love. Few people recognize the fact that Jesus got 
into trouble not so much because he believed in God but because he believed 
in the sacred worth of the individual soul. If Jesus had gone throughout the 
Palestinian or Greco-Roman world merely talking about God and doing 
nothing to help man, he would have hardly run into trouble because almost 
everyone in the world of his day believed in God or in gods. Jesus got into 
trouble because he believed in man, a belief interlaced and interwoven with 
his concept of God. 22   
 
For Mays, the problem of Christian faith in the America of his day was that it 
misunderstood and even ignored the manner in which the love of God and human beings 
were inseparable. In relation to racial inequality, the love of God was divorced from the 
love of human beings. The basic question that was asked was, How can one love God and 
not other human beings of a different racial background?   
For Mays, the Christian imperative to love God and other human beings is 
integral to the overall character of Christian faith, especially Christian ethics. Overall, 
Mays’s ethical perspective consists of a mediation between these two objects of love. 
Mays understood Christian faith as a balancing act between faith in God and faith in 
humanity. Mays viewed this balancing act as constitutive of healthy minded (James) 
religion. It is a pragmatic understanding of religion that seeks to avoid the excesses of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
21 Ibid., 65. 
22 Ibid., 16. 
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other-worldliness and humanism. In other words, it is an approach to the Christian moral 
life that mediates transcendent principles and empirical realities.     
One of the great difficulties of life is to avoid ext remes. Professor H.Y. 
Britan of Bates College used to say in his philosophy classes, “Truth is 
seldom if ever found in extremes.” We need to avoid extremes in religion. 
We run the risk of constantly making our religion either completely God 
centered or entirely man centered. When we make it completely God 
centered, we commit the fatal blunder of trying to establish connection 
between ourselves and God without due regard to our neighbor. If our 
religion becomes too God centered, it is likely to become highly 
otherworldly, a religion whereby we seek mainly to save ourselves from a 
burning hell or win a place of heavenly rest after this earthly life has ended.23  
 
Mays understood the dangers of religion that is removed from the natural world. What he 
has in mind is Protestant evangelicalism. With a focus on personal salvation and 
repentance of sin, the individual and other-worldly character of protestant evangelicalism 
is apt to ignore the social contexts that affects religious life.   
History is full of examples of this kind of religion where the church puts on 
revivals, calls “sinners” to repentance and seeks to save their souls while the 
great social evils of poverty, unemployment, slavery, disease, crime, war, 
racial discrimination, political and economic injustice-go untouched and 
unchallenged.24  
 
Being consistent with his anthropology, Mays also understood the dangers of religion 
which placed too much of an estimate in human beings. What he had in mind was a 
secular faith in human beings fostered by the enlightenment, wherein human dependence 
on religion was lessened and human autonomy increased.  
If our religion becomes wholly man centered, we risk the unpardonable sin of 
making man into a god. We are likely to ignore the existence of the God 
whom Jesus believed and the God whom the Christian is supposed worship. 
The completely man centered religion is likely to lead man to believe that he 
is self sufficient and that he can lift himself entirely by his own bootstraps. 
                                                                 
23 Ibid., 24. 
24 Ibid. 
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His ethics may become a man-centered ethics with no reference beyond 
itself.25  
 
Mays’s reflections are influenced by protestant liberalism, particularly the Social Gospel. 
The manner in which he minimizes the evangelical aspects of Christian ethics and 
maximizes its social aspects, is testament to the social gospel’s imprint upon his 
perspective. Again, Mays was more concerned with the moral applicability of Christian 
faith in the social world than with its ability to save souls. His concerns about the 
morality of a segregated society were no less subject to this approach to Christian ethics.            
 
Belief in Action 
 For Mays, at the heart of ethical faith is a belief in action. Belief in action is the 
union of theory and practice, a union embodied in the life of Jesus Christ. Knowing the 
problem, in popular Protestant thought, of divorcing belief from action, Mays is clear in 
emphasizing the connection between the two. He makes the case that theory and action 
are not mutually exclusive. Practices are informed by beliefs and to separate the two is to 
divorce what we do from what we believe. Mays contends that we do what we believe. 
Hence, there is no contraction between the two. For example, if a Christian fails to live 
out the imperative to love in action, in the arena of race relations, it is due to his or her 
not believing in the imperative, not the difficulty of its practice. Interestingly, he 
concedes that at times there may be some difficulty orienting belief with practice. 
However, the union of the two inevitably occurs.    
Contrary to popular opinion, there is no conflict between belief and action. 
Beliefs are not theoretical ideas divorced from doing something. Beliefs 
always find expression in action. There may be a gulf between intellectually 
assent-merely agreeing that something is so-and action, but there is no gulf 
                                                                 
25 Ibid., 24-25. 
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between really believing in something and to act constantly contrary to that 
belief. It may be possible to have a temporary conflict between what we 
believe and what we do, but the conflict will eventually disappear. Our actual 
beliefs will soon be found to coincide with what we do.26  
 
Embracing the model of Jesus has implications for the social witness of the Christian. 
When one embraces Jesus he or she simultaneously embraces the moral imperative to act. 
Interestingly, Mays concedes that negative social consequences may proceed from 
embracing the Jesus model. He even suggests that individuals as well as generations, 
throughout history have found it difficult to live out the social witness implied by the life 
of Jesus.    
Jesus is the central figure and our guide for Christian living. But when 
anyone is urged to accept Jesus, seldom is the fact taken into account that he 
is being advised to model his life after a man who was rejected by his 
generation and who was nailed to the cross between two thieves. The great 
majority of the members of the human race will never be willing to die for 
their convictions. Adults urge youth to do what those who are older have not 
done. We might as well be honest and admit that any person who attempts to 
live his or her in accordance with the content of the life and teachings of 
Jesus is likely to find the going hard. It may not mean a physical death, but it 
may mean less, social, economic and political success.27  
 
It must be noted that Mays’s promotion of the witness of Jesus as a model for human 
agency is not cast in terms of a high Christology. Rather, Jesus is cast solely as a model 
for ethical living, not as a savior. Furthermore, Mays offers a sense of moral realism with 
regard to the consequences that may follow taking the Jesus model seriously. He 
acknowledges that following the model of Jesus means going against the grain of popular 
morality. For Mays, as far as race relations and segregated society were concerned, 
following the Jesus model was well worth the risk. 
                                                                 
26 Ibid., 75. 
27 Ibid., 72. 
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 Being consistent with his theological perspective, the ethical aspects of Mays’s 
perspective had direct bearing on his concerns regarding race-relations of his era. Loving 
God and humanity, as modeled in the person of Jesus Christ, meant that racism and 
segregation were antithetical to the Christian ethic. For Mays, authentic Christianity, in 
terms of race-relations, meant challenging racism and segregated society. Overall, the 
Christian imperative to love God and humanity was meant for both whites and American 
Negroes. And it meant willingly accepting whatever consequences that came with 
challenging segregation and white supremacy.  
 
Assessing Mays’s Legacy 
 At the outset of this chapter, I suggested that the theological legacy of Benjamin 
Elijah Mays is a resource for progressive politics and political theology in the United 
States today. In this regard, his brand of liberal Christianity, embodied in a style of 
leadership representative of the Negro era, and informed by the social gospel, is a 
resource for engaging political conservatism. There is theological and political value in 
the themes of democracy and universalism as they play out in his doctrine of God, 
anthropology and ethical thought. Overall, it is the pragmatic nature of his leadership and 
theology that is instructive for progressive politics and political theology in our age. In 
the concluding chapter of this dissertation, I flesh out, in greater detail, the implications 
of his theology for theological discourse today.              
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the theological legacy of Benjamin Elijah Mays. In 
this regard, I suggested that Mays belonged to an era of Negro social and religious 
leadership, an era that spanned three generations, between the early post-reconstruction 
period and the dawning of the Civil Rights/Black Power era. Mays stood as a public 
theologian of the Negro era. With social concerns regarding the then American Negro 
situation and Segregated American society, he forwarded a pragmatic theological 
perspective geared toward race relations. Through a democratic understanding of the 
classical doctrine of God and a pessimistic yet hopeful anthropology, Mays sought to 
overcome the idea of Negro inferiority and white supremacy. As far as the Christian 
moral life is concerned, the Christian ideal of love, as modeled by the life of Jesus, has 
serious implications for race relations.   
 In the next chapter, I turn to the role of education in Mays’s ethical perspective.   
Here, I outline his philosophy of education and its application to the desegregation of 
American educational institutions at the height of the Civil Rights movement.  In Mays’s 
thought, the imperative to love God and humanity, in connection to race relations, plays 
out in his advocacy of education as a mode of social transformation. For Mays, education 
is connected to the Christian moral life. To understand the moral implications of his 
entire theological perspective, it is important to consider his promotion of education, 
especially as it related to the then American Negro and segregated American society. 
Overall, Mays’s democratic understanding of God, humanity and the Christian moral life 
are constitutive of his ethics of education. With this said, I shall now turn to Mays’s 
philosophy and ethics of education.    
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CHAPTER V  
 
 
 
PRAGMATISM AND SOCIAL HOPE: RACE AND CHRISTIAN ACTION IN 
THE THEOLOGY OF BENJAMIN ELIJAH MAYS 
 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the role of education in Mays’s ethical perspective, 
particularly his promotion of education as a means of social progress. First, I will explore 
his philosophy of education. Then, I will discuss the application of his philosophy to a 
concrete situation, namely, the desegregation of universities and public schools ten years 
after the historic Supreme Court ruling, in 1954, that deemed segregated schools 
unconstitutional (Brown v. Board of Education).  I will conclude with a discussion of the 
contemporary relevance of Mays’s theological legacy and ethics of education. Before I 
begin, I will expand briefly upon his outlook on race and Christian ethics.  
As I suggested in chapter four, Mays viewed race relations of his era as the test of 
Christian ethics. For Mays, the Christian imperative to act was impeded by racial 
inequality. Race relations, in the America of his day, was one arena where the Christian 
belief in action was challenged. He viewed race relations of his era in negative terms. The 
then dominant racial practices, of whites towards Negro’s, were in his mind, not 
Christian. The Christian ethic of love in action was hardly visible. What’s more, the 
Christian imperative of love in action was weakened by what appeared to be an 
unwillingness to carry it out.     
Many of us are concerned about race. It is here that we are most likely to be 
shackled and bound by current practices, which we are afraid to break away 
from. Our Christian behavior breaks down perhaps more in this area than it 
does any other. After the Christian faith has its say about the unity of man in 
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God and man’s duty to man, and modern science has made its 
pronouncements as to the potential equality of the races, our customary 
behavior in the realm of race is likely to fall below minimum Christian 
standards. We seem to lack the motivating power to act on what we say we 
believe about God, Jesus, and man, and similarly on what we say we believe 
about science. Our fears make cowards of us.1    
 
 Again, Mays was concerned with the relevance of Christian theology to race 
relations. Mays viewed Christianity, particularly Christian doctrines, in positive terms. 
He believed an appropriate understanding of Christian doctrine in its universal and 
democratic dimensions would benefit race relations of his era. His appeal to and 
promotion of the doctrines were both orthodox and liberal in orientation. His appeal was 
orthodox in the sense that he did not attempt to reconstruct the doctrines. Rather, he 
reinterpreted them for his social concerns. His appeal was liberal in that the doctrines 
were meant for social transformation, not evangelization. His appeal to orthodox doctrine 
and their liberal application are synthesized in his promotion of the life of Jesus as the 
model for Christian action, especially along the lines of race relations. The end of his 
reflections was the dismantling of segregation and its effects upon the then American 
Negro. Having elaborated upon the ethical aspects of Mays’s theology, I now turn to his 
moral confidence in education as a means of improving race-relations.        
 
The Ethics of Education 
Connected to the ethical aspects of Mays’s theological perspective is a moral 
confidence in the enterprise of education. Beyond his attempt to improve race-relations 
through re- imagining Christian doctrines, Mays promoted education as a moral vehicle of 
social change, especially as it related to the American Negro. Similar to his promotion of 
                                                                 
1 Ibid., 72. 
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a democratic understanding of God, Mays promoted a democratic understanding of 
education, both formal and secondary education. Mays spent twenty-seven years (1940-
1967) as the president of Morehouse College in Atlanta, Georgia.2 The presidency of 
Morehouse College was the platform where he addressed his greatest social and religious 
concern, that of segregation in American society and its effects on the American Negro. 
At Morehouse, Mays used the prestige and influence of the presidency as an instrument 
in challenging segregation in American society. Though he provided leadership in other 
arenas such as the YMCA, and the World Council of Churches, it was at Morehouse 
College, as an educator and administrator, where he made his greatest contributions. A 
staunch advocate of education as a means of social transformation, Mays spent his entire 
career promoting education as a means of achieving social progress in race relations.  In 
terms of the social prospects of the American Negro, Mays linked education with Negro 
social mobility and freedom. Overall, Mays saw a connection between an educated Negro 
citizenry and the realization of democracy in America. However, segregated institutions, 
especially educational institutions, stood in the way of democracy being realized for the 
American Negro. During his lifetime, he sought the desegregation of these institutions. 
For Mays, the promotion of education was integral to the dismantling of segregated 
society. Education was so paramount to Mays’s moral vision that shortly after he retired 
from Morehouse in 1967 at the age of 73, he became the president of the Atlanta Public 
School Board, where he served twelve years. Integral to Mays’s educational strategy, is 
the view that education is one arena where actual social progress can be achieved. The 
strength of Mays’s promotion of education, was derived from his personal development 
and achievements, via education, which stood as a testament to its possibilities.     
                                                                 
2 See Born to Rebel. 
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Mays’s Philosophy of Education 
Mays understood education as being vital to the social prospects and future of the 
American Negro. He believed that education, secondary and formal, was one route to 
overcoming the individual and collective restraints and negative effects of segregated 
society. 3 He knew that education could not remove the cumulative effects of the legacy of 
slavery on the Negro and American society. However, he believed education could 
provide the Negro with more social freedom and mobility, and greater access to 
economic and political goods. Mays’s philosophy of education was deeply rooted in the 
impact that education had upon his life. To understand what education meant to Mays, in 
relation to Negro freedom, it is important gauge his philosophy of education.  
In 1972, Mays delivered a commencement address at Alderson Broadus College 
in Philippi, West Virginia. Entitled “Education To What End,” Mays offered a diatribe on 
the purpose of education. In doing so, he reveals his philosophy of education. He begins 
by providing a working conception of education and its purpose. Then posits three 
functions of education: 1) to empower individuals and groups 2) to promote the common 
good and 3) to instill discontent with mediocrity. To begin, consider Mays’s working 
conception of education. 
Generally speaking, education is designed to train the mind to think clearly, 
logically and constructively; to train the heart to feel understandingly and 
sympathetically the aspirations, the sufferings, and the injustices of mankind; 
and to strengthen the will to act in the interest in the common good. To state 
the purpose in Christian perspective, the aim of education should be to glorify 
God and to serve mankind…Specifically speaking, education should be 
sought for its own sake.4         
                                                                 
3 In this section and the pages that follow, I draw upon a commencement address delivered by Mays 
entitled, “Education to What End?” ( Alderson Broadus College) and an article, “The Role of Schools in a 
Social Revolution” (Teachers Colleges Record, vol. 65, 8 May 1964), Moorland-Spingarn, to discuss 
Mays’s understanding of education. Also, see Barbara Sue Lewison’s article “Mays’s Educational 
Philosophy” in Walking Integrity, 216, for an insightful on Mays’s perspective on education.   
4 Benjamin E. Mays, “Education to What End?”, 1.  
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For Mays, education has a theological and social task. Theologically, it is connected to 
one’s devotion to God; it is a means of rendering worship toward God. Socially, it is not 
an instrumental good, a mere means to acquiring goods such as fame, fortune and power. 
Rather, education has intrinsic value. Its intrinsic value is connected to its function in 
improving persons and society. Hence, education has personal and social value. 
Essentially, this is a classical conception of education and it is upon this conception of 
education that Mays’s entire theology of education rests.    
  
Education and Empowerment  
Beyond the idea that education is to be sought for its intrinsic value, Mays casts 
education in terms of individual and collective empowerment. Mays maintained that 
education was an empowering tool that enabled an individual, race or nation of people to 
protect itself from exploitation. The lack or absence of education makes one weak and 
vulnerable to being taken advantage of by stronger and more enlightened groups or 
individuals. Education serves as a source of strength against powerful and enlightened 
forces in the world.     
An educated man, a trained race or a literate nation is much better qualified to 
defend itself against the strong and the unscrupulous than an untrained man, 
race or nation. Whether we like it or not, there is a fundamental selfishness or 
defect in human nature. We respect strength and not courage and not 
cowardice, knowledge and not ignorance, the man who stands on his feet in a 
manly way and not the man who cringes and kow-tows. History shows that 
strong nations for the most part exploit weak nations, that strong races 
usually take advantage of weak races and that strong individuals are inclined 
almost always to push weak individua ls around even a blood relative, or a 
weak brother or sister. As one who believes in the power of religion to 
transform mankind, I reluctantly make this confession. I have seldom, if ever, 
known a nation, however religious, seen a race, however, democratic in its 
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pronouncement, known an individual, however Christian in his profession, 
who would not take advantage of the ignorant, the weak and the cowardly. 5 
 
Next to racism and segregated society, Mays viewed ignorance as the greatest 
impediment to Negro progress. Although Mays was not an avowed black nationalist, he 
understood the then Negro situation in nationalistic terms. In this regard, American 
Negroes were only as strong and capable of self-sufficiency as their intellectual 
development allowed them to be. And for Mays, the arrested intellectual development of 
then American Negroes, due to white supremacy, contributed to their weakness as a 
group.   Such weakness made Negroes constantly vulnerable to exploitation. Overall, his 
career in and advocacy of education among Negroes was his contribution to the 
intellectual development of American Negroes.  
  
Education and the Common Good 
Though education functions to empower an individual, nation or race of people to 
protect itself from exploitation, it is not reducible to mere self-defense or collective or 
individual self-assertion. Rather, education also has an altruistic function. In this regard, 
education functions to promote the common good. Hence there are social aims of 
education. For Mays, education and the common good operates on three levels: 1) to 
elevate the masses 2) to identify and nurture the moral potential of persons and 3) to 
sensitize the human conscience to the social ills of the world. Let us consider the first 
level. 
                                                                 
5 Ibid. 
  
 
114 
 
According to Mays, one aim of education is the elevation of the masses of 
humanity. It is an aim that counters any notion of education that is concerned solely with 
individuals and individual interests.  
Education is not designed merely to lift one above his fellows, to enable one 
to make a living, but rather its purpose is to equip man to help his fellows, to 
elevate the masses, the less fortunate. For if one has a better mind than his 
fellows, more wealth than his fellows, has a better opportunity to develop 
than his fellows, he is obligated to use his skills in the interest of the common 
good. To use education for the common good is mandatory because trained 
minds are rare, only a small percentage of the total population of the world is 
college trained. And to whom much is given much is required.6            
 
For Mays, there is a connection between education and human service, especially where 
the masses of humanity are concerned. It is more than an instrumental tool, to be used 
solely by individuals, for the sake of instrumental ends, such as fame, fortune and power. 
Rather, this is an altruistic understanding of education that serves as a special challenge 
to privileged individuals, those who have been afforded educational opportunity. Overall, 
Mays suggests that the educated person, by virtue of their privilege, has a social 
responsibility in improving the lot of the masses, the mass of persons who have not been 
afforded educational opportunity.  
  Integral to the function of education in promoting the common good is its 
connection to fostering human growth and development. In its social aims, education is 
concerned with identifying and nurturing the moral potential of human beings. In this 
vein, Mays contends that education is not an elite enterprise that is reserved for and only 
cultivates the moral potential of the privileged. Rather, it recognizes and develops the 
moral potential of those who are born at a social disadvantage.     
  Education aims to sharpen insights so that we see man not as he is but as he 
can and ought to be. Education should sensitize us so that one sees not only 
                                                                 
6 Ibid., 4. 
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the potential of a Cicero born with a silver spoon in his mouth but also the 
potential of a Horace, the son of a former slave; and the potentials of a James 
Weldon Johnson and a Countee Cullen; not only the potential of Milton, born 
in favorable circumstances, but also the potential of a Shakespeare, whose 
father was a corrupt butcher; not only the potential of George Washington, 
the rich Virginia planter, but also the potential of Booker T. Washington, a 
slave; not only the potential of Nehru, born  Brahman, but also the potentials 
of John F. Kennedy, born with more than he needed.7  
 
Mays knew first hand the personal benefits of education. His status as a race leader and 
college president was made possible due to his exceptional education and the professional 
experiences it afforded him. He earned a bachelor’s degree from Bates College in 
Lewiston, Maine, and a master’s degree and Ph.D., from the University of Chicago. 
However, his educational development was delayed due to the limited educational 
opportunities afforded him by his Southern upbringing.  Consider the fact that Mays did 
not graduate from high school until the age of twenty-two. Unequal social arrangements 
and an environment driven by agriculture resulted in sporadic schooling during his 
childhood and youth, thus preventing him from realizing his potential at an earlier age. 
Mays knew all too well how the lack of education contributed to his delayed educational 
development and to the unrealized potential of the Negro of his era. He also knew how 
the resource of education aids the development of human beings. Overall, his moral 
confidence in education as a developer of human potential was connected to his personal 
history and to the condition of the then American Negro.   
  Beyond its concern with the moral development of persons, education functions to 
sensitize persons to the social ills of the world, in service of promoting the common 
good. Mays maintained that education should make one sensitive to social and moral 
                                                                 
7 Ibid., 5. 
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condition of one’s age. For Mays, the educated person, nation or race is concerned about 
poverty, disease, war, racism and other ills of the human condition.      
Education should make one sensitive to the needs of the world. The world 
can hardly be secure as long as more than half of the peoples of the earth are 
starving, more than half have diseased bodies, and more than half can read 
nor write. If it is important to train the mind to fly to the moon and walk on it, 
to build atomic and hydrogen bombs capable of destroying the human family, 
it is equally important, or more so, to train our children and students to have 
sympathy and empathy for all classes of men who dwell on all the face of the 
earth. If parents can train their children in the ways of prejudice by walking 
600 miles to protest busing and if our politicians, North and South, so-called 
liberals and conservatives, can unite against busing, the aim of education 
should be to create a society where Black and White, Gent ile and Jews, 
Protestants and Catholics can live together, study together and worship 
together.8         
 
For Mays, education should have a humanizing effect on those who benefit from it. In 
this regard, it functions to expand one’s awareness of the world around them, and instills 
a deep sensitivity to its needs. Hence, education, in this view, is a moral force. As we 
shall see shortly, this moral view of education unfolds in Mays’s criticism of segregation 
in higher and public education. Overall, the idea and reality of segregated educational 
institutions contradicted the idea of education as a moral force. Also, this moral view of 
education is a criticism of education as an instrumental tool, to be used solely by 
individuals for the sake of instrumental ends (i.e., fame, fortune, power and etc.).        
 
Education and Discontent with Mediocrity 
  There is an element of transcendence that runs throughout Mays’s theology of 
education. It is connected to his understanding of God and anthropology. Mays believed 
that one should always strive to be more than what he or she already is. Under these 
                                                                 
8 Ibid. 
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terms, education should instill dissatisfaction with the ordinary. For Mays, this is the final 
end of education.     
The final end of education which I shall mention in this address is to create in 
the individual a wholesome state of dissatisfaction, what I call divine 
discontent with the ordinary, mediocre performance: To make one 
dissatisfied with the better if the best can be achieved. Satisfaction means 
stagnation and death. It comes from two Latin words which means “enough 
done.” The teacher who is satisfied with his teaching will never teach better. 
The artist who is satisfied with his past performance will hardly make new 
discoveries. The man who is satisfied with poverty will never have enough 
bread and to spare…Education, college or university, is designed to make one 
restless and dissatisfied with things as they are; dissatisfied with war, poverty 
and disease.9   
 
Similar to his understanding of education in connection to human development, Mays’s 
disdain for mediocrity was connected to his personal history. Again, Mays was a 
beneficiary of an elite higher education. He attained such an education despite his 
disadvantaged Southern background. Consider the fact that Mays grew up in world 
driven by agriculture and white supremacy that did not support his educational 
aspirations. His father was a sharecropper who had no appreciation for book learning and 
discouraged his college aspirations. Coupled with the discouragement of his father were 
the social arrangements of his native South Carolina that also discouraged any form of 
education among Negro’s. Moreover, when he did enter and matriculate through college, 
he was challenged by yet mastered the curriculum of his school, Bates College. Needless 
to say, his successful matriculation through the University of Chicago, earning a Ph.D., 
allowed him to stand out among his peers and above the racial assumptions of his age.  
Overall, Mays’s personal experience and elite social status, instilled within him a disdain 
for mediocrity in connection to education.  
                                                                 
9 Ibid., 6. 
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The most salient aspect of Mays’s ethical understanding of education is the 
connection between education and the common good. For Mays, the grand aim of 
education is to improve the lot of human beings and society. This ethical understanding 
of education was integral to his attack on segregated society. Mays viewed segregation as 
a barrier to the common good. He believed that educational institutions had a social 
responsibility in dismantling segregation, in the interest of promoting the common good. 
In fact, in the years that followed the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court 
ruling, involving the desegregation of public schools, Mays wrote about the role of 
schools in promoting the common good.     
 
Education, the Common Good and Social Progress 
In an essay entitled, The Role of Schools in a Social Revolution, Mays wrote about 
the role of schools in promoting the common good. It was written at height of the Civil 
Rights movement, tens years after the 1954 Supreme Court decision, which ruled 
segregation in public schools unconstitutional. Mays forwarded a proposal of how 
universities can facilitate court orders to desegregate universities and colleges as well as 
the rest of U.S. society. The essay is at first a criticism of schools that failed to carry out 
court orders. Here, Mays indicts public colleges and universities for being complacent in 
carrying out the imperative of desegregation, which the court decision demanded, and for 
not providing America with the intellectual leadership also demanded by this event and 
the times. The most scathing aspect of his criticism was that schools failed to fulfill their 
responsibilities as torch- lights of democracy in a democratic society. Beyond criticism, 
however, Mays provides a list of recommendations for how schools may bring about this 
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process. Overall, the essay promotes the notion that education is one arena where social 
progress is possible.    
 
Mays’s Criticism of Higher Education 
 Mays begins with an indictment against colleges and universities, asserting that 
institutions of higher learning were not functioning as they should in facilitating 
desegregation. The then malfunctioning of schools defy his assumptions regarding the 
role of schools in a society.  
I TAKE IT FOR GRANTED that the role of schools in a democracy differs 
from that of schools in a fascist or communist country. I also take it for 
granted that the social revolution means the struggle for civil rights in which 
Negroes are deeply involved. In asking about the role that schools should 
play, I imply that our schools are not functioning as they should to insure the 
peaceful success of the present social revolution. 10 
 
Mays expands on the indictment by placing the role of schools in the context of a twenty 
year legal battle for civil rights for the American Negro, which had evolved into a full 
blown social revolution at the time of his writing.  
To begin on a negative note, the schools, including colleges and unive rsities, 
have done very little to advance the humane revolution now underway. The 
major battle for a change in the Negro’s status in American life was fought in 
the federal courts between 1935 and 1955. Although schooled men waged the 
legal battle, university officials for the most part resisted every inch of the 
way of the Negro’s effort to enter state universities.11 
 
Mays goes on to cite examples of Universities, primarily in the South, and one 
northern school, that resisted the imperative of desegregation. Such schools include the 
Universities of Maryland, North Carolina, Missouri, Georgia, Texas, Oklahoma, 
Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, and Clemson in South Carolina. These universities, 
                                                                 
10 Benjamin E. Mays, The Role of Schools in a Social Revolution, 684. 
11 Ibid. 
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Mays contends, upheld segregation and only admitted Negro students when forced by 
court order. The violence that erupted when James Meridith was enrolled at the 
University of Mississippi and opposition of then Governor of Alabama, George Wallace, 
who resisted the desegregation of the University of Alabama, were concrete examples of 
the failure of schools in facilitating social change.  
  Interestingly, Mays maintains that there were universities where faculties and 
administrators were supportive of desegregation. However, such support did not emerge 
until two to three years after the Supreme Court decision. He asserts that the officials and 
faculties of the Universities of Georgia and Clemson were supportive of the admission of 
their earliest Negro students, albeit sometime after the decision. For the most part, 
support for desegregation came slow. He contends that in the wake the court decision, 
employees of these universities, particularly professors, did not lend their support for fear 
of loosing their jobs. He further contends that there was a climate on these university 
campuses where free and open debate surrounding the support of desegregation was 
prohibited only that which upheld segregation was allowed. What’s more, the pattern of 
resisting segregation and even gradualism, among the universities, was also found among 
public schools.       
 For Mays, the resistance and gradualism of universities, colleges and public 
schools, toward desegregation, was a travesty of democracy. The inaction of these centers 
of learning, defy his assumption that schools, particularly, universities and colleges, are 
democratic institutions, whose task is to sustain and promote the democratic ideal. And at 
the level of intellectual and social leadership these schools failed miserably. When 
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speaking of the repressive intellectual climate on many of these universities and colleges, 
his assumptions regarding what democracy means unfolds. 
Academic freedom just did not exist. It could hardly have been worse in a 
totalitarian country. With this kind of resistance the universities cannot be 
given credit for contributing to the peaceful success of social revolution in 
education. It is the essence of freedom to permit free discussion and debate. 
This was not the case in the period following the order in the historic Brown 
case. 12 
 
For Mays the repression that occurred at institutions of higher learning was the result of 
poor leadership. Leadership, on the part of these institutions, in relation to desegregation, 
was in his view, what was demanded by the times.   
It is clear that all too many schools provide no leadership to insure peaceful 
desegregation, either educationally or in the larger society. The proper role of 
the schools, up to now, should have been what it was not-the provision of 
more positive and constructive leadership to insure peaceful change and 
acceptance of change.   
 
 
Education as an Agent of Social Progress 
After indicting colleges and universities for failing to live out their responsibilities 
as torch-lights of democracy, Mays offers constructive guidance, by suggesting what role 
schools should play in an era of social change. In Mays’s recommendations, there are 
three levels upon which schools may render leadership. First, to provide scholarly 
research and promote free and open inquiry surrounding the issues that spawned and 
necessitated the era of change. Second, to encourage the democratic participation of the 
privileged class in facilitating change. Finally, to support the expansion of democracy by 
offering societal leadership through educating the larger society, especially its decision- 
makers.  
                                                                 
12 Ibid., 685. 
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Social Progress and the Promotion of Scholarly Inquiry 
In Mays’s view, institutions of higher education are centers for truth seeking and 
knowledge production. Colleges and universities promote democracy through the pursuit 
of truth and the production of knowledge. With respect to the era of desegregation, 
centers of learning could help society by providing research and forums for debate that 
would increase social understanding. For Mays, this meant making available resources 
from the natural sciences that undermined the idea of the inherent inferiority of the 
Negro. It also meant employing the social sciences in explaining the history, contours and 
effects of racial inequality in America. Overall, in their function as research centers, 
searching for truth and producing knowledge, schools could do a tremendous service to 
society in countering the idea of Negro inferiority.  
The schools, especially the colleges and universities, should provide 
objective understanding and truth, especially with respect to racial 
differences. Although there are many people who believe that certain races 
are inferior to others, the colleges and universities must make it clear that 
science has reached no final conclusion as to the validity of this assertion. It 
is clearly established that differences in a so-called racial group are just as 
wide as differences between the races and that very superior people are found 
in all groups.13  
 
When a society is undergoing unprecedented social change, schools can help society 
understand the nature and meaning of the change that is occurring.  
Similarly, schools should help people to understand the causes of the current 
social revolution as a part of our history. Social revolutions do not spring full 
grown from the head of Zeus, nor do they develop overnight. Western man 
embraced the most revolutionary doctrine ever expounded to man. It is not 
communism but the Judeo-Christian religion, with its emphasis on one God 
and the worth and value of every person, that provides the basic dynamic of 
today’s revolution. Even during slavery, the Christian gospel upset men so 
much they had somehow to justify slavery to their own souls as being God’s 
will.14            
                                                                 
13 Ibid., 685. 
14 Ibid., 686. 
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Mays understood that desegregation challenged the racial assumptions of American 
society, particularly the American South. For him, the ideas of Negro inferiority and 
white supremacy are what created and held together segregated society. It was an 
institution whose assumptions about the races, prior to Supreme Court decision, went  
virtually unchallenged. To facilitate the mandate of the decision it was important that 
academic institutions to examine the assumptions that held segregated society together. It 
was equally important to examine the assumptions, which yielded the court decision. In 
democratic fashion, schools could play a crucial role in evaluating the logic of both 
segregation and desegregation.       
 Mays also understood the unprecedented nature of desegregation, that it disrupted 
the social world of American society, particularly the American South. It is no wonder 
that he understood it in revolutionary terms. Like the American Revolution and the 
Emancipation Proclamation, the phenomena of desegregation would profoundly alter 
human relations, especially race relations. Mays understood that institutions of higher 
learning had the intellectual resources necessary to relate the unprecedented event of 
segregation to a larger history of social change. In doing so, these institutions would help 
society understand the meaning and process of desegregation.        
If schools are to are to provide scholarship and facilitate social understanding of 
desegregation and the social climate surrounding it, then scholars and students should be 
allowed the academic freedom to inquire and debate its rationale. For Mays, academic 
freedom is a fundamental right within democratic institutions of higher education. And if 
this freedom is denied, then it must be fought for.  
If denied this freedom of discussion and debate, the schools should fight for 
this right. The freedom to discuss, to debate, and to seek truth and 
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understanding are the ingredients that make a school or a college great. As 
the church should be free and unafraid to expound and implement a universal 
Gospel, the schools should be unshackled in their pursuit of truth and 
understanding. Teachers in the humanities and social sciences should fight 
for freedom to search fear of truths about social relations, just as men in the 
natural sciences battle to be free to explore the world of matter.15  
 
In Mays’s view, desegregation and the spirit of social change that accompanied it was not 
without any rationale. For him, the Supreme Court decision and the then social climate 
were connected to a larger history of struggle, connected the Negro’s quest for social 
justice in America. The Negro’s struggle and demand for social justice were predicated 
upon the principles of democracy. Segregated society was a contradiction of such 
principles. Hence, the Supreme Court decision and the spirit of social change that 
accompanied it. Given the rationale behind desegregation, academic freedom meant that 
the logic of desegregation and segregation should be open to inquiry and debate. The end 
of academic freedom is the promotion of human understanding.  
 
Social Progress and the Role of Privileged Classes 
For Mays, one of the barriers to the desegregation of schools was the lack of 
white participation in carrying out court orders. Mays contended that many whites would 
not get involved because they viewed desegregation as a Negro issue. He cites white 
college students in particular, as having an apathetic attitude toward desegregation.  
I sense the feeling that white students in the US are not deeply concerned 
about what is going on. A white student said to me a few years ago that if a 
Negro can gain a larger foothold in the American economy, more power to 
him; but it is the Negro’s fight, not his. The idea seems to exist that the social 
revolution is something isolated from the rest of our culture, affecting only 
Negro’s.16  
 
                                                                 
15 Ibid. 
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Democracy means that everyone is involved, that desegregation is not a Negro issue. 
Schools can help to promote this kind of understanding.  
Here schools have a definite part to play. The struggle to make democratic 
principles applicable to all people alike is not a one-sided proposition. Every 
American is involved. Either the American Dream applies to all, or it applies 
to none. The Negro is not on trial; American democracy is. More people look 
to the United States for guidance, financial assistance, and leadership than to 
any other nation. No nation has espoused the cause of freedom so sincerely or 
as vigorously as the United States. No nation has fought for democracy 
abroad, quite without any motive of conquest, as has the United States. But 
the test of democracy is not what we do abroad but what we do at home. If 
the democratic torch is put out there or if it always dims and gutters before 
the problem of white versus black, I fear for its survival in the world.17 
 
If America is to be faithful to the democratic ideal, then the issue of desegregation is not 
an issue that only affects the Negro. Rather, it is an issue that affects all Americans. For 
Mays, desegregation not only improves the social prospects of the Negro, it also 
improves American society. Negro’s are not the only group to benefit from 
desegregation, whites benefit also. For these reasons, white democratic participation was 
integral to the success of desegregation.       
White students are not the only group on college and university campuses to be 
democratic participants in the desegregation of society; democratic participation is 
needed from school officials also. For Mays, schools should be citadels of democracy, 
wherein the democratic spirit is exuded among students, faculty and administrators. 
Those who govern a school and are responsible for decision-making have a role to play in 
the dismantling of segregation.         
It is clear that it is the responsibility of every school to become a citadel of 
democracy. Trustees and board members, administrators, and faculty should 
make it plain to the students and the public that no color barrier exists on its 
campus. The policy of the institution on this point should be made quite 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
16 Ibid. 686. 
17 Ibid. 
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definite…When the key leadership is clear about policies things usually work 
out reasonably well.18  
 
Mays suggests that when democracy happens at every level of an academic institution its 
impact pours into the community. Because academic institutions draw students, faculty 
and administrators from communities, the democratic spirit, when cultivated at the 
college or university, is reinvested into the communities from which they come. In other 
words, communities are affected by the spirit of democracy upon the return of students, 
faculty and administrators. This impact is quite significant with regard to students.   
Schools have influence in the community, and what happens on the campus 
of an important institution is abound to have some effect on its community. 
Attitudes are molded in the classroom and in college activities, and the 
attitudes formed in a responsible academic setting will feed back into the 
various locales from which students come.19  
 
 What Mays asserts with regard to schools as citadels of democracy can be 
attributed to what he experienced as a president of a Negro College. The involvement of 
students, faculty and administrators in the desegregation of society occurred at many 
Negro colleges and universities. These schools were models for how white colleges and 
universities could participate in a social revolution. Their participation in the 
desegregation of society was an affirmation and expansion of the democratic ideal. The 
model of Negro schools, especially it students, served as the model for white colleges and 
universities, especially their students. Again, Mays lamented the apathy toward and 
limited involvement of white students in the desegregation of American society. For him, 
Negro students and schools could not do it alone. To cast colleges and universities as 
citadels of democracy is to call for more participation, especially on the part of white 
colleges and universities and their students, in the desegregation of society. 
                                                                 
18 Ibid., 687. 
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The Public Role of Higher Education 
Mays maintains that colleges and universities can facilitate and promote social 
understanding by supporting and interpreting the process toward a desegregated society. 
He contends that schools should take a positive stand toward the goal of a desegregated 
society. Further, schools should educate citizens, especially decision-makers regarding 
the value of a desegregated society. He suggests that as society goes through the process 
of desegregation, schools can play an interpretive role in each step of the process. 
Essentially he calls for schools to become institutional social leaders.  
Now that desegregation is being generally accepted, the schools should take a 
more positive stand and exercise more positive leadership in getting society 
desegregated…The schools can help to interpret the situation by making 
studies of communities where progress has been made in desegregating 
certain facilities…Finally, schools should encourage a direct and informed 
response to legislators when relevant bills are before them…When civil 
rights bills are defeated, then schools should interpret for the community the 
nonviolent protestors who demonstrate but who are sworn to the nonviolent 
way of life and they should permit all students to join in such nonviolent 
protests…The sooner the walls of separation are torn down and all 
discrimination based on race is abolished the sooner we will have peace in 
America. There will be no permanent peace if these things are not done. Can 
the schools work for peace? 20       
 
Mays was confident in education as an agent of social change. He viewed the entire 
enterprise of education, from institutions to scholarship to faculty to students, as an arena 
where actual social progress can be achieved. In his view, the enterprise of education is 
capable of changing both the individual and society.         
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 688. 
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The Contemporary Significance of Mays’s Legacy 
 Mays’s confidence in the moral and political possibilities of education is a 
resource for engaging the social and political challenges of our age. His promotion of 
education, as an enterprise that is concerned with the common good and the promotion of 
democracy, is relevant for progressive political activity today. In particular, his appeal to 
education is instructive for political projects that seek to empower the disenfranchised, 
particularly disenfranchised minorities.  
Today, education is a paramount issue in American life. Both the quality of public 
education and the politics of affirmative action in higher education are current topics of 
ongoing public discussion. Under-performing inner city schools, overcrowded 
classrooms, teacher shortages and decreased state spending for schools and academic 
programs characterize the quagmire of public education in the United States today.  21 At 
the level of higher education, one does not have to look any further than the affirmative 
action debate, to weigh the significance of education in American life today. For 
Americans from all backgrounds, education is an arena that demands serious attention. 
And it is one arena where I am convinced that social progress is possible.  
Historically, education has been one path to social advancement pursued by 
African Americans. Benjamin E. Mays represents a legacy of leadership, from the Negro 
era, that promoted education as a social value and a means of progress. The Black college 
movement, which started in the Reconstruction era, was built on the logic of education 
and Negro progress. Mays participated in this movement via his leadership at Howard 
                                                                 
21 At a high school leadership summit in October 2003, U.S. Secretary of Education, Rod Paige unveiled a 
series of measures to close the high school achievement gap in the United States. It was a response to what 
has become a national crisis in secondary education in America. Among the concerns addressed are high 
school drop out rates and low on- time graduation rates for high school seniors. See web article, “Paige 
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University and Morehouse College. His ethics of education remains relevant today. It is 
relevant at the levels of secondary as wells as higher education. However, its relevance is 
not simply limited to African Americans but to Americans from diverse backgrounds, 
particularly the disenfranchised, whose social and economic prospects can be elevated 
through education.   
  
Conclusion 
  In this chapter, I gave an account of Mays’s ethical perspective. By 
probing his philosophy of education and its application to the desegregation of American 
educational institutions, I unearthed his confidence in education as a means of improving 
race relations. What I contend in this treatment of Mays, is that his promotion of 
education, as a means of social progress, remains relevant today. Overall, my treatment 
of the theological legacy of Benjamin Elijah Mays is an effort to identify a resource for 
social transformation today. In this regard, it has taken seriously the social barriers that 
limit social change as well as identify possible routes to social transformation in light of 
such barriers. In terms of the former, the conservative mind of the era of segregation, as 
well as that of contemporary America, stands as an ongoing challenge to progressive 
efforts at transforming American society. As far as the latter is concerned, the arena of 
education, as well as democratic public discourse, are actual means of achieving and 
measuring social progress. This was true for Mays’s era and it also holds true for ours. 
Though they in no way lead to the realization of an American utopia or the Beloved 
Community of Martin Luther King, Jr., they do lead to social betterment. To be sure, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Unveils Series of Measures to Close High School Achievement Gap,” 8 October 2003 
(www.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2003/10/10082003.html/).   
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education is not the sole arena whereby progress can be achieved. However, it is an 
important one. In the next and final chapter of this dissertation, I bring together all of the 
concerns, drawn from my treatment of Cornel West, Reinhold Niebuhr and Benjamin 
Elijah Mays, and offer recommendations for the reconstruction of progressive politics 
and political theology in a conservative age. It is to this task that I now turn.       
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE RECONSTRCTION OF 
PROGRESSIVE POLITICS AND THEOLOGY IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY  
 
 
 
In this dissertation, I have suggested that we have witnessed the eclipse of 
progressive politics in the United States. In this regard, political conservatism has 
successfully eclipsed the influence of political liberals and political leftists. Perhaps the 
most visible manifestation of this eclipse is the waned influence of the civil rights 
establishment and the fragility of its most significant achievement, affirmative action. In 
this final chapter, I offer recommendations for the reconstruction of progressive politics 
and political theology in the United States.  
There are two basic recommendations that I offer for the reconstruction of 
progressive politics and political theology in America today, both are grounded in 
political realism and democracy. First, I recommend a more realistic approach to the 
pursuit of democracy. In this vein, the kind of utopianism that accompanies a democratic 
vision such as Cornel West’s, needs modification. A political concept such as democracy, 
to say nothing of “radical democracy,” is utopian enough without the “radical” adjective. 
Building on the insights of Reinhold Niebuhr, insights pertaining to the myth of progress 
in history and the limits of liberalism and radicalism, I recommend a pursuit of 
democracy without illusions. Second, I call for more democratic political and theological 
discourse among political liberals and especially radical leftists, and for the pursuit of 
achievable social goals. In this vein, the kind of political perfectionism that concerned 
Niebuhr in his criticism of Marxism needs to be discouraged among liberals and radical 
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leftists. When it comes down to public issues such as affirmative action and higher 
education, political realism and democratic public discourse are needed. It is in this 
regard that the theological legacy of Benjamin Elijah Mays is of paramount importance. 
The value of democratic theological discourse is integral to the legacy of Benjamin Elijah 
Mays. Connected to the value of democratic theological discourse, is the pursuit of 
achievable social goals in service of the expansion of democracy. In Mays, education is a 
vital means for expanding democracy and bringing about social change. One means of 
expanding democracy through education today is public support for two-year colleges. In 
concluding this chapter, I discuss two-year colleges as a means of expanding democracy 
and achieving progressive social change in a conservative age. This discussion proceeds 
in light of ongoing debates about affirmative action and higher education. All of the 
concerns of this dissertation are brought together in this discussion.  
 
 
Political Realism, Democratic Political Discourse and Progressive Politics in 
the Early 21st Century 
 
In chapter two, I raised some concerns about the pursuit of radical democracy in 
the prophetic pragmatism of Cornel West. Again, I am not as hopeful as is West about the 
future of democracy in America.  The politics of privilege and merit that I see in political 
conservatism, coupled with the moral absolutism of the Christian Right and the separatist 
nature of identity politics, prevents me from sharing his democratic hopes for America. 
Of the three forces mentioned, I view political conservatism as the greatest barrier to his 
hopes for a democracy that embraces the concerns of disenfranchised racial minorities, 
gays and lesbians, and women. In my estimation, the kind of participatory democracy 
sought by West is a remote possibility. Although “radical democracy” is a remote 
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possibility, the pursuit of more democracy, remains important. However, I am convinced 
that the pursuit of democracy should be undertaken without illusions. In terms of 
progressive politics in the United State today, the pursuit of democracy without illusions 
requires an acknowledgement of the state and limits of progressive politics in the 21st 
century.  In other words, it requires political honesty or political realism. Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s reflections on liberalism and radicalism are insightful in this regard.  
 
Political Realism and Political Liberalism in the Early 21st Century 
In chapter two, I turned to Niebuhr’s reflections on political liberalism in the early 
20th century. His reflections may be extended to liberalism in last decades of late 20th 
century and the early 21st.  Niebuhr’s criticism of the optimism of the supposedly 
enlightened or liberal intellectual of his day can be extended to American liberal 
intellectuals today. Niebuhr’s critique of the liberal of his day was based on assumptions 
regarding the supposedly evolutionary and progressive course of American society. 
Consider the political liberalism born out of the Great Society Era. There is a sense in 
which the anti-poverty programs and civil rights policies, born out of that era, were 
connected to optimism about America’s future. Seemingly, the social dilemmas 
surrounding poverty and race could be alleviated if not eradicated. Yet such optimism 
took for granted the conservative forces which sought the preservation the then prevailing 
social arrangements. In the early 21st century political conservatism has all but crushed 
such optimism. The idea of “Big Government” as symbolized by Franklin Roosevelt’s 
“New Deal” and Lyndon Baines Johnson’s “Great Society,” is remote if not non-existent 
in contemporary political affairs. The conservative ideology which reigns today is the 
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result of over twenty years of social engineering which has limited the powers of 
government in American life. In turn, corporate power and influence has replaced that of 
government. It is a consequence of the conservative reaction to “Big Government” 
liberalism, which dominated the third quarter of the 20th century, has led to the 
unprecedented social reforms of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Massive social reform ushered in 
a conservative backlash at the dawn of the 1980’s.  Somewhere between 1976 and 1980 
political liberalism lost its luster, and it social consequences for subsequent decades were 
tremendous. From the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 to George Bush in 1988, 
William Jefferson Clinton in 1992, and to George W. Bush in 2000, conservative 
ideology has reigned in American politics.  
 One writer, H.W. Brands, tells a story of the rise and fall of liberalism in the last 
half of the 20th century. In his book, The Strange Death of American Liberalism, Brands 
speaks to the current state of liberalism and its death: 
 The unsolved of American politics is: Who killed liberalism? The decease is 
undeniable (even if, like the death of Elvis, it is occasionally denied). During 
the 1960’s, liberalism permeated American political life; it was in the very 
air, supplying the optimism and energy that allowed Lyndon Johnson and the 
Great Society Congress to declare war on poverty and inequality and believe 
they could affect the historic foes of human happiness. But by the mid-1970’s 
the liberal dream had died and by the early 1980’s “liberal” had become an 
almost actionable epithet. Subsequent sightings of liberalism’s ghost were 
occasionally mistaken for the real thing, but after a feckless attempt by the 
Clinton Administration to refashion national health care, even the ghost was 
rarely seen. 1  
  
On one level, the strange death of liberalism can be understood as a result of a 
conservative revolution, which began in the mid to late 1970s. However, it may also be 
understood in terms of the effectiveness of conservatives at persuading large numbers of 
                                                 
1 H.W. Brands, The Strange Death of American Liberalism (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2001), vii.  
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Americans that “Big Government” is not good for American society. Conservatism reigns 
not simply because its ideology drew people to the polls. It reigns because conservative 
ideologues out-muscled political liberals in terms of organization, commitment, finance 
and political strategy. Overall, the success of conservatism cannot be reduced to politics. 
It is a matter of conservatives utilizing more than political tools in influencing large 
numbers of people. Whereas liberals of the 1960s, and 1970s relied primarily upon 
political representation to garner popular support and implement massive social reforms, 
conservatives used a multiplicity of tools, namely, mass media, religion and overall 
culture. In other words, they exerted influence upon Americans by not just appealing to 
Capitol Hill and who should hold public office. Rather, conservatives appealed to cultural 
issues such as, child rearing, sex and violence in the media, and moral issues that touch 
large numbers of people regardless of political persuasion. Furthermore, conservatives 
embraced religion, particularly Christianity, as a source of value. In doing so, they 
appealed to the popular religiosity of the American public. Culture, not politics, made 
their success inevitable. 
 Another writer, Sara Diamond, has written extensively on conservatism, 
especially in its evangelical form, and its impact on American politics and culture. In two 
significant studies, Roads to Dominion: Right Wing Movements and Political Power In 
the United States and Not By Politics Alone: The Enduring Influence of the Christian 
Right (1998), Diamonds attests to monstrous influence of the conservative right. She 
argues that the success of the right is derived their ability to influence people through 
cultural politics not simply representational politics. The conservative appeal to culture, 
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especially as it is connected with religious and traditional values, accounts for why 
liberalism has been eclipsed. On the enduring influence of the right, Diamond asserts:  
Its successful mobilization has been decades in the making, has been the 
result of astute planning by movement leaders and the commitment of tens of 
thousands of adherents, who draw strength largely from sources outside the 
formal halls of power. The Christian Right remains the most powerful, active 
forces in U.S. politics today. Partly because the movement delivers votes to 
the Republican Party. But the Christian right is much more than an electoral 
faction. . . . It is a political movement rooted in evangelical subculture, one 
that offer participants both the means and motivation to try to take dominion 
over secular society. 2 
 
The death of liberalism’s influence in American politics and culture is a tragedy. 
It is the result of the combined forces of political and cultural conservatism. The ideals of 
social democracy and tolerance and the practical effects of political liberalism: social 
legislation for the poor and disadvantaged are not held in high esteem, particularly by the 
rulers and decision makers in our society. The death of liberalism has resulted in a great 
chasm between the powerful and powerless, those who live in relative comfort and excess 
and those who struggle materially (economically) to survive. The dream of the Great 
Society has proven to be just that, a dream. Herein lies the tragedy of liberalism’s death; 
it is a dream deferred.         
 
The Limits of Radicalism in the 21st Century 
Connected to the limits of political liberalism in the early 21st are the limits of 
radical politics. Reinhold Niebuhr’s reflections on Marx are vital to a discussion 
regarding the limits of radicalism in the early 21st century. Integral to this discussion are 
the utopian and perfectionistic tendencies of radicalism, tendencies that lead to a political 
                                                 
2 Sara Diamond, Not By Politics Alone: The Enduring Influence of the Christian Right (New York and 
London: The Guilford Press, 1998), 1. 
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and economic absolutism with regard to social arrangements. As a result, democratic 
political discourse on how best to improve our society is thwarted. In my estimation, 
utopianism and perfectionism are not only the limits of radicalism; they also represent its 
dangers. Further, there are additional dangers of radicalism that I reserved for this 
chapter, dangers that I will address at some length. These dangers prevent democratic 
political discourse and coalition building and are characteristic of theologies of liberation 
and radical feminism. They involve fanaticism and what I call the romanticization of the 
oppressed. For the purposes of this discussion, I will revisit Niebuhr’s reflections on 
radicalism, coupled with three contemporary writers, who also seek more democracy in 
political discourse, and discuss their relevance for political and theological discourse 
today.  
 
The Dangers of Radical Politics 
As Niebuhr points out, the utopian and perfectionistic impulse of Marx called for 
radical social change. In this regard, he understood the Marxist vision as a form of 
radicalism. Again, the goal of the Marxist vision and radicalism, for that matter, is the 
total transformation of the dominant order. Niebuhr conceded the noble aims of 
radicalism. However, he did warn of its dangers, dangers which resulted in fanatical 
practices that were undemocratic.  
Radicalism as a method of observation brushes the moral pretensions and 
cultural elaborations of a given civilization aside to discover what kind of 
power-relations is to be found at the foundation of the social structure. 
Radicalism as a method of action seek to level centres of power in the interest 
of justice. The radical is therefore necessary in every society but he is 
particularly needed in an era in which old forms are disintegrating and the 
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new ones are emerging. Yet the radical cannot built or preserve a society 
unaided.3 
 
Niebuhr concedes that radicalism has a place in a society which is undergoing 
tremendous social change. In many respects it assists social change under the appropriate 
condition. In this regard, one thinks of the social movements of the 1960’s and how the 
presence of black radicals, the Black Panther Party, and women radicals, the National 
Organization of Women, contributed to the dawn of a new era. They were aided by a 
climate of progressive social change which swept not only the United States, but also the 
third world. 
 Though radicalism does have a place when the conditions are right, radicals 
cannot go it alone. Niebuhr suggests that despite their noble aims, radicals cannot 
implement transformation without the aid of others, namely, the dominant class. He 
maintains that one of the dangers of radicalism is the assumption that social 
transformation can occur without the aid of dominant classes. Those who manage the 
dominant social order are needed in its transformation. Unfortunately, radicalism is prone 
to dismissing the dominant class as allies in social transformation. At worst, members of 
the dominant class are cast as foes that need to be eliminated along with the dominant 
order. In this regard, radicals lack what Niebuhr calls a “Liberal Spirit in Morals.”  
                                                 
3 Ibid., 252; idem, Reflections on the End of an Era . 
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Radicalism is so intent upon bringing the covert conflicts in society into the 
open and upon discounting the ethical pretensions of power-politics that its 
eye is not accustomed to recognize and to appreciate the elements of mutual 
accord which actually develop in every social in every social situation. If the 
liberal spirit is beset by the sin of hypocrisy because it inclines to provide 
moral refinements for essential unmoral relations, the besetting sin of a 
consistent radicalism is cruelty, because it fails to appreciate the motives of 
honest sympathy and justice which manifest themselves in any society. The 
pure radical has difficulty in coming to terms with his foe short of the foes 
annihilation and in organizing a society by other than tyrannical means.4  
 
Radicalism can lend itself to social practices that are not democratic. By casting members 
of the dominant class as foes it runs the risk of loosing potential allies. Consequently, 
pure radicalism not only prevents alliances with members of the dominant class, it also 
alienates and marginalizes the radical, thus rendering their aims immobile. Again 
Niebuhr asserts,   
No old system is supplanted purely by a conflict of interest between the 
privileged and the disinherited. The influence of the relatively disinherited, 
who view the struggle in rational and moral terms, is always considerable. No 
proletarian movement has yet existed that did not receive invaluable aid from 
middle-class intellectuals. The Negroes did not receive their emancipation 
nor will they be able to gain further extensions of rights in our society 
without the aid of white men of sensitive conscience. The struggle for the full 
political and social emancipation of women was a contest of power in which 
the new economic weapons which an industrial civilization placed into the 
hands of women were probably decisive factors. The struggle was 
nevertheless not purely a contest of power. The women had the support of 
many men who had become convinced of the justice of the feminist cause.5    
 
These reflections, written more than three decades before the civil rights and 
women’s movements, speak volumes about the dangers of a radicalism that does not 
posses a liberal spirit in morals. Negroes and women who seek to go it alone in changing 
the social order run the risk of not changing anything at all. The cause of the disinherited 
is only aided through the assistance of the privileged. In the end, the danger of radicalism 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 252. 
5 Ibid., 253. 
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is an “us” versus “them” approach to social transformation. The “us” is the disinherited, 
the oppressed or in Marxist doctrine the proletarian class. The “us” is the focus of the 
radicals vision and advocacy, and the prime agent responsible for carrying out social 
transformation. The “them” refers to the oppressor, the status quo, members of the 
establishment or the system. In Marxist doctrine “them” refers to the owners of 
production, the capitalists. In the end, for the Marx informed radical the relationship 
between the oppressed and oppressor and their relationship is one of alienation. It is this 
alienation that Niebuhr challenges. Tragically, Marxist thought encourages this 
alienation.  Niebuhr questions this alienated relationship in criticizing what he calls the 
exaltation of the proletariat in Marxist doctrine. 
 
Romanticizing the Oppressed 
An important feature of Marxist thought is the role of the proletariat or oppressed 
in bringing about a new social order. In bringing about this new social order the 
oppressed are viewed as moral agents who because of their social status, possess the 
virtue and perspective necessary for social transformation. Niebuhr criticizes the 
exaltation of the proletariat or the oppressed in Marxist doctrine. In his criticisms he 
points to the dangers of ascribing moral superiority and infallibility to the values and 
perspectives of the economically and politically disenfranchised –the oppressed. In his 
reading of Marx he contends that the oppressed are exalted because they have an 
undistorted view of the problems of society and thus have greater revolutionary potential 
than the dominant classes in transforming it. Hence, the oppressed or proletariat become 
the elect in bringing about a new social order. Niebuhr contends that this outlook is 
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illusory because it imposes a messianic burden upon the oppressed and it assumes that the 
oppressed are not vulnerable to the kinds of corruption found among dominant classes. 
Further, exalting the oppressed inadvertently encourages collective egoism and the will to 
power among the oppressed, which for Niebuhr can have destructive consequences. In 
speaking of the messianism and egoism extolled by the primacy of the oppressed in Marx 
and the logic behind it Niebuhr asserts the following:    
It is not difficult for the moralist to detect immoral elements in the Marxian 
exaltation of class. It is charged with both vindictiveness and egoism. The 
egoism is the more pronounced for being a compensation of frustrated ego in 
the contemporary situation. The class which has its human meaning and 
significance destroyed in the immediate situation, declares itself the most 
significant class for the future of history. While this may lead to a deification 
of the class, reaching absurd mystical proportions, it is on the subjective side 
an understandable reaction to present inferiority, and, objectively considered, 
it may be justified by the strategic importance of the proletarian class in the 
task of rebuilding society. Who is better able to understand the true character 
of a civilization than those who suffer most from its limitations? Who is 
better able to state the social ideal in unqualified terms than those who have 
experienced the bankruptcy of old social realities in their own lives? Who 
will have more creative vigor in destroying the old and building the new than 
those whose lives hunger, vengeance and holy dreams have compounded a 
tempestuous passion. 6  
 
For Niebuhr, there is a danger in exalting the oppressed. This danger exists on 
three levels. First, exalting the oppressed denies that the oppressed are fallible and 
vulnerable to corruption, and assumes that the new social order, ushered in by the 
oppressed, will not replicate the abuses of the old order or implement new abuses within 
the new order. Second, in ushering a new social order through radically transformation, 
the oppressed run the risk of not preserving anything of value from the old order. It is less 
than likely that a messianic proletarian class, in its desperation to create in a new order, 
will be concerned with preserving anything from the old. Finally, there are the 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 156; idem, Moral Man and Immoral Society 
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consequences of collective egoism and the will to power among the oppressed. Such 
consequences involve political and economic loyalties and commitments among the 
oppressed that do no go beyond their class. In this manner, the oppressed duplicate the 
abuses of dominant order. Essentially, the exaltation of the oppressed is illusory. In 
Niebuhr’s word’s,  
The question which confronts society is, how it can eliminate social injustice 
by methods which offer some fair opportunity of abolishing what is evil in 
our present society, without destroying what is worth preserving in it, and 
without running the risk of substituting new abuses and injustices in the place 
of those abolished. That question raises two issues which the proletarian is 
not willing to consider. From his perspective there is nothing good in modern 
society which deserves preservation. In his mood he is not inclined to worry 
about the future. Like all desperate men he can afford to be romantic about 
it.7                           
 
Exalting the status of the oppressed is tantamount to making the oppressed a 
totality, a totality with possibility of tyranny and corruption. Niebuhr warns that 
romanticizing the oppressed only conceals their limitations. In other words, the oppressed 
are just as fallible and prone to error and hegemony as the dominant classes. Moreover, 
what makes this doctrine problematic is that it denigrates the dominant classes or 
oppressor and it renders them impotent in being a potential ally. To ascribe moral 
superiority and infallibility to the oppressed deems the dominant classes as inferior to the 
oppressed. It denies the fact that the oppressed and the dominant classes are dependent 
upon each other and prevents alliances and communication between the two. Such 
alliances and communication could aid the cause of the oppressed while simultaneously 
minimizing the potential for corruption and tyranny among the oppressed.   
The dangers of romanticizing the oppressed, that Niebuhr cites in reference to 
Marxist thought, are evident in North American theologies of liberation. In contemporary 
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terms, the romanticization of the oppressed in Marxist doctrine is equivalent to the 
exaltation of blacks in black liberation theology, that of women in feminist and 
womanist, theologies, and the poor in all. The romanticization of these groups is the 
equivalent of the moral superiority and infallibility ascribed to the oppressed in Marxist 
doctrine. The denial of possible tyranny and corruption among the oppressed are 
concealed. The consequence is the totalization of the status of the blacks, women and the 
poor, with the dominant classes being deemed inferior. Concretely, this means that 
political activity and discussions surrounding race, gender and class become one- 
dimensional. Hence, whites have nothing to contribute to political activity and 
discussions regarding race and racism, men nave nothing to contribute to political activity 
and discussions involving gender and sexism, and the rich and powerful have nothing to 
contribute to political activity and conversations surrounding class and poverty.  
Perhaps the greatest limitation of romanticizing the oppressed is the potential of 
the oppressed for failing to distinguish genuine allies from rivals. Consequently, blacks 
are left without alliances with whites, women without alliances with men and it leaves the 
poor without alliances with the rich and powerful. In the end, the totalization of the 
oppressed only hurts and does the oppressed a disservice. It places a gargantuan 
responsibility on the shoulders of the oppressed to escape oppression. It tempts the 
oppressed to go it alone and take on a system without the help of dominant classes. It 
tempts the oppressed to go it alone when, in actuality, it needs allies from and among the 
dominant classes.   
Consider black liberation theology, as a case for thinking about the 
romanticization of the oppressed. Beyond its radical demands, a consistent feature of 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Ibid., 168. 
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James H. Cone’s perspective is the primacy of the black oppressed as agents of black 
liberation. By virtue of their social status blacks have higher moral potential and insight 
than whites in undertaking black liberation. By virtue of their privileged status whites 
have lower moral potential and little to contribute (beyond money) to the cause of black 
liberation. In Cone’s perspective, alliances between blacks and whites are not given 
thorough treatment and the idea that the black oppressed are morally fallible is concealed. 
In the end, it places an unfair and unrealistic messianism or moral responsibility on the 
shoulders of African Americans, while at the same time contributing to the ongoing 
polarization of African Americans and whites in American society.   
 
Further Criticisms of Radicalism in Contemporary Political Thought  
Niebuhr’s criticisms of Marx, particularly its utopianism and romancing of the 
oppressed, holds true for Marx inspired radicals today. In American political and cultural 
life today, the anti-capitalism and pro-proletarian impulse of the legacy of Karl Marx 
exerts little if any influence upon the power-holders and decision-makers of our society. 
What’s more, the forms of radicalism informed by Marx’s legacy, such as communism, 
socialism, various kinds of nationalism and radical feminism, have been eclipsed by the 
very economic forces which Marx eschewed. The children of Marx’s legacy, particularly 
those on the cultural and political left, who invoke Marx’s name or categories from his 
thought, are hard pressed to find popular support for their Marxian loyalties. This is 
especially true for the champions of the oppressed in American society, i.e. black 
Marxists, liberationists, radical feminists and others.         
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 Richard Rorty speaks to the eclipse of radicalism in an essay that is concerned 
with the plight of the cultural and political left in the 20th century. In his book, Achieving 
Our Country, Marxism in the West is indicted in the following passage: 
At the end of the twentieth century, Marxism is the position of Roman 
Catholicism at the end of the seventeenth. By then the full horror of the 
Renaissance papacies and of the Inquisition had been made known. Many 
Christians thought that it would be best for the bishops of Rome to close up 
shop. Christianity, they pointed out, had long antedated the papacy, and 
would be much better off for its demise.8    
 
Rorty’s comments on the fate of Marxism are not that of a faithful loyalist who laments 
that the savior has not arrived, but one who sees the limitations of Marxism, especially its 
abuses, and parallels its fate to that of Catholicism on the eve of the Enlightenment. In 
this regard, Rorty proposes a repudiation of Marxian loyalties, particularly among the 
cultural and political left, who turn to Marx for inspiration. In another passage, he 
suggests that Marx’s legacy is limited and should not determine the course of the 
American left, neither should the story of the left should be told by and through a Marxist 
lens.  
For us Americans, it is important not to let Marxism influence the story we 
tell about our own left. We should repudiate the Marxist insinuation that only 
those who are convinced the capitalism must be overthrown can count as 
leftists, and everybody else is a wimpy liberal, a self-deceiving bourgeois 
reformer….I think that we should abandon the leftist- versus- liberal 
distinction, along with other residues of Marxism that clutter up our 
vocabulary-overworked words like “commodification” and “ideology,” for 
example. 9 
  
Rorty’s reflections point to the limits of Marx’s legacy. Such limits are reflected 
in the undemocratic tendencies of Marxism that led to repression in many regions of the 
world, Europe, the Soviet Union and Africa. Its limits are also reflected in its impotent 
                                                 
8 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 41. 
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history in the U.S.  Rorty derides the monopoly Marxists have had on leftist thought in 
America, that its anti-capitalism and pro-proletarian impulse defines the true spirit of 
justice. Those who are not so moved by such an impulse cannot be considered genuine 
leftists. Such sentiments in his view are undemocratic and polarizing. Hence, he calls for 
a democratization of leftist thought. Such democratization leads to the relinquishing of 
Marx’s stranglehold on leftist or progressive thought. Such democratization extends to 
left-wing beneficiaries of Marx’s legacy. One beneficiary already mentioned is black 
liberation theology. Another such beneficiary is radical feminism. 
 Earlier I discussed the dangers of romanticizing the oppressed. This discussion 
dealt primarily with liberation theologies, particularly black liberation theology, where 
dominant and powerless classes are forever alienated from one another due to the 
romanticization of the oppressed. However, another issue is connected to this discussion. 
This has to do with the alienation and abuse that occurs between and among victims of 
oppression, especially when members of oppressed groups refuse to romanticize 
oppression. In other words, what does it mean when the oppressed oppress each other? 
Radical feminism is one arena where this question may be raised.  
The dangers of radicalism, which concerned Niebuhr and worries Rorty, are also 
evident in radical feminist thought. The Marxian vocabulary of exploitation, oppression, 
commodification and ideology are a part of the radical feminist lexicon. As Rorty 
suggests, such vocabulary has been overworked and even abused. One writer who points 
to the dangers of romanticizing oppression, especially where women are concerned is 
Jean Bethke Elshtain. In Elshtain’s work, romanticizing the oppressed results in 
repression. Elshtian maintains that radical feminism is repressive in its demands for 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Ibid., 41-42. 
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absolute solidarity and conformity, by way of thought and political practice among 
women. She maintains that it is repressive because it does not allow for difference nor 
substantive debate among women. In Elshtain’s estimation, radical feminism only allows 
a singular approach and perspective towards the lives of women. Furthermore, it distorts 
the concrete social realities that women face. In calling for women’s liberation, Elshtain 
suggests that radical feminism contributes more to the oppression of women than to their 
freedom. In an essay treating the repressive quality of radical feminism, Elshtain asserts 
the following:  
I have characterized as repressive the major statements of that wing of 
feminism which terms itself “radical.” I use the term advisedly. It is not 
deployed in a loose and pejorative sense but as a careful depiction and 
evaluation of a version of liberation that, as it is internalized by individual 
women, requires that they deny whole dimensions of their lives and 
experience. These denials are then buttressed and kept in place by incessant 
and intrusive demands for solidarity by the constant reiteration of doctrinal 
truths. Ultimately, the denial is itself denied and placed, as a burden, a 
judgement, and an accusation, upon others with the implicit aim of silencing 
them.10      
      
Elsthain writes not as one who belittles nor disregards the real suffering of women. 
Rather, she writes as an empathizer who has serious concerns regarding how the suffering 
of women is articulated, advocated, and contested. In another passage she maintains the 
following: 
I do not question the genuine problems and suffering found by women within 
this-or any other-society. But I do question the level at which radical feminist 
arguments are couched; insultingly simpleminded; replete with contempt for 
rigorous, systematic thought; insistent upon naïve and dangerous rejection of 
the need for tentativeness, deliberation and criticism in both politics and the 
arts that cannot be expected to turn on a simple set of truths. Radical 
feminism becomes the paradigmatic instance of repressive feminism in the 
                                                 
10 Jean Bethke Elsthain, Real Politics: At the Center of Everyday Life  (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1997), 174. 
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degree of self- repudiation and denial it demands and in the muddled and 
ultimately numbing coherence of those analyses it fears. 11 
 
 For the most part, Elshtain views radical feminism as one-dimensional. It is a one- 
dimensionality, which regards all men as unredeemable oppressors and all women as 
oppressed. It prevents men from being genuine allies of women in their search for more 
freedom and treats women as perpetual victims. Like the proletariat in Marxist thought, 
women as a class are viewed in messianic terms responsible for their liberation. It has a 
quality of fanaticism which Niebuhr wrote about when dealing with radical Marxism. 
And as Rorty suggests, it has led to repression, giving leftist thought a bad name.  
 Romancing the oppressed in black liberation theology and radical feminism is one 
reason for the eclipse of progressive politics in the last twenty years. There is a sense in 
which the success of conservatism at the end of the twentieth century has been aided by 
the abuses of progressives. The polarizing tendencies of radicalism: the polarities of 
black and white, rich and poor, male and female, coupled with absolutist perspectives, 
have facilitated its eclipse. These polarizing characteristics of radicalism that I term “the 
romanticization of the oppressed,” is what Richard J. Ellis has called, “The Darkside of 
the Left.” Ellis suggests that the polarizing tendencies of radicalism betray the best of the 
liberal progressive tradition. Like Elsthtain, Ellis turns to radical feminism as case study 
for “Illiberal” practices among radicals. Ellis calls for a repudiation of “Illiberal” leftist 
thought and practice, radical feminism being one instance. In providing a definition of 
“Illiberalism” Ellis posits:  
By “Illiberal” I mean, as Webster’s dictionary defines it, “intolerant, bigoted, 
narrow minded,” but also I have in mind a broader collection of related 
attitudes and behaviors, including disregard for civil liberties and individual 
autonomy, an authoritarian, antipolitical  or antidemocratic ethos, Manichean 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 174. 
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view of the world as a battleground between absolute good and absolute evil, 
demonization of the enemy or moral absolutism, a conspiratorial, apocalyptic 
or millenial outlook, and glorification of violence.12  
  
“Illiberalism” betrays the liberal progressive tradition. Unfortunately, Marxist 
thought and its radical offshoots such as radical feminism are guilty of committing the sin 
of “Illiberalism.” Again, radical feminism is not the only branch of leftist thought which 
guilty of this sin. African American radicals: black Marxists and black liberation 
theologies and womanist and feminist liberation theologies are implicated also. These 
instances of radical discourse have repressive and “Illiberal” tendencies. The 
“Illiberalism” of these branches of thought place limits on genuine conversation and 
debate and prevent coalition building around substantive issues, namely, those 
surrounding gender, race and class, overall progressive social transformation. Such 
“Illiberalism” and its consequences is a tragedy. 
Overall, I am convinced that democratic political discourse is necessary if 
progressive social change is to occur in America. I will concede the value of radical 
politics under certain conditions, like a totalitarian government. However, I do not think 
it has value today’s political climate. The dominance and persistence of political 
conservatism is testament to its limitations. What I call for is more democratic political 
discourse surrounding the substantive issues of our age. Not only is democratic political 
discourse needed, but democratic theological discourse and practical ethical strategies are 
needed also. The legacy of Benjamin Elijah Mays is instructive in this regard.      
 
 
                                                 
12 Richard J. Ellis, The Darkside of the Left: Illiberal Egalitarianism in America (Lawrence, Kansas: The 
University of Kansas Press, 1998), xi.   
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Democratic Theological Discourse and the Expansion of Democracy in a 
Conservative Age  
 
The pursuit of more democracy is not only aided by democratic political 
discourse; it is also aided by democratic theological discourse, and by the pursuit of 
achievable social goals. The legacy of Benjamin Elijah Mays is instructive along these 
lines, especially where theology and education are concerned. The value of democratic 
theological discourse and the pursuit of an achievable goal, such as the education of 
African Americans, are instructive for political theology today. At the level of theology, 
Mays appealed to a democratic understanding of the image of God, in connection to the 
inherent worth and potential of human beings. This view affirmed the inherent worth and 
equality of all human beings. In this regard, no individual, social class, race or social 
group is precluded from contributing to the flourishing of the world. This includes 
American Negroes, the rich and powerful, the disenfranchised of society, persons from 
different cultural backgrounds, women, etc. Throughout his lifetime, Mays employed this 
theological concept to de-center white supremacy and the idea of Negro inferiority. For 
the American Negro was precluded from contributing to American civilization. Given 
Mays’s democratic conception of the image of God, What would it mean to employ 
democratic theological discourse in such terms today? 
One way to improve theological discourse, particularly at the level of political 
theology is to move away from theological discourse that privileges any particular social 
group, race, class or gender, In my estimation, theological discourse that privileges the 
powerful and wealthy of society, whites, African Americans, women, the economically 
disenfranchised does more harm than good. Again, I must refer the earlier discussion 
surrounding black liberation theology and the dilemmas that arise from romanticizing the 
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social status and experience of the oppressed. Such privileging denies the moral fallibility 
of the oppressed and opens the door to all manner of abuse by the oppressed. What holds 
true for black liberation theology, theologies of liberation and the American left, for that 
matter, is also true for political conservatism. In my reading of political conservatism in 
the United States, there is an overt privileging of the affluent and powerful in American 
society. The conservative focus on individualism, competition and merit is an idolization 
of the privileged classes in America. With such a focus, especially where merit is 
concerned, political conservatives are committing the same errors as their liberal and left-
wing opponents. In their obsession with merit, political conservatives deny the morally 
fallibility of those who have privilege, power and prestige. Consider, for example, the 
financial scandals in the corporate world involving the ENRON corporation and 
corporate powerhouse Martha Stewart. Also, consider the endless speculations 
surrounding election fraud in Florida and the presidency of George W. Bush in 2000.  
Due to these considerations, I contend that theological discourse should move away from 
privileging any social group, class, race or gender. More democracy is needed in 
theological discourse today and the theological outlook of Benjamin Elijah Mays is a 
resource in this regard.  
In terms of social ethics, Mays viewed education as one arena where social 
progress is possible. Interestingly, he did not view education as the means of resolving all 
the social dilemmas that plague the disenfranchised, particularly the disenfranchised 
American Negro of his era. Rather, education was one means of improving the social lot 
of the American Negro. My contention is that education is a valuable arena for pursuing 
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social progress today. For a moment, I will discuss the possibilities of education in 
relation to the affirmative action debate.    
One of the limitations of the affirmative action debate is that it tends to focus 
solely on minority admission into four- year institutions of higher education. It is easy to 
walk away from arguments for or against affirmative action, with the impression that the 
education of minorities is solely determined by these institutions. Unfortunately, two year 
colleges, as possible sites for minority educational advancement, are seldom factored into 
the discussion. Just consider the conservative argument against affirmative action that 
focuses on the performance of minorities on standardized tests such as the SAT. This 
argument, citing low test scores and even poor academic achievement among minorities, 
is perhaps the strongest case against affirmative action. If one concedes to this argument, 
does this mean that the educational pursuits of minorities are permanently thwarted? Is it 
possible that there are colleges in the United States that better serve the needs of minority 
students, particularly students that do not perform well on standardized tests and are even 
ill prepared for college? Is it possible to transcend the affirmative action debate and at the 
same commend formal education for minorities, especially minorities that do not perform 
well on standardized test and are even ill prepared for higher education? For this writer, 
there are colleges that better serve such students. One system of higher education that 
works in this vein is the junior or community college system.  
One way to transcend the dilemmas of the affirmative action debate and at the 
same time promote social progress by means of education is to promo te junior or 
community college education. In the United States there exists a system of junior and 
community colleges that serve students that either lack the financial resources necessary 
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for a four-year college or university or are sufficiently insufficiently prepared, 
academically, to compete at such schools. Typically, the financially challenged student is 
also academically ill prepared. However, it is the ill prepared student that I am principally 
concerned with. Unlike elite institutions of higher education where the issue of 
affirmative action is endlessly contested, junior and community colleges provide ill 
prepared students with the necessary resources, context and leverage required for further 
education advancement. In my estimation, the junior college system in America is 
democracy in practice. It makes social mobility possible through providing educational 
opportunities to persons who otherwise could not afford them.  
In a recent issue of Black Issues in Higher Education, a series of articles were 
devoted to community colleges, African Americans and higher education. 13 They were 
written in light of a recent Supreme Court ruling that favored affirmative action at the 
University of Michigan. The articles were proactive in responding to the high court’s 
positive ruling. The articles acknowledged that the affirmative action debate is far from 
over and pointed to junior colleges as an overlooked and undervalued resources where 
African Americans and higher education are concerned. 
 By highlighting educational statistics from the Department of Education and 
interviewing community college administrators, the articles suggest that junior colleges 
are a vital means of preparing minorities for bachelor degrees while at the same time 
transcending the affirmative action issue. According to the research, junior colleges 
enroll the highest percentage of degree seeking African American in higher education. In 
2000, of all degrees conferred to African Americans, 28% came from community 
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colleges. Associate degrees which were secondary to bachelor degrees, constituted 50.3 
% of all degrees conferred to African Americans. Master’s, professional and doctoral 
degrees represented 17.3, 2.4 and .9% respectively of all degrees conferred to African 
Americans.  
One junior college highlighted in the articles was Miami Dade College in Miami, 
Florida. Miami Dade College is the largest junior college in the United States with 
160,000 students. It leads the nation is producing minorities with associate degrees. It is 
also the school where this writer earned an associate degree. Miami Dade is a feeder 
school for public and private colleges and universities across the state of Florida. Schools 
such as Florida International University, University of Central Florida, Florida Memorial 
College, Florida A&M University and Florida State University, to name several, are sites 
for further educational advancement of graduates of Miami Dade. To be sure, schools 
outside of the state of Florida are also targets for graduates of Miami Dade.  For non -
traditional students, especially the academically ill prepared minority students, Miami 
Dade is a port of entry of higher education. For the ill prepared minority student the two-
year junior college is a viable starting point for obtaining a higher education.  
In my estimation, it is less than likely that the affirmative action debate, in 
relation to undergraduate education, will go away. As long as an objective measure such 
as the SAT is used to question the ability and potential of minority students, and as long 
as minority students fall below such measures, the affirmative action debate will 
continue. In fact, the elimination of the practice, in the distant future, is not 
inconceivable. In light of such prospects, there remains the ongoing challenge of 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 See “Community Colleges: A Port of Entry,” in Black Issues in Higher Education, 28 August 2003, 
volume 14. Two insightful articles in this series are “An Overlooked Oasis?” by Kendra Hamilton, and 
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preparing minority students for college. The junior or community college is an 
undervalued and underexposed resource that is a proactive means of serving students that 
are ill prepared for four year institutions.  
    Overall, I acknowledge that greater effort has to be made in preparing minority 
students for higher education and that there is a link between higher education and social 
mobility. I further acknowledge that education alone will not resolve the dilemmas 
wrought out of the injustices of history. Connected to this limitation of education, is the 
fact that the route of education is not desired or pursued by all. Notwithstanding the said 
limitations, education remains viable arena for social progress in a conservative age.  
               
Conclusion 
In a conservative age, progressive efforts toward social transformation are 
challenged to be creative and self-correcting. There is a sense in which the dominance of 
conservative ideology is due in part to the imaginative and organizational efforts, of 
conservatives. Through the use of think tanks, media outlets, and organized religion, 
conservatives have eclipsed the public influence of liberals and radicals. Again, such 
influence is not the result of politics alone. Although politics is a major arena of 
conservative domination such dominance is not the result of politics alone. This insight 
should not be lost on progressives.  
The concerns of this dissertation lead me to label early 21st century America an 
age of conservatism. This dissertation has dealt primarily with political conservatism and 
its implications for political theology and progressive politics. However, there are forms 
of conservatism beyond politics, such as cultural and intellectual conservatism, that are 
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also deserving of ethical and theological reflection. Political conservatism is a starting 
point for discussing the future of progressive social change in contemporary America. 
And I am eager for others to join me in this conversation.          
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